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JOINT COMMITTEE ON TORT LIABILITY
San Diego State Building
July 18, 1977
(Products Liability Public Hearing)

CHAIRMAN JOHN KNOX:

will come to order, please.
promptly.

(See Appendix I)

If the meeting

I think we'll start the hearing

We have a number of witnesses to hear today, and we

want to give everyone a chance to explain their point of view
respond to questions from the Committee.

This is a regular

nd
called

hearing by the Joint Committee on Tort Liability of the California
Legislature.

Today's hearing is on the subject of products

liability and is the second in a series of three hearings we're
having during this month of July on various aspects of tort
problems in California.
In Los Angeles on July 11 we heard testimony on professional liability and on July 22 we'll be in San Francisco, and
that's this Friday, to hear testimony on insurance company underwriting practices.
The particular problem we're considering today is this:
California manufacturers and consumers have in recent years been

I

confronted by a crisis of potentially disastrous dimensions.

In

1974, which is the latest year for which we have statistics,
products liability losses and loss related expenses totaled almost
$200 million nationwide, and if current actuarial studies are

correct, this figure may now be approaching a billion dollars.
While the breakdown is not precisely known for California, it is
clear that as in medical malpractice and other liability areas,
that California's share accounts for the largest portion.

1

It is

also clear that most insured manufacturers in California have had
premium increases ranging from 100% to 5,000%.
We are told that the cost of products liability insurance
in many instances may exceed 20% of the manufacturer's sales receipts
for essential products like medical supplies and packaged food items.
For simple household products such as chairs and ladders, this
cost may be as much as 40% of the receipts.

These charges are

eventually reflected in higher retail prices, and as a result an
added burden is placed on the consumer's pocketbook in an era of
chronically high inflation.
Small and medium sized manufacturers lacking the bargaining and economic power of the corporate giants in many cases have
been forced to go without coverage or funded self-insurance programs.
Still more serious are the reports our Committee has received that
several manufacturers have ceased production altogether.

Quite

obviously, if this denotes a trend, we're on the verge of a
calamitous situation for California business.
We are presented with a dilemma.

On the one hand, if we

do nothing, the result could well be economically catastrophic, but
on the other hand,presently proposed legislation may only immunize
manufacturers from suits, leaving large classes of injured parties
without remedies and without manufacturers receiving a meaningful
reduction in premiums.
Accordingly, the purpose of today's hearing is to consider
the causes of and possible solutions to the problem facing manufacturers while also assuring victims of faulty products that
they will be fully compensated for the injuries they suffer.

2

Our witnesses today include distinguished scholars and
representatives of manufacturers,
legal profession.

insurance underwriters, and the

Testimony will form a basis for interim recom-

mendations we intend to make for legislation before the next
session of the California Legislature.

We are aware that the

blame for the present situation has been laid on all sides.
Responsibility has been fixed upon a myopic judiciary -- I d

't

write that, may the record show -- avaricious insurers and

•

and careless manufacturers.

rs,

The problem is indeed complex, and

we only ask that the witness give primary consideration to the
recommendations to the public's interest, even though this may
not always coincide with their immediate economic interests.

We

are primarily interested in suggested solutions to the problem.
I think the Committee, as I indicated at the hearing we had earlier
in the month,

is pretty well convinced there is a problem, and

while we'll be glad to listen to your horror story-- we've heard
an awful lot of them-- what we're interested in now is in
proposals for legislation that may be of assistance in solving
the problem.
Our first witnesses this morning are from the American
Mutual Insurance Alliance, Mr. D. K. Holliday, Vice President of
Sentry Insurance, and Thomas Conneely, Regional Vice President
and Counsel of the Insurance Alliance.

Gentlemen.

While you're coming up I should introduce my colleagues.
On my far right is Senator Newton Russell of Los Angeles county;
next to him is Mr. Fred Hiestand, one of the counsels to the
Committee; on my immediate right is Martha Gorman, also Counsel
to the Committee; on my left Joyce Faber, Committee Secretary,
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and to her left, Assemblyman Alister McAlister, Santa Clara County,
and to his left Assemblyman Floyd Mori of Alameda County.

As other

members come in during the day, we'll introduce them.
Gentlemen, if you want to proceed.
MR. TOM CONNEELY:
committee, I'm Tom Conneely.

Mr. Chairman and members of the
The association I represent has

recently changed its name and we're now known as the Alliance
of American Insurers, but the process of the change is a little
slow, so I'm basically the same organizatLon.
My sole function here this morning is to make a couple
of

ief comments and describe the Alliance and then turn the

microphone over to Mr. Holliday, who represents Sentry Insurance
Company, which is one of our member companies.
The Alliance is a trade association of over one hundred
property and casualty insurance companies.
are mutual companies.

Most of our companies

Among the services we provide to those

companies is to appear at hearings such as this and endeavor to
available to the committees, such as yours, as much information
as we can gather.

My only intention is to, at the conclusion of

all these hearings, submit something in writing and some material
that will fill whatever gaps that seem to be there from our point
of view.

I prefer not to inundate you with a lot of stuff which

will simply duplicate other things which you will receive.

I want

to make it clear that I'm available to any members of the Committee
or staff at any time to attempt to respond to questions.
I

11 simply turn it over to Mr. Holliday.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Mr. Holliday.

4

With that

MR. KEN HOLLIDAY:

Thank you,

(See Appendix II)

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.
I am Vice President, responsible for commerc

My name is Ken Holliday.
1 lines, underwrit

and loss control for Sentry Insurance, a mutual

ny.

Sentry

is a medium-sized company and we'll handle about $150 million in
commercial business this year.
My background has been primarily in underwriting for

•

almost 19 years.

I have a BBA degree, a major in insurance; I

have an LLB degree, and am a member of the Georgia Bar.
also a CPCU.

I am

I have been active for the past year and a half in

several industry committees dealing with the products liabili
problem.

At the ISO, which is the Insurance Services Office, a

rate-making and statistical organization for the industry, I
am currently serving as the Vice Chairman of the Products Liabili
Committee, which is looking into several aspects of the situation,
the major effort being a closed-claim survey which involves
something over 20,000 products claims closed by some 23 companies
during the last part of 1976 and the first quarter of 1977.

The

final report of that survey will be available sometime toward the
end of the summer.
I also serve as Vice Chairman of a subcommittee of that
committee which has done a complete review of the standard coverage,
insurance coverage that is being granted for products liability.
Some recommendation for amendments of coverage have been made and
are still in committee and they are not finalized at this point.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners last
year also appointed a task force to study the products liability
situation.

They held several hearings and were to submit a final
5

to the NAIC Executive committee in December in Phoenix.
I was appointed asa member of an advisory committee and some 15
sentatives from industry, trade associations, and so forth
nd advised that committee on its final report.

We were charged

December with developing a voluntary mechanism for the insurance
stry to deal with complaints on availability of insurance.
And that was finalized by the target date of February 15 and
to the task force and has ultimately been adopted by
the NAIC.
One of the recommendations was that each State Commissioner
an Advisory Committee locally to deal with products compla

ts on availability and work to solve them, to find markets

at were willing to write the coverage for those insureds.
nt to that, we did form such a committee in Wisconsin,
and I am currently serving as Chairman of that committee.
I have given Ms. Gorman copies of three or four documents
I

th

would be informative to this group.

The first is a

let or paper prepared by Insurance Services Office on rating
s and statistical procedures for products liability
(See Appendix III) .
rat

difficulties.

A lot of good information is there on the
Also a pamphlet prepared by the American

Mutual Insurance Alliance outlining some of the problems with the
proposed mandatory residual market mechanisms which some people
have thought would be a solution (See Appendix IV) .

And also

Sections 3 and 5 of the NAIC Advisory Committee report to the
Task Force (See Appendix V).
I understand, essentially, you would like to know someth

about how the process of underwriting goes on.
6

As the paper

from ISO points out, the rate-making methodology employed in the
past by ISO produces manual rates for a minority of the business,
that is from the standpoint of premium volume for products liability.
The majority of the premium comes from what we call A rated classes.
An A rate is simply that there has been insufficient data ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Can you speak more directly into

mike please, Mr. Holliday?

•

MR. HOLLIDAY:

Better?

Okay?

The A rated classes, again,

simply means that there is not a manual rate that is statistically
justified.

There are some broad parameters that are arrived at

through judgment largely by analogy with other classes of business.
Some of the classifications, particularly in manufacturing, are
simply those of a wide variety of products and the quality of
products within a given classification.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
in the last few years?

•

MR. HOLLIDAY:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

What's an example of an A rated product
Can you think of one?
You mean as a classification of business?
Well, you said a product is A rated --

I guess it's a new product that there is no experience on.
MR. HOLLIDAY:

Right?

Well, or that there's such a wide variety

of exposure within the product that there is no credible rate base
to break it down to the fine classification.

One good example

would be farm equipment machinery manufacturers.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. HOLLIDAY:

I see.
That classification includes anything from

a simple plat point all the way up to combines or very sophisticated
machinery.

So when you look at that and try to establish an

average rate, it obviously would be unfair to the plat point
7

manufacturer and would probably be inadequate for the more hazardous
mach
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. HOLLIDAY:

Thank you.
So those are the classifications that

are largely -- the price is largely determined by the judgment
of the underwriter involved.

I might just mention a few of the

things that he takes into consideration in determining a price.
Fir t, there is probably a departure point in the schedule of
lished A rates, or a range somewhere, an average for the class.
So you must consider characteristics of the product, which would
either
He

it more hazardous or less hazardous than the average.
his information from the producer, the agent or broker, or

alesman who gathers information from the insured about his past
losses, how many losses that he suffered, what has been the outcome
of those losses.

Products brochures, loss control engineers' reports

that he orders, he looks at management experience in that line,
considers what happens if the product does malfunction.
take an arm off or would it just simply bruise a knee?

Would it
This is

the extent of the hazard.
The question of hard goods versus soft goods and the
life of the product.

In other words, if you're talking about some

of the capital goods which have experienced quite a problem, punch
presses, the life of those products sometimes runs 40 or 50 years,
so there is a great accumulation of exposure on the market as
opposed to a cooking manufacturer where most of their products
re consumed within a short period of manufacture.
Discontinued products, and we find that is quite common
where an insured may have tried a product in the past, maybe started
8

to make a snowmobile, started for a couple of years, then discontinued it.

And we have to know how

was out, what was the

loss history on those products, and determine a price for that
exposure which still may be out in the market.
he distributes, for example.

The markets where

We were looking at a case recently

where about 75% of his product, and it was a farm equipment
manufacturer, was in canada, and the products climate is al
different there, so a substantial credit was given in his rate, due
to the fact that this product was primarily used in a country where
we don't have the growing strict liability doctrines and so forth
that we have in this country.
Labels, warnings, proper instructions, design -- whether
he handles or distributes foreign products or incorporates
components in his product.

ign

We have a problem of getting to the

manufacturer of the foreign products with our court system.
whole harness agreements that he might have signed or have signed
in his favor could be a plus or minus in his rating as it af
the exposure.

cts

There is what we call a vendor's endorsement, where

a distributor may be covered under the manufacturer's policy .

•

Of course that cuts down the exposure for the insured distributor
so there's a credit usually given for that.
programs and record keeping are important.
done and the records kept.

The quality control
The testing that is

Whether he has enough records in terms

of serial numbers, warranty registrations and so forth to undertake
a recall program in the event he determines that he has a very
unsafe product that's out.

We find quite a few of the smaller

manufacturers, particularly, that don't have that kind of record

9

available, and it would be impossible, virtually, to recall faulty

In the design you look at the quality of the product
itself.

That is, if it's an economy model versus a quality model

with good safeguards on it.

Changes in design in the past.

Perhaps

we find in our loss control survey that they are making a good safe
now but that only began two years ago.

There are still a

of products out without the safeguards, and that has to be of
concern.
Defense costs are a big item and we find that particularly
1

of the manufacturers of machinery for the work place are sued
ly and have defense costs even though they may escape paying

a

So the defense cost has to be priced into the coverage

nt.

j

cause

's a real factor in products liability.
Another thing is reinsurance availability in the cost

re

nee for the primary insurer.
t

A variety of other

s go into looking at that individual's product.

For

le, I was discussing with Tom a case we had recently with
facturers of a posthole digger, an auger type with a power
ff from a tractor.

It is almost impossible to guard that

part entirely, so we were asked to insure or look at the
manufacturer.

It so happened that we were aware of the particular

we had incurred a claim lodged against the distributor
r state on that particular auger.
la

So in going to our

person who had been handling that case, he had done an
aus

investigation and we found out that this was one of

the few that they had put out without a safety device, and as a
lt, an exposure that normally an underwriter would shy away
10

from, through the knowledge that we have gained through handling
the investigation of another insured for that product, we were
able to give him a quotation, at least.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Now you're surveying 20,000 products

claims?
MR. HOLLIDAY:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

•

surveying?

A little in excess of 20,000, yes, s
And what are you looking for when

're

What information in categories are you going to
MR. HOLLIDAY:

?

This is a rather exhaustive questionnaire

that each claims person as he closes that claim completes.

it

is designed to gather information on a variety of questions that have
been raised about products liability.
CHAI~~N

KNOX:

Who is filling out these claims, the

claims people for the insurance company?
MR. HOLLIDAY:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. HOLLIDAY:
finally for the compnay.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

•

Yes.
I see.
The claims person who closes the claim
So he is familiar with the file.
It would show the nature of the claim, the

nature of the injury, how much was paid, what the cost of

fense

was, etc.
MR. HOLLIDAY:

The theory of settlement, whether punitive

damages were alleged, and whether he felt that impacted on the final
judgment.

Some of the proposals for schedule of benefits, questions

were constructed so that those could be evaluated and priced out or
at least get some evaluation of a no-fault ....
CHAIR}ffiN KNOX:

And you're going to summarize all this and

publish it?
11

MR. HOLLIDAY:
the end of the year.

It will be published and widely distributed.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
to look at that.

I assume we'll have that summary toward

We'll look forward to having a chance

Do you know if the Insurance Commissioner has

appointed a Products Advisory Committee in California?
MR. HOLLIDAY:

I'm not sure.

The last update I had,

we had about 13 states that were either appointed or in the process
of

inting.

We have Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut,

some of the eastern states, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and
Minnesota that are in the midwest, and Kansas.

California,

I think, had expressed an interest, but the status of that
advisory committee, I'm uncertain.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Now from the standpoint of an under-

writer, if you were going to see if the law could be adjusted in
some fashion that would cause you to set a substantially lower rate
general for manufactured products, what changes in the law would
you suggest?

Generally speaking, that is.

MR. HOLLIDAY:

Yes.

As a member of the Alliance

without

getting into this in detail, we have served on several committees
there and the Alliance has published a pamphlet which does include,
and I believe Tom will leave a copy of this with you, some of the
modifications in the tort law that we favor.

In terms of whether

those modifications, were they to go into a given state this year,
would that impact on the premiums being paid by those insureds
in that state, that would be very doubtful.

Because of the way

products claims arise and in the state perhaps, and the union,
maybe even overseas, the modifications in a given state would
have

little impact on the rates.
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If those were enacted

uniformly, country-wide, they certainly would impact on the
escalation of cost, depending on when claims that were affected
by those statutes arose.
In other words,

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

it would take a while,

regardless of what we did, before it would have an impact on the
industry and thus on prices and what not.
members of the committee?

Any questions from

Senator Russell.

SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL:

Yes, I was wondering,

if

there are no changes toward liability, if things go on the same
as they are, what is your prognostication as to the ability of
the insurance industry to continue to provide product liabili
insurance coverage?
I think, by and large, we will continue

MR. HOLLIDAY:
to provide a market.

The big question that we're facing now is

the cost of providing that coverage.
buyer.

The affordability

to the

Given enough time, working with a system and given some

stability in that system, I think the pricing for the coverage
can be handled by the insurance industry.

•

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Assuming that we do not have those

stabilizing factors, do you see a continuing escalation absent
some type of legislation?
MR.HOLLIDAY:

Yes, I was working toward that.

What we

have seen in the last two or three years really is a catching up
of rate level.

We were inadequately pricing it in the past years,

with the emergence of strict liability doctrine and the theory of
entitlement that it brought the claim activity up to a level.
I'm not certain that that will continue to escalate, that is in the
pricing, as much

the next five years as it has in the past five
13

years.
s

But it

to esca

11

te

as claims and

ns of claims escalate.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
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well informed
recent history

and projection, how adequate is that
I guess I can't expect you to say
give us some kind of an idea?

formed judgment?

Of course,

not very

Are we still worki

can you
in a maze,

or do you really think you have a handle on this now, assuming
no legislative changes?
MR. HOLLIDAY:

I think the attention given to

liability ten years ago, six years ago, was slight, simply
in terms of the overall commerical lines book of business, it
accounted for a slight fraction of it.

With the emergence of what

has occurred in the last few years, this is fast becoming a major

line of insurance.

For our own company, for example, we have

increased partly through rates, and partly through taking on
additional exposures, is about ten times over what we were writ
in 1969 and 1970.

So now it has become enough of a major part of

our book of business, it's getting more education of underwriters,
loss control people.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well that being the case, why are we

told in California that a lot of -- it's harder and harder to get
insurance and product liability, not just the cost but a lot of
companies are going out of that line entirely or in California.
You say the contrary, that your company is increasing its business.
MR. HOLLIDAY:

But there are still types of business

that we are not equipped to write.

We don't have the expertise

to write aircraft products, for example, not the capacity, because
you're looking at great catastrophe type losses, and most of that
is handled through pooling arrangements.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So as far as your company is concerned

then, you have a handle on it, you know where you're going.
15

It's

increasingly a larger part of your total business which musn't
mean it's going to be a profitable part, and aside from the fact
that it may be too costly and so forth, as of now you're in control
of the situation?
MR. HOLLIDAY:

In

.markets where we feel we have the

expertise, but we are certain
with a quotation.

not able to provide every product

And that's really

Advisory Committees that I alluded to earlier.
these accounts that cannot

t

ion of the State
It is to take

insurance quotes, and put them

in the hands of some experienced and sophisticated producer-type
people and underwriting people from larger companies in the area.
They simply go to work trying to match up perhaps that agent who
doesn't have access to all the markets with the market willing to
write it.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well in the areas in which you are

expert, have there been products that you have dropped and you will
not insure even though you're expert, because of ....
MR. HOLLIDAY:

Because of individual loss history?

Certainly.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. HOLLIDAY:

For example?

There's a period --well, thinking of an

automobile jack manufacturer wh
very lax testing program.

was to consumers, and he had a

We had a lot of failures to these jacks.

If that customer won't take the necessary steps to build in quality
controls,

positive locking devices, and so forth,

then you will

find generally the companies are unwilling to insure that product
in its present form.

16

SENATOR RUSSELL:

In a specific company, is there a

general category of a product that you don't touch anymore, even
though you're an expert, because of various problems?
MR. HOLLIDAY:
have gotten out of, no.

Not any product line that we, Sentry,
But individual cases within there,

because of the variations in quality control, variations in
management expertise, of design, this sort of thing, we would

•

not write.

Or we might write one just like it from another firm .
SENATOR RUSSELL:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Any questions?

MR. FRED HIESTAND:

Mr. Hiestand.

Yes, Mr. Holliday, do you break down

or do you know if there are any statistics that show of all
different rating classifications, what percentage falls into the
large A rating and what percentage is in the composite rating,
either in terms of like gross sales of the companies, the total
premium dollars that are written by insurance companies?

What

criteria that you divide this up so that one would just have some
notion as to ....
MR. HOLLIDAY:

•

Yes, the yellow pamphlet from ISO shows

that for the latest year, which is the policy year ending in 1974
if you have that, it's shown on page 13 -- it shows that broken
down by the monoline manual rating classes.

The monoline A rated

classes and the composite rated, loss rated and large A rated
classes, which is by far the majority of the premium of the total.
MR. HIESTAND:

The large A rated class?

MR. HOLLIDAY:

Yes.

MR. HIESTAND:

And this is broken down in terms of the

premiums that are charged?
17

MR. HOLLIDAY:

Premiums

nd the incurred loss by those

categories by year.
If an

MR. HIESTAND

1 manufacturer is in a line,

you would normally

a large A class rating, but he says,

look, I've got a different

it.

been told, there was a manufacturer of
control but yet he found his

Like we've

presses that used remote

nee premiums for the operation

of these punch presses was just as h

as

was for people with

manual control punch presses7 they just wouldn't consider it.
was just a punch press.

Is there any way someone who wants to

get insurance can have the

come in and actually evaluate

that particular product and s
press, but we do it

It

, you

, look we're a punch

a different way?

MR. HOLLIDAY:
of a given company

Yes, certa

The loss control engineers

well go in and look at the problem.

that particular case it comes from
made by a purchaser in

In

modification that might be

ssing the remote control.

There have been

instances where the manufacturer, regardless of modifications made,
has been involved

suits,

whether he's held 1
MR. HIESTAND:

or not.
Well,

someone makes what is a s fe
the user may not use the

MR. HOLLIDAY:

determining -- I mean, if
ct,

you then anticipate that

as it is supposed to be used.

Therefore it could be haza
rating than it would

lved in a lot of expensive defense,

, therefore it goes into a different

if it was used as intended?
Wel , I'm simply saying that may have been

the case in the remote control

ss because we find a lot

of those are modif

market for fifteen, twenty

They are on
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years and it really isn't a guarantee that claims won't arise.
MR. HIESTAND:

Well,

I know, but it seems that with any

product, no matter how safely made, you can ant

ipate that someone

may not use it as it was intended or may take off the safety
equipment.

In determining how to rate it and what premiums ought

to be paid, do the insurance companies anticipate that the most

•

dangerous use which this product can be put will likely be put by
the least reasonable person in determining what insurance ought to
be?
MR. HOLLIDAY:
tion of some people.

Well, that may certainly be the considera-

The loss history of that manufacturer is

a governing consideration as well as the industry in total.

If

he has been manufacturing remote control or guarded punch presses
throughout the life of his firm,

then I would think certainly he

would be paying a lower rate than one who did not.

It may be that

he started this three years ago when the majority of the outstanding
exposure did not have that safety device, too.

So the rate credit

being given currently would have to be a very minor one,

•

ASSEMBLYMAN S. FLOYD MORI:

if at all.

You mentioned the problem

of having goods or products that are manufactured with foreign parts
or from foreign manufacturers.

What is the problem when you have

different state laws and goods are manufactured in a different
state and sold and used in another state?

What kind of problems

arise there?
MR. HOLLIDAY:

Normally, you can still bring in the

manufacturer into our court system here,
States.

if he's in the United

We find many cases a manufacturer might be incorporating
19

a subassembly or distributing

rts that are manufactured overseas

where there is no way to

t to them, so he stands in the shoes

of the manufacturer as

as that su t

determining what qual

s

wherewithal to make a tr

s.

difficulty of

we just don't have the

to Germany to see just how they

manufacture that product.
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI:

Even at that

picking machines that are used
Kansas, whichrns a dif

dif

Manu

, but manufactured

here in California.

?

th

rent states.

Cal forn

nt quality control state-administered

of standard than we
as soc

's say the cotton-

~-

You

Are there any

different standards in

cturing, we are told, for example,

that California has higher standards than any place else.
if products are
of problems

here and manufactured in Alabama, what kind
we have, or do we?

MR. HOLLIDAY:

Well, the rati

that is established for

t liability assumes countrywide distribution.
es

ishing rates by state's own product liability.

that whether

's manufac

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Do you

pay based on California j

r

largest common denominator,
Californ

surers of
Ca ifornia.

our current law in Californ
state.

In Iowa they've got to

ts.
One of

manufactured

So it assumes

re in the country.

nts are h

is that some

We are not

in California or in Alabama that

the suit could arise

then?

But yet,

s say
s is

things we've been hearing
won't insure products
statement made saying that

s cha ing manufacturers out of the

That doesn't fit with what
20

just said, does it?

MR. HOLLIDAY:

That has not been my experience.

No,

we make no such distinction in our company.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
very much, gentlemen.

further?

Right, anyth

Thank you

We appreciate your attendance very much.

I know that you've come from a long distance and it's very kind
of you to be with us.

Mr. Creighton White of the Fireman's Fund.

While Mr. White is coming up, I would like to introduce Senator
Robert Beverly, Vice-Chairman of the Committee from Los Angeles
County and recent visitor to Alaska.
MR. CREIGHTON WHITE:
members of the Committee.

Mr. White.

(See Appendix VI)

Chairman Knox,

My name is Creighton White.

President of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.

I am V

I have nationw

responsibility for commercial auto and liability underwriting.
The remarks I make here today are directed at underwriting
practices in the product liability area.

Of course, Mr. Holliday

touched on many of the same sort of issues that I intended to
touch upon and are contained in my statement.

Therefore, I will

skip over those things that he's already addressed.

Fireman's

Fund is the seventh largest property-liability insurance group in

•

the country and a major market in California for all types of
personal and commercial property and liability coverages.
substantial interest in the findings of this Committee.

It has
Last year

Fireman's Fund wrote an excess of $10 million of identifiable premiums for product liability coverage.

About 15% of this amount was

in California, that is, involved California sellers of goods.
policy of Fireman's Fund

regarding product liability coverage

the same as with other lines of insurance.
but only when it is adequately priced.
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The
is

We want the business,

The adequate price for

products liability insurance

S

r, become very difficult

1

to ascertain because of new doctrines and
liability system that

al scope of liabil

spawned enormous increases

u.s.

Chairman of the

stated that in Cali

800% since 1965.

s in the tort
and

and jury verdicts.

consumer

Sa

ia

ssion recently

liabili

He also affirmed

of ten $100,000 product-re

The

awards

increased

t there is now an average

ted

week in the state.

This activity has transformed the

liability line from

a miscellaneous, rather minor exposure, to a most volatile,
d ff

lt one and

a very short

r

of time.

Naturally

enough then, product liability underwriters are taking a close look
at applications for the coverage and are charging premiums
sufficient to cover the loss potential and expenses.

Following,

I listed some of the things that a product liability underwriter
will look a .
most of

I think Mr. Holliday did an excellent job describing

se and perhaps I could sk

over that in order not to

bore you too much.
CHAIIDJ!.AN KNOX:
interest
concerns?

It's one of the last things that is

What is the financial standing of the manufacturing
It's been our experience that

compelled to making cuts, safe

n bus

rams are among

sses are
first

to feel the cutback.

MR. WHITE:
to
wha

s 1

ili

That i
situat

have you, when there is
it is in

safety area.

not only re

exper
s, workers compensat
nse cutti

ted

situations,

to be done, we often

Of course, often applicants for

products liability coverage are defic
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nt in one or more of these

areas.

But when they are willing to adhere to our loss control

recommendatioM the problems can be corrected.

Consumers are

protected, underwriters can assume the risk profitab

in most

instances, and thus develop a capacity to accommodate the always
growing insurance needs of our society.

I might ment

that

in the State of California we have 62 loss control engineers on
the job in the field,

•

types.

including two industrial hygienist engineer

As I perceive the product liability market today,

the

situation is more one of affordability of the coverage than of
availability.

There are ready sources of product liability

insurance in California and across the country.

As we have

determined in these marketing assistance programs, which are
blooming and have already been described, we find,

for example,

that most people, most manufacturers, most sellers of goods with
products liability problems may not have received the type of
marketing assistance that they require.

In these marketing

assistance programs, we have found to date that we can take care
in the regular market of most of the product liability problems
that come to the fore.

I

SENATOR RUSSELL:

In the small business, say a new

business or a new order of business, can those types of individuals
meet these standards and remain solvent economically today, or does
it really take a going establishment of a larger size to be able
to meet the criteria?

I recognize that it would depend on the type

of product, but let's say one of the tougher ones.

Are we in a

sense sort of precluding the small entrepreneur from getting into
that type of business?
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is is a

MR. WHITE:

il

It, of course,

presents considerab
criteria,

t these k

wou

I

see

certain entrepreneurs

reasons, quali

:L

con

t

l

relat
rse

as a cost of

s ze,

manufacturers,

As sa

suppose you're

I

sales.

we're ta

Wel

rcent of sales.

cost go down

about sa

s

, does liability

s

sa<

MR.

vJHITE:

underwr

is cou

No.

i

r account,

the

use

because when you get

exper

nee

self-rated in e

rge fellow,
this own ... he's

a

1 as an example.

f

ay how much of DOW

s
t

that

Does cost

example, as opposed

t may be $1 or $2 mill

ASSEMBLYMAN MORI:

It

s to cost?

ta

No.

smaller guy

mo t ofte

ha

In

to size?

t the j

to

that the cost

less than sales.

normal

MR.
ta

stand

s

re

to si

rise

It

insuran e is

:L

a new

e funding for safety

i

ASSEMBLYMAN MORI
of 1

t pe

enter

product because of the

of

t'

I

s, translated

:L

't have the actual

con

re at
that answer.

t

RUS
the compa

i

re

of the

t

sura

s that

ste

s

r.

Does the
i

rce

relates to
ss

, or what?

As

MR. WHITE:
product.

It could be higher depending on the

What I was saying was that it's diff

when you get that big they are often on a la

lt to answer because
deductible basis.

They assume more of the risk themselves or are on what we call a
retrospective rating plan.

That is, after the fact,

the losses

below a certain level are looked at and then charged back to h

•

through a rating formula agreed upon between the two parties .
SENATOR RUSSELL:
and growing.

Well, let's take one that is modest size

Can he expect his insurance cost, as a percen

, to

keep pace or increase faster?
MR. WHITE:

It would keep pace because the rates are

based on total sales without regard to size.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Did you want to finish the statement?

I had a question about Exhibit 1.

It says that for each dollar

of loss, I assume that is dollar paid to a claimant, there was
an additional 42¢ of expenses incurred by the insurance company in
defending the claim.

42%, your guys are getting more than the

plaintiffs' lawyers.

•

MR. WHITE:
fees,

incidentally.

That may be true.

Not all that is attorney

The close claim study indicated, though, that

about 80-85% was.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

But this doesn't include brokerage fees

for selling the insurance or general overhead of the company.
This is the actual defense for that particular claim, 42¢ per
dollar paid to a claimant.
MR. WHITE:

Out of these 7,791 close claims studied,

this was the fact.
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CHAIRMAN KNOX:
claims where you
fully de

Excuse me.
ing?

't

or

d

The s

ratio -- gosh, I have to

, but th s

or for some reason or a

you d

I would 1

't pay.

and we'll have

cla

that has already been
7,700 records were analyzed,

excess of 20,000 soon.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

sample

You

other question I

t.

t 30¢, based on the study so far

t out

30¢ of each dollar of loss that the

nary

employer was

the election of the

Well, they

President with a smal
wanted to ask.

's not.

to mention that this is a pre-

mentioned by Mr. Holliday and on

to some

1

ili
s

for at

r these ki

because the Worker's
CHAIRMAN

that the so-called

ree.

or whatever it is,

warra

r

MR. WHITE:
to

where you successfully defend

Okay, well

liminary report of the c

not re

alone.

s.

MR. WHITE:

~s

at is

To answer that I would have to get back to

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

strict 1

s.

se on that cla

's 4

r cla

the pre

rticular dollar

to

It has nothing to do

statis

you successanything.

I mean,

that for a dollar of loss,

bas

lude those
s

In other

t back to the sta i

CHAIIUJ'JAN KNOX:

MR. WHITE:

this

and you

c

MR. WHITE:

Doe

s

0¢ of the

lar of loss.

11, remember the

f

iabil t
nsat

s.

r is not required
's exc

from this

Act, etc.

We re ta
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ing

product liabili

loss.

MR. WHITE:

That's right.

Where the employer himself

in the estimation of the claim man ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

We're talking on Workers' Compensation

now, as opposed to a consumer ....
MR. WHITE:

This is all products liability stuff.

What

we're trying to say here is that the employer of this injured
employee, this injured employee brought suit against our manu-

•

facturer.

The employer, in the estimation of the claim man, the

man filling out the form, was also negligent.

He might have been

negligent by failure to maintain the machinery if the machinery was
involved or overcoming safety devices or whatever.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR.

HIESTAND~

Okay, anything further.

Yes.

I just have a couple of questions.

on "C", the next item which Mr. Knox is referring to.
mean, I gather,

Mr. Hiestand.
One is

This would

just from simple logic that based on your experience

a statute of limitations for products liability that barred claims
beyond six years would eliminate 45% of the total products liability
claims for the companies that you have insured.
MR. WHITE:
indication.

This is not just us, but that

~s

the early

The preliminary indications from this close claim study,

yes.
MR. HIESTAND:

You mention in your prepared testimony

that you feel that insurance acts as a check and balance on
shoddy products, but part of that is just because of the cost in
the marketplace.

And that cost that is becoming high is also in

response to the tort lianility system which you then comment you
feel has become more of a check than a balance.
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So my question

is what do you feel
system

to be

so that

to cha

omes more of a

the tort l
than a check?

MR. WHITE

the plain

rt

ff and

s, r

major alliances.

You have heard from
Insurance As soc
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o the American
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11 return the

rights as

basis and I
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much
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CHAIRMAN
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of Chicago,
Professor,

i

I

?
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I

have a

be avai

VII)

wh

now
le to

I wou

s

scuss most
to me that the

is

f

s

Well,
11

rather not

tement.

It seems

have been raised

the

Committee have turned on specific proposals for recommendation.
Much of what that statement was designed to do was to recount
the chronicles.

Much of the shifts in

s liability law

above and beyond the commonplace one of negligence in strict
liability, it seems to be that it is reasonably self-sufficient,
and I would rather devote myself to some of the issues that came
up here and to direct attention in particular to some of the

•

problems of a substantive nature that have been raised.

I

ink

one of the best ways perhaps that one could begin this is to
begin with the statement which was read before and which it was
noted that there is always going to be a trade-off; that is,
there seems to be very little way in which somebody can find the
situation or scheme which will on the one hand relieve manufacturers of some of the burdens which seem to be imposed upon
them by the current situation in products liability without
cutting down by some degree of measure of plaintiff's recovery.
The dilemma is not perhaps as difficult as it sounds because it may
well be possible to reshape some of the substantive rules in a
manner which will reduce the very high administrative costs which
are now associated with the operation of the system.

I think, for

the most part, if one could find a way, as it were, to eliminate
the friction which takes place in many of these products liability
transactions without reducing recovery, things would be best.
Unfortunately,

it seems to me that that is going to be fairly

difficult to do unless you are prepared in the course of this
Committee to take a comprehensive reevaluation of the entire
system of civil procedure and related instances which are current
in this state and indeed in many others.
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So what I thought I

might want to do is, as it were, make the case for our statute
of limitations in a way which is somewhat different perhaps than
that which is presented in our

I think, in
order to make the

effect, it supplements what s done.
thing a bit more concrete, what I'll

11 go to my

is I

strength, which is talking about cases rather than to the
strength of the prev
underwriting pract

witnesses, wh
s and the like.

is to talk about general
As I was reading the advance

sheet, I came across a case that was decided recently in California
which I think is a very instructive vehicle by which you could talk
about some of the problems which plague products liability cases
and which indicate some of the problems a

prices which you have

when you deal with this kind of coverage.
Machine and Tool
Reporter 535.

Co~any,

The case Price vs. Niagara

and I have it here.

It is 136 Cal

In one sense it is a perfectly routine products

liability case.

A fellow gets his fingers cut off by a machine

in the course of its operation when there is some unexplained
malfunction.

The question is, what do

it was quite clear

do?

t one did with a case l

Compensation case and the on

particular accident.

It clearly

you had to decide was the

i

t was caused by the

disabili

ls and

this.

nt and it was a Workmen's

rose out of and in the course of

extent of med

Twenty years ago

growth of

course, to get the Workmen's

actions, of

ird
f

nsat

s (and I think

that's quite proper) and then you start to bring an action against
some th

party manufacturer, suppl

r,

distributor of the line.

In this case what you did, you had a tool press which was manufactured in New

1940, which was so
30

to some other person

before it was sold to the employer of the injured worker.

It

turns out also that the press was originally equipped with certain
kinds of guards which had been removed when the machine had been
So in order to deal with this

sold from one carrier to another.

kind of case, what you had to do was to go through a whole variety
of

que~tions

all of which were shrouded in uncertainty in order to

get some kind of resolution of the questions, simple questions,

•

as to whether or not the defective machine which was put on the
market by this defendant was the cause of the injury of this
particular plaintiff.
state it like that.

The statement looks very simple when you
It doesn't look to be too much different from

the question of whether or not Jones ran down Smith in an intersection, but the moment you start to look at the way in which these
cases unpack themselves in trial, you begin to wonder how it was
that you could even solve them at 42% of the total claims dollars
because it seems to me that the cost should in reality be a great
deal higher.

The first thing one has to note about this case is

machine tools are generally made as multi-purpose items which
are going to be customized by any individual employer or manufacturer

I

after they are purchased by the product liability defendant.

One

of the problems that you have in the product liability area is that
recent documents --

I guess the major California cases -- Balito v.

The Improved Machinery corporation -- something like that, decided
in 1973.

Before this case, the general rule was that you made a

machine and the question of customization was strictly

an employer's

responsibility, not that of the original manufacturer.

That being

the case, in effect, if you made it in accordance with your own
specifications, the fact that certain safeguards were not put on
31

the machine at the time it originally started which persisted until
the time of defect.

Now what happens?

You have to decide whether

or not the customization should be

on by the original

manufacturer or by somebody else, and that's a question upon which
you could have endless kinds of debate because it turns out some
customization may be possible at the general level.
of customization may not be.

Some types

It may be possible to put on an

all-purpose guard but the all-purpose

rd may not be particularly

good for any one purpose and it may well be that better substitutions
will take place later on in the chain of distribution.
Is the issue of foreseeability relevant,

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

as far as the manufacturer is concerned?
DR. EPSTEIN:

I think foreseeability is one of the great

inheritants of the modern tort law.

It seems to me that it domin-

ates a great many of the discussions in ordinary negligence but
it seems to me that it is an essentially unmanageable test.
can foresee that anything will be done with the product.

You

Nothing

is more foreseeable than that a safeguard would be removed by
some employers who
efficiency.

sh to increase the machinery's output and

What you really have to ask is not the question of

whether or not the gua

is forseeable.

The issue before these

cases is whether or not some party other than the original
over the machinery and could make

manufacturer has full
the decision one
to take it off.

or a

r in order to keep that guard on or

It seems to me if you start to look to full

control as the tests in these kinds of cases, what you will be
able to do is to
view of causat

sert the more sensible traditional common law
back into

even if there is an or

case and to say that it is possible

nal de

to cure, or if there was an
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original machine which was safely made,
was defective by subsequent use.
of foreseeabili

to convert into one that

If you start to use the question

, all you are going to do is to make each and

every one of these cases jury determination and then you are just
going to have no principle judgment because whereas the jury may
come up with an answer, doesn't have to defend it, which is very
convenient in a case like this for the very simple reason that

•

is no principle way that you could start to defend these
judgments one way or another.

It seems to me that if you want to

get major institutional reforms, one of the important things you
have to bear in mind is that rules have their place and anyth
whi

just constantly opens up a very broad range of factual

inquiries to a jury without what it encompasses, to what to do or
where to go,

is going to increase uncertainty,

if going to increase

the difficulty of making estimations about underwriting, it is
going to make it very unclear to people who not only manufacture
machines but those who service them and use them as to what their
responsibilities are.

At this point, virtually, under the Calif-

ornia law of products liability anything goes to the jury and it
may do with it what it wants.

There is nothing which has a kind

hard edge, tough-minded quality about it.

It seems to me that if

you had a good rule which talked about cures and curing causes in
products liability and machine tool cases, you would be a lot better
off than with the current situation that we have today.
example, in
at

For

Price case which I just mentioned, the plantiff's

, having lost the case at trial and now trying to get

either a retrial or directed verdict in his favor, argued that
really you can't cure an original defect because what happens is
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somebody else might install a guard on there but it may not be
connected with screws which are quite as strong as those which
the original manufacturer would have put on there, so therefore,
it is a little bit easier to disconnect it, as though somehow
or other it should make a difference whether it is going to take
a screwdriver or a rachet wrench in order to get that guard off.
It seems to me that kind of point, once you reach that level, you
are really talking about the kinds of speculation which do not lend
credit to the judical system and yet that's exactly where we are
in the current situation in california.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:

What was the holding in the case?
The holding in the case -- it was nice

there was no holding in the case.

There were a series of objections

raised by a plaintiff's attorney after the fees which were rejected
by the Appellate Courts and one of the reasons why the case is so
important is this is the kind of case which one can lament even
though it turned out in the defendant's

judgment which was affirmed

on appeal because the important question was not to my mind
institutional, it was not the outcome of the case.
question was the proceedings that were used to reach
decision.

The important
th~kind

of

If you had a strong rule which said the state of the

art governs the time in which this thing is put on the market,
there is a directed verdict for the defendant, a summary judgment
which would take you maybe a nickel per trial, literally, because
no one would bring it.

If you start to have these kinds of open-

ended cases, open-ended indefinite rules, what you are talking
about is 100 grand on either side, if the injury is large enough
to warrant that kind ....
34

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Well, obviously in this case, the

defendant's motion for a non-suit failed at the trial and it
went to the jury.
It went to the jury.

DR. EPSTEIN:
for the defendent.

What they did, Mr. Knox,

reinvented the wheel.

And the jury decided
in a sense they

Every single major issue of substantive law

came up in the course of that decision to be passed upon by the

•

jury.

I think you ought to examine the opinion because it's ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:

you had,

I will .
... it's instructive of the way in which

in effect, not an accident case anymore but some sort

of a litigated form of World War III in which people bring you
truth and force from every conceivable point in order to interpret
safety ordinances by the New York Department of Safety in 1931.

And,

in fact, what is so remarkable about this case is that they manage
to talk about eight or nine issues of causation without ever telling
you how the accident happened.

Because as it turns out the products

liability law has gotten itself so convoluted and so bizarred to
death that you don't really care about the immediate elements.

I

You only care about those things that are remote and distant in
time, and never about those things that are immediate and proximate.
It is a complete conversion of the general rules of causation that
say you start from the accident and look for the nearest things
first and the remotest things last, to exactly the opposite
situation.

We ignore plaintiff's conduct, we ignore employer's

maintenance, we ignore rehabilitation modifidation and repair,
1

and we go after that poor guy, who 40 years ago shipped out a
machine which was not only in accordance with specifications but
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in accordance with the customs, standards, and practices of doing
business at that time.

There is no way that one can develop a

system of incentive effects, you know, based upon your incentive
effects that they create to undo acts that have long been done, and
yet that is exactly what you get in this kind of a case.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:

Now what do you suggest as a remedy?
What do I suggest as a remedy?

We do have

our package, and, I think, that obviously I don't think that it
is necessary to go down the 16 or 17 other factual issues that were
raised by this case.

Suffice it to say that each of them were

shrouded in uncertainty, dripped in confusion, but what one needs,
I think, are rules which will give you some sense of what counts
as a safe harbor.

It seems to me that it is absolutely important

to have the type of situation that says that if you do it right at
the time that you let that thing out on the market, come hell or high
water, you are going to be safe from liability, even if somebody else
is not; and it seems to me that that is what you want with the future,
and also the past.
Now,

in the discussions of underwriting,

I think it is

important to have to distinguish two issues, and I would like to
make a point perhaps a bit more forceful
When you price a mach

than was made before.

tool, say your punch press, Mr. Hiestand,

you don't only price the punch press that comes off the presses
today, as it were, because

n you do have to worry about modifi-

cations upon which they can hold you to account, but there is no
rule that says it is just a safety.
backlog of mach

You also have to price the

that is already on the market.
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It turns out

that that is just a terrible problem because you don't know who
owns the machine, you don't know the extent to which they have been
maintained, you don't know, as it were the value of the laborer
who happens to be using the machine, whether it happens to be low
level labor or high level labor, or whatever.

And you have to

really do this on an individualized basis, and you can't do
so when they look at this guy with a recent development of

•

innovative machinery, they are going to charge him with all the
sins past, present, and future with respect to things already
out on the marketplace.

And it seems to me that in order to

handle that problem, both in the grading problem and in terms of
the sheer equity in favor of the defendant, who did everything
that was expected of him at the time that he did it, that you
have to have some kind of statute of limitations based upon,
and which guarantees you some sort of protection, based upon the
use of the product out in the market.

Now, the question then is,

what is the size form that you could use, and here I think it is
important to mention the alternatives, which I would reject, and
which were endorsed by the Interagency Task Force in its report.
They had two types of things:

one said that we could start the

use of useful life type of limitations, and say that for each
particular product, you are going to start to assign some form of
useful life and the moment the product is out on the marketplace
before that useful life, it seems they say that liability or the
defendant should beinsulated from liability.
problems with that.

There are several

One, you never know how to calculate the

useful life for any machine that is constantly undergoing provisions
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prepared for maintenance and improvement.

If you take a building,

for example, its useful life is perhaps 20 years without maintenance
and 50 years with, and so when you start to try and figure out
what it is, you are not going to be able to do it product line
by product line.

You're going to have to do it product by product.

At that point, it seems to me that the entire system just
collapses of its own weight as a generalized kind of defense, because
there are too many individual dllicriminations that have to be made
in order for it to be working.

All you will do, in effect, if you

make that into a statute, is to give another layer of common
law, of statutory confusion above and beyond the common law confusion that we have.
Now, I don't wish to say that the useful lives are
unimportant, but it seems to me that as a matter of case law,
you can introduce that into cases and arguments, you know, in this
great battle of negligence and strict liability and whatever, and
do it with a fair bit of force and effect.

I certainly would not

want to introduce a statute which would foreclose the defense which
in principle makes good sense.

What I want to say is that it

seems to me it is a singularly unpromising line for legislative
reform.

It seems to me that rather than to have to bite the

bullet of how these cases ought to go, and try to do it in a manner
which knocks out most of the bad cases on principle, which costs a
great deal to bring and defend, which clutter up the courts,
which take a great deal of resources away from all persons concerned,
whether it be social resources, plaintiff's resources or defendant's
resources; and the only way you could do that, I think, is by
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straight time limitation, and then you build into that time
limitation certain kinds of exceptions I will get to in a moment
in order to try to preserve those rich loads of decent cases which
ought to be brought or try to keep out the dross which ought to be
kept out.
The second kind of proposal that one might consider,
which I also think ought to be rejected, is one which is based

•

upon contractual types of situations.

It has been suggested in the

Interagency Task Force study that we engage in a system that deals
with an elaborate set of disclaimers, and what you do is that you
start to make your products and put disclaimers on the product
thing and

use that thing for 10 years at your peril.

wrong with that?

Well, what is

I don't think there is anything wrong with it

in principle, so long as you could be sure that the network of
communication is going to take place between worker who uses the
machinery and the defendant who does not.
with contractual solutions is two-fold.

The problem that you get
On the one hand, with respect

to the products that are going to go into the marketplace in future
years, it is clear that you are not sure that the communication is
going to make itself known; the warnings may get rubbed off, they

I

r1ay get effaced, they may get removed, the product goes from handto-hand, the parties that use them may not read them, so

it's a

real question as to whether you get anything that even looks like
the contract.

And oddly enough, here the statutes of limitations is

better, because by making it a public declared statement, this is
what we want to do, everybody will be given notice of it, not
because the manufacturer in the individual case will have to give
notice, but because the law, as suitably publicized, will be put
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into work places with notices of the effect, will make the
communications take place much more easily because it will be done
by better and independent sources.
The other problem that you get with the disclaimer type
situation, or the second one,who is going to set the statute of
limitations.

If you have the manufacturer set it, there is always

the question of whether or not there will be an advantage taken by
third parties, not subject to the original agreements.

I have

less fear about that than most people because I basically believe
that markets work even when it comes to safety if you know what
the rules of the game are going to be.

But if you don't share my

kind of confidence, and I must say that most people don't, you
are going to have to find somebody else who is going to set those
warnings and the last thing I would want to do is have a committee
of 500 sitting down on each of 10,000 products that come on the marketplace each day, saying you are eight years 4 you are ten years, you
are nine and a half, or whatever.

It seems to me that you get your-

self in the worst kind of political morass imaginable if you try
to make those individuated judgments.
The second problem that you have with the statute

is it

doesn't deal with the backlog of products that are already on the
market.

That is, I wou

guess the several millions of machines of

one kind and description wh

are out there already, and to the

extent that you start to talk about disclaimers, it seems to me
that it would not work with products that are already in the
marketplace.

To take the contractual metaphor one step further,

unilateral variations of previous contractual arrangements by one
party are not binding on the other, and it seems to me that the
40

disclaiming causes that are instituted for products that are
already on the market would amount to a unilateral disclaimer.
So it seems to me, therefore, that you are driven back to the
kind of standard statute of limitations that we have had, and the
trick that you have to do with a statute of this sort is to say
what you think the dominant principle ought to be and what you
think ought to be the exceptions to it, and we have struggled at
great lengths with the AIA to see if we could try and figure out
those areas in which defenses are appropriate by way of statute and
those areas in which they are not.

And my own guess about the

situation is that you wish to have pretty much a blanket statute
with a single time period across the board.

I am in favor of a

fairly generous time period, the statute itself as granted says
eight, I gather the Committee revision says ten and that is fine
as far as I am concerned.
what it covers.

Then what you have to do is figure out

I would like it to cover all liabilities regardless

of the theory in which the case is brought.

That is, it seems to

me that if you were to say, for example, that only strict liability
actions were barred, there would be a resurgence of negligence
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cases, because the truth of it is that the distinction between
strict liability in negligence, which may have been perfectly clear
in 14th Century road accident cases, is not at all clear when it
comes to modern product liability cases.

If you stop and look at

the kinds of things that you are supposed to take into account in
design defect cases under a strict liability theory, you find that
it was the exact same list of things that you take into account
under a negligence suit.

The way in which you can combine them

may be somewhat different, but, in fact,

41

the difference is so

marginal that you will not have the kind of major systematic
institutional effect that legislation ought to aspire to, ought to
achieve, it seems to me.

So it seems to me you ought to go across

the line and then what you ought to do is to create a set of
exceptions.

Now, what are these exceptions to be based upon?

Well, one of the exceptions that I think you are doing to want in
a statute of this sort are exceptions based upon duties imposed
upon a manufacturer after he has parted with possession and control
of his product.
Now, it is quite clear under the modern institutional
framework, many of these obligations today are imposed by statutes,
and as far as the total loss is concerned, whatever you think about
the merits of the statutes that impose them; these don't present
any kind of a particular problem.

But, for example, if you have a

product that is going to be recalled because it was discovered to
be dangerous 11 years after it was first put on the marketplace,
and the manufacturer refuses to honor the statutory obligation to
recall it, I should be appalled that he could hide behind the original
10 year statute based upon manufacturer production, when in fact the
duty upon the manufacturer arose only after the statute of limitations.

It seems to me you could have a very strong case, for

cutting off some remed

s, but not all remedies, because remember,

you could still sue other de

nts even with our statute of

limitations, after the defendant has done with his product.

But to

have a statute of limitations which runs even before the defendant
has committed his own wrong strikes me as being foolish, dangerous,
perverse, or worse.

Then the question 1s precisely, which duties
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are you going to worry about; and here I must say, the Price case
is giving me some concern, because there is a suggestion there that
if juries are allowed to say that a manufacturer, once he is allowed
to put a machine on the market, is constantly under a continuous
duty to update, modernize, and to warrant subsequent uses of the
machines as to what's to come, and it seems to me as a substantive
matter, if you have no standards for that, it is an open-ended source

•

of confusion and despair.

I, for one, would like to see that statute

of limitations coupled with a substantive provision which gives you
some clear guidelines as to precisely what the source of these
substantive duties are going to be.

For the most part, I would

want to limit it, I think, to cases where the statutory and
administrative control and maybe couple that with other provisions
that it may be a duty to inform those people whom you know,
in the event that there are reports back to you about the
imminently dangerous characteristics and qualities in the machine.
We try to deal with that to some extent in our duty to warn
statute.

We don't put it forward as, shall we way, a monument to

perfection.

•

It is an exceptionally hard area to go by.

be that you have to do it product by product.

It may well

Drugs require one set

of rules, automobiles another, machine tools another.

I am ndreal

that sure about it, but it seems to me that if you have ,a statute
of limitations with the subsequent duties, and then you say that
every time you don't correct that original defect you are in breach
of your subsequent duty, what you have done is created a statute
of limitations which requires the plaintiff to replea an original
cause of action.

That is not our intention in connection with the

statute of limitations package, and if the statute is construed

that way, you can see why the commendable conservatorism of underwriters, which, I think, you have heard mentioned already before,
will indeed be justified.
The second of the kinds of exceptions, I think, that
one would want and that I have been able to identify is one which
would concern reconditioned, refurbished and modernized products.
Here, when you are dealing with a product originally put on the
market by "A", 15 years later as we have done by "B", it seems to
me that "B" to the extent that he is responsible for any wrong or
for the condition of the product, and I would make his responsibility
is going to put it out as a reconditioned

for that product total if

product, ought not to be able to get the benefit of the statute of
limitations which runs for "A".

Again, we get into a very awful

situation where the statute would run, not only before the occurrence
of the injury, which is a difficult one, one concedes that freely,
but also would run before the occurrence of the wrongful act.
The third of the exceptions that I think one could start
to make is one that deals with the question of fraud.

you describe fraud, willful at one time,

is a real problem as to

rt of the defendant.

gross misconduct on the
jury to say that
for a jury to find

consc

One doesn't want the

design choice was an open invitation

it was a

simply because they didn't
the sense to be

Now, there

lent disclosure or concealment

an additional guard on it.

You want

t the defendant knew about the risk, thought

that he would be able to escape liability by playing it fancy,
and even though he

the improvement was warranted, for

some reason or another decided not to use it.

So it seems to me

you could isolate that class of cases that involves willful
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and wanton

misconduct of the sort for example which, in my judgment, would
support a case of punitive damages against the product manufacturer.
It seems to me then that no matter what the time, you would not
want the statute of limitations to protect them.

The only argument

that you could make against that exception, which shows you the
difficulties of the Committee that you have to face,
can police it.

•

there.

is whether you

If you can police it, I would like to see it in

If it turns out to become a royal road for the evisceration

of the statute of limitations, I would prefer that it be kept out.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Well, you know, the problem that I see

with the -- I mean I can readily understand the flat statute, and
I think that is something we are really going to have to tussle
with, because there is no effective statute at all now, as best I
can tell.
DR.EPSTEIN:

You know, Mr. Knox, I must admit ....

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

I mean I am assuming that we're looking

from the standpoint of trying to reduce premiums.

Now, maybe we

are going to decide that we can't reduce premiums this way.
DR. EPSTEIN:

I

You know, I don't think that anyone

can come up here and say that the only thing we have to do is
reduce premiums.

It seems to me we have to ....

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:

No, of course not.
To reduce the premiums by eliminating those

cases which are least meritorious, by getting rid of that portion
which of course is the most unwarranted.

If it turns out that even

after these statute premiums remain wHat they are and you are
happy with the substance of rules of liability that you have, and
the answer is so be it, I mean, you know ....
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CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR.EPSTEIN:

I agree with you.

It seems to me that that is it, but the

hard question is, I would like to argue the mild view about it that
when you put statutes forward, I think the first thing you have to
do is assume that it is going to be a fair degree of judicial integrity
in the way in which they respond.

I mean, I know and I have

seen cases, indeed, the recent statute of limitations in medical
malpractice is one I recall, shall receive the tour de force
interpretation in wrongful death cases by the California Supreme
Court.

And so, there is a

it were, more pla

the question that they will be, as

iff-oriented

n the Legislature would be.

But I think at least at the first approximation since you do
reserve the right to amend it, I hopeand pray that there are no
constitutional issues which work in this kind of a case.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Well, they always work, you can't avoid

them.
DR. EPSTEIN:

But I mean that they would not dominate.

I would hope that after Schwall v. Jones, that the California
Supreme Court would recognize the utter error and futility of its
ways in the guest statute case.

I mean the guest statute may or

may not be a good thing, but to say it is a constitutional issue
is to my mind utterly

sgui

You might as well say that the

statute of frauds raises constitutional questions.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Well, you can always with a due process

clause, it just depends on whe
is being taken away
DR. EPSTEIN:
of course every cha

your life, liberty and property

courts.
Well, you know, I mean if you say that
tort liability whether by the courts or by
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the Legislature will make it a constitutional issue.

If you expand

liability, presumably somebody could come in today or tomorrow
and say,

"Aha, what you have done is deprive defendant of his life

liberty and property."

If you have contracted, you have the same
I don't believe the Due Process Clause,

issue the other way around.

the Equal Protection clause, or the Eminent Domain Clause was ever
designed to have such a bizarre result, which is to say that any
shift in the substance of liability within the state, however
minute, was to call upon a constitutional crisis.

It seems to

me that if you have statutes of limitations which go from two years
to one year, that is a constitutional issue under this inte
tion.

ta-

Now, I think that one has to recognize, at least under

current trend that with respect to economic matters not regard
fundamental rights, race and the like, for example, the recent
view in California in Schwall v. Jones is the correct one, which
if you give them a fair degree of legislative deference, and so
as they are trying to respond socially identified and perceived problems, we are not going torub

too hard on the due process issue.

I

would hope that that view would prevail, and I think when you are

•

writing legislative history you ought to address the constitutional
matter so as to indicate that you consider them,

it may even help.

I mean you have to write as it were a brief for your own legislation.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
for a second though,

Well, no,

is it,

law inthe public interests,

just to get back to my question

from the standpoint of clarifying the
is it better to have a flat statute or

is it better to have a flat statute plus the exceptions you propose?
DR. EPSTEIN:

I am in favor of the exceptions because
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think they can be managed.

The only one that gives me real concern,

well, the first and the third give me some concern, but I think,
in fact, you can draft the third one so as to say, "provided that
it is understood that there is no continuing duty on the part of
the manufacturer to upgrade his product after he has parted with
possession and control."

Or you could simply, and alternatively,

you could simply say that the subsequent duty exception is limited
to those cases in which the obligation is imposed upon the defendant
by regulation of public rule, and if you didn't like that, you would
get the recall cases and the drug cases and you would leave out
cases like Price, where somebody argues that 35 years after they put
a product on the market, you want to go into the factory that owns
the machine and tack on the guard.

It seems to me then that maybe

the answer is we change the exception somewhat from the way in
which they are situated and are built, but you keep the principle
and the exceptions.
to get some equity out of this, and

I would like to

I recognize it's a trade-off, and I think that your original
statement was very prescient on that point, correct.

And then

the question is, where do you draw, and I sweated enough since
we first worked on this thing s
subsequent duty issue is one

months ago that the open-ended
t you just cannot let lie.

I am

also persuaded that you really want to define the fraudulent exception
would t

fairly narrowly.

Now, if I were to do it over again, I

that exception in our statute of limitations, more

closely to the punit
are really talking about

damage statutes so as to indicate that we
extraordinary case and not the usual
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one, and the reputable manufacturers have nothing to fear from
that.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Well, you sort of have common law fraud,

a false statement, reliance on the falsity and damage therefrom,
but then a vicarious involvement because the reliance is not
necessarily going to be by the individual injured.
DR. EPSTEIN:

That is right, but I think you are going to

have to satisfy it, and, I mean, the bystander cases, I have no
desire to see that rule overshifted.
insurance thing.

Casual conversation in the halls, this is where

all my empiricism comes from,
of the premium.

That is not the source of the

indicates that's less than 2 percent

If you think about the impacted area, rare is

bystander injured by the fall off the ladder; rare does the bystander
sort of throw his hand into the machine tool.

The only case that you

have to worry about bystander liability really is, I think, auto
cases.

I don't know why, and there the statute of limitations

won't touch it, because most automobiles on the road are under
10 years of age, so it seems to me that if you want to get to the
bystander problem in some of these cases, you are going to have

I

to work your way through the state of the art.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
workers' comp. case.

It is like the Price case.

DR. EPSTEIN:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
false statement?

No, but you have the third party claiming

Yes.
I mean,

is the worker relying on the

I don't think so.

DR. EPSTEIN:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

No, I mean .... '
He is just doing what he is told.

49

DR. EPSTEIN:

The argument that is really here is not

that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a misrepresentation
theory, rather plaintiff's theory

well, rather the plaintiff's

theory is argued that not only is there a defect in the design
of construction, but which is one that is known and asserted to by
the defendant by the time they put it on the market, and so it is
basically a willful and wanton version of the strict products
liability, what would otherwise be a strict products liability.
The other point, too,

is that there is also a weak

misrepresentation claim that can be made, and I think Traynor was
quite right, Judge Traynor, when he said that,
famous Greenman case, implic

implicitly, in the

in the presence of the machine on

the market, is the representation that it will do the jobs for
I think basically what happens is that you

which it was intended.

have this whole web of social interactions between individuals in
which I put something there, a chair, and you know you are supposed
to sit upon it, but not to put an army of 15 on it, and that the
chair represents weight of the normal individual, and to some
extent, it seems to me

t you could say that the machine itself

contains the representat

and eliminates the vicarious representa-

tion argument that you are go

to do.

But if you define it

narrowly enough with respect to the mental state, I think you could
live with that kind of a statute, but aga
own assessment as to how you th
to the situat

, you have to make your

the courts are going to respond

As to the basic statute, I think it is really a

very principled one.

It gets you out of all of these terrible

confusions that you get in cases like Price, it doesn't deprive
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the plaintiff of all remedy because in every products case
somebody other than the manufacturer has control of the use of
that product in the interim and those part
by the 10 year statute of limitation.

s will not be

ted

There will be problems

with the Workmen's Compensation situation, but it seems to me that
you have to answer this question flat out.

If Workmen's

nsation

is inadequate, then maybe you have to reexamine benefit structures
and coverage, but I regard that as essentially beyond the scope
of this Committee at this time.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

I have two questions on scope:

one is,

how would the AIA feel if we put in a tough statute that we also,
at the same time, would concommitently put in a stronger regulat

n

of insurance rates?
DR.EPSTEIN:

Well, it seems to me, I would be appalled in

some sense, because I think the only reason California has managed
to survive the insurance prices here is that basically it has more
competition in the marketplace.

If you have these vast changes

in exposure and risks equally, the resurgence of liability and
a regulatory process, what you would simply do would be to dry up
the amount of capital which would go in there, and everybody knows
that the amount of business that you could write is a function of
the amount of reserves that you could keep otherwise, that the best
way that you could handle the insurance thing is to leave it open
to market

~echanism.

This state has been ....

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

We have just witnessed

damndest

market mechanism situation I have ever seen in my life.

We were

told, probably by the insurance people, that they were going to,
now, this year, come up with a study of 20,000 cases.
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They are

going to share all of this information and they are going to provide
the rates based upon the largest common denominator.

Now, if that

isn't a combination of restraint of trade, I have never seen it.
DR. EPSTEIN:

No, again you have to be careful.

The

pooling of information ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

The pooling of underwriting information.

They set the rates based on experience.

They are going to pool all

their experience and set the largest posssible rate.

Isn't that

what they said?
DR. EPSTEIN:
available to each

They said that the information will be made

ividual firm so that each firm can take it

into account when it comes to the setting of the rate,

What is

going to happen, it seems quite clear to me that the minimal rates,
either based upon the number of products put upon the market, the
number of tires, the number of fillings of carbonated beverages or
the percentage of sales, are going to decline in importance, as it
turns out the risk becomes so large that individualized safety features
are going to have to be taken into account.

There is nothing about

the ISO study that says that since all of you got the same study,
that all of you are going to
to peg your rates together.

Sit down in the same room and start
I take it that it is prohibited by

the anti-trust laws with respect to setting rates in the marketplace.
The rates are going to be higher, it seems to me, than they were in
1950, 1960, 1965, no matter what this committee does.
it is very hard to go

That is,

an area as richly textured as the

common law area, and sort of say,

"friends, the clock says 1952

is the law, and we have a one cent statute, the products liability
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law of 1952 shall govern in this state", and sure enough, they
would say implicit in the earl

law is the later law, we would

be right back to where we started from before.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Let me ask you this question.

We are

tussling, and this committee is charged by the resolution creating
this committee, to look at products liability.

Are we real

going to do anything for California business and/or Californ
victims by comprehensive statute change in California alone or
would we be better off to simply help draft federal legislation
and strongly endorse it?
DR. EPSTEIN:

I mean, again, I must say I rega

that as

one of the very hardest questions that you could possibly ask,
and one to which you could go both ways.

My instinct is that I

would rather see it done at the state level first than at the federa
level because it seems to me that the moment it goes to the
federal level, you have no control over what
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:

•

~s

going to take place.

There's a bill in the hopper back there ....
I know.

It's not a very good one.

are many of them in the hoppers back there.

There

It seems to me that you

are dealing with common law substantive issues where all the expertise
is located on the state level.

Very little of them at this point

are located on the federal type level.

It seems to me,

too, that

the arguments that you can make in favor of some reform in the
products liability measures are not only based upon cost to manufacture but also because recoveries are given in cases where in
principle it ought to be denied.

The constant refrain in California
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is the plaintiff can do no wrong no matter what it is he has done
is to me a great disservice, a great offense to principles of
corrective justice, the principles of common law.

The constant

confrontation of defenses is something that one has to take into
account, how they all become matters for the jury and then with
heavy instructions that the presumption is

strongly~ainst

in each and every case in which they apply.

them

It seems to me that you

could do a great deal here for the manufacturing community.
ornia is a very large part of this business.

Calif-

This is not South

Dakota when it comes to either the buying of manufacturers or the
buying of cases, and it seems to me, also, that legislation in
California would be important in another respect.

That is, if

you get it through in a state like California, places that might
otherwise say, why should we worry, we look to California as an
example.

And the courts here have been the most "progressive"

(I use the word in quotes), and the Legislature's response to
it,

I think, would be a strong argument to getting statutes,

either this statute or others like it through, and you would help
the situation to a very large extent.

If it failed at the state

level, one might move to the federal level.

But there, I don't know

what the political forces are going to be applied, and I don't know
what kind of a product is going to come out of the hopper.

So it

seems to me that the best thing that you could do is sort of face
up to the local responsibility, and then if it turns out that
federal legislation is needed, take that as a second bow to your
arrow, arrow to your bow.
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I suppose, too, if it were -- I suppose

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

if we are looking at the underwriters mend

their ways, lowering

the rates, for example, that it would take longer to validate
federal legislation than it would state legislation.
DR. EPSTEIN:

I

think one of the nice things about the

statute of limitations, you cannot make any representations that
premium levels will go down, because there are still a lot of other

I

things that remain in the hopper after it goes through, but you could
say that the tendency of the legislation is going to be unamb

s.

It will remove a very large number of products as potential sources
of liability and allow the commerce to continue at its ordinary
rate.

I mean, one of the real inequities about a statute like

this is you get a company that makes bad products in 1930, and it
is out of business by 1940, you have a perfect cause of action
but no defendent.

The only people who are left are those who are

good, and they survive in the marketplace, and what they are told
is that they now are placed with an unanticipated tax on their
revenue, which probably equals the entire net worth of the company
that they represent.

•

And, you know, the insurance companies, I

think, are designed to provide a service at a profit, and the
manufacturers feel the same way.

They work perfectly well in

market situations when you have sensible liability rules, but when
you start to throw this huge, huge set of costs upon people, the
market will take time to react, and it will not react in ways which
people find happy.

I mean they are basically, if you want to put

it in crude terms, the products liability reforms or changes
through the courts, I would say

California about '66 is when the

trouble started to begin in this state until about the 70's, have
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resulted in a wealth shift of billions of dollars and nobody responds
very happily to that.
get it

Those who lose it feel grieved and those who

grow, and they insist that their rights are going to be

protected and nobody is going to take it away from them.

What

you have to do is to make a judgment as to how much of those gains
are deserved and how much of them are ill-begotten.
you.

I don't envy

It seems to me that the task is a very hard one but what I

will state, what I will reemphasize, I am quite happy to advocate
most of these reforms are products liability without the empirical
data as to what the extent of the dislocations are because it seems
to me as a matter of sheer substance, looking only to the equities
of the individual cases, something has got to be done.

Why the

Niagara Machine and Tool Company should be hauled through the mud
in a case like Price is simply beyond my comprehension.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

I appreciate the philosophical implications

of what you are saying but as a practical politician, it is very
difficult to change the law unless you are responding to a crisis.
DR. EPSTEIN:

I understand.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

You know if you get up before a committee

and say that it is right and just that we do this, frankly,
unfortunately, it doesn't get very far.
DR. EPSTEIN:

I want to put it this way.

It seems to me

that there is -- let me make the following kinds of arguments;
I did not say that rightness and justice is the only reason why
you make change.

It seems to me that once the pressure comes on,

and it is here, and it ought to be here, then what you try to do is
do the best that you can.

I mean you are all politicians, but there
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is always a little bit of you I hope which is a statesman, and
to the extent that we find both components ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:
rect him from the grave,

No, a statesman is a dead politician.
Dead politician.

Well, maybe we can resur-

I would say, but to put it this way,

Mr. Knox, you can have a crisis and what you could do is make such
a mess out of it by way of legislation that you will have two crises

•

and it seems to me ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:

That often happens .
... that also happens.

What you've got

to do is pick your spot and to go in there and get a very strong
sense of the way in which things work.

And it seems to me, you

know, I could talk about the underwriting practices, I know
something about the economics of the situation, but if you just
look at the cases, what you will find out about it is that the
simple proposition is that everybody is responsible for me but me,
and so no matter what happens to you there is always going to be
somebody else whom you could try to hook with a liability thing
and the expansion of liability basically doesn't treat that as its
fundamental publicly stated proposition.

But when you get down to

it, that's what is at work in all of these cases; that is, you
will just find some little thread, however tenuous, upon which you
can then hold some manufacturer and disregard the plaintiff's
conduct in its entirety.

It may well be, and I would say if I

thought that I could draft a good statute on product modification,
state of the art, contributory negligence, by which I mean a
statute which was not only just but one which prohibited deviation
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in the courts, I would not want the statute of limitations.
But it seems to me that you've got such a climate of opinion in
the Legislature, such a deference to the jury.
out what we will do.

We can't figure

We will let them decide, because they

don't have to publicize their reasons.

You have to go to some

broader gauged statutes than we otherwise have.

And,

in fact,

one of the things that we did with the AIA package, we did it both
ways.

We had the broad gauged statute on the statute of limitations,

we have a very complicated statute on duty to warn which is an
effort to track out the elements of the cause of action, we have one
on product modification which handles some of the problems but not
all of the problems, and I could give you a string of hypotheticals
that our statutes do not cover.

The reason it doesn't cover is

because we don't want the Encyclopedia Brittanica in the form of
a product modification statute.

You try and get 80% of it, and if

we got the four or five other statutes through and they were respected,
that would be fine.

I think it would take a lot of pressure off the

statute of limitations if they were construed in the manner which I
would hope.

But the equity of the statute always permits the courts

to imply an exception.

I would rather than have to fight the

statute of limitations when it came from exceptions than to have
to deal with the other statutes, because I could draft -- invent
exceptions to them, some of them which would be desirable, some of
them not.

What is happening today is essentially the inquiry which

we have before the court is utterly standardless.

When you talk

about asking whether a product is duty safe, that's not an answer.
That's a question and nobody seems to be able to find any way to
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get to that question and what you have now
collective incremental j

LS

a sense of the

t in the courts which has swung so

far over in the wrong direct

that no product is safe.

that machine principle won't do it, nothing will do it.

If
There

were 19 possible defenses in that case and yet you could still get
a plaintiff's verd

t over all of them.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

I

come to the conclusion -- we were

always taught in law school that for every wrong there is to be
a remedy.

Now, we are learn

that for every injury there has

to be a remedy.
DR. EPSTEIN:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
DR. EPSTEIN:
tort system.

We need a remedy.

That's right.

And that's the problem.
That's a problem.
Yes.
And I mean -- I have always believed in the

I have always believed in strict liability for

construction, defense, protection for bystanders.

Somehow or other

somewhere between 1969 -- '66 to '69, the California courts have
gone off the rail.

I have some hopes lately in the last three

or four opinions I have read coming out of the intermediate
court have been decisions wh

have upheld the defendant's

contention upon appeal, but these haven't set the thing back.
They are rather like Price wh
go three steps further.

is to say, we are not going to

We are going to allow this thing to be

a jury question instead of hav

directed verdict for plaintiff as

a matter of law on facts as sk

as the ones that were presented

in the Price case.
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CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Any questions?

SENATO~ ~P~BEYERL¥:

If this witness gets into court

very often, there must be a whole army of court reporters ....
DR. EPSTEIN:

I've never been to court in my life.

I

may have had some expertise but I would never hire me to try a case.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

All right,

MR. HIESTAND:

Mr. Hiestand.

Could you illustrate, using the statute

of limitations how something like the cancer-causing drug DES or
any sort of drug that years after it's released on the market
is found to cause injury to people where it would fit in here
how it would be covered by the exception or not?
DR. EPSTEIN:

I gather you did not have, the committee

thought an exception would be appropriate for carcinogenic drugs
in the previous meetings.
of Chicago DES case.

Let me tell you about the University

Maybe we could help change your mind.

Now,

the University of Chicago ran in a case, ran a study on DES in an
e

to determine whether or not the drug was good at preventing

miscarriages during the course of pregnancy.

It turned out there was

a woman at the Harlan Medical School who took care of diabetic
tients and used DES at a very high success rate.
thought

t it was the drug that did it.

The people

It turned out that what

did it was that this gal was so terrific when it came to handling
nant mothers that she could have used no drug and gotten
better results than anybody else with the best technology on the
face of the earth.
the one

So they had a thousand people in two pools,

1 got the drug and the other got a placebo, done in

1953, '54, somewhere around there, but they had no written consent
form.

don't even have a record as to which people got the drug
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and wh

a placebo che

people
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case
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something else?

to get sidetracked, Dr.

tute of 1

EPSTE

DR.

There is

and it turns out that there
ing

of

that each and every

I

There

mothers have when the posr

get the cancer at some future
t

that kind of a case is

quite blunt about it, that when

you are dealing with new drugs, that if you want a risk distribution
mechanism, the last thing you want to do is to force all of those
costs back on the defendant, because the cost is not going to be
random if there's a disaster.

You will break every insurance

company and every drug company by doing that.

You'd rather this

would be handled by first party mechanisms, and the second point
is that it seems to me that when you have a system in which you
such exhaustive regulations, ex antum, designed to prevent
these drugs from being released on the market by all kinds of
tests, that what you should do is rely upon those regulatory
mechanisms to handle these problems rather than try to turn your
attention to the tort mechanism in order to deal with it.

So

that for my own money, is that if you start to deal with the tort
remedy in these cases, it is just another perfect instance of
ing to handle a situation where the issues you get involved in the
case is simply beyond the capacity of any judicial body to handle
any kind of an intelligent way, and therefore, -- I'm sorry
about these cases.

I mean everyone finds them tragic, but it

seems to me that the cost is too great.

And I might add that

there is another cost involved in this.

Let's suppose we change

th s rule and say to every drug company,

"Even if you follow

every single precaut

that is required of you by statute or

the state of the art which is ever hard and even though you
tell the other fellow who takes it, you assume the risk either
for yourself or for your heirs or descendants, as the case may be,
that you are going to have this kind of liability,

you have to

then ask yourself, what's going to be the effect of this upon the
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introduction of new drugs into the market.

It seems to me today

that the major problem that we have in the drug area is that the
FDA and its assessment of errors simply takes the error of bad
drugs into account but does not take into account the error of
keeping good drugs off the market.

Saccharine is a bizarre and

extreme illustration of this inability to take into account two

•

types of error within the regulatory process.

We can't cure that,

but it seems to me that, if in fact all the regulatory biases are
in favor of protection to an unwarranted extent by it, to then
throw on to that a kind of a tort liability with respect to future
drugs will inhibit the development of drugs more effectively than
the FDA could do it.

One of the costs that you have to mention and

measure is not only the costs of injured people who don't recover
because of our statute of limitations or our state of the art
legislation, you also have to take into account the people who
will never be able to bring this suit against anybody by virtue
of the fact that they were injured when some drug which was
manufactured and in wide use elsewhere, might have been able to

•

alleviate that condition under which they have suffered.

This is not

the place to go into harangue against the FDA and its drug kinds
of policy but I do think that it is appropriate to mention that
given those legislative biases that this might be the

one thing

that in the end will do more harm to the very public that you
are trying to protect than the statute of limitations cum state
of the art defense.

I heard about from Jerry Wilson the exception

drafted into the statute for carcinogenic drugs and I was somewhat
distressed to hear it because it seems to me that if I were to try
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to illustrate our statute of limitations with Case #2, I would have
gone through the DES cases either in Detroit or against the University of Chicago and Ely Lilly as the perfect instance of a basic
and traditional tort cases which usually involve, you know, 20 years
ago a collision which lasted 15 seconds is now taken into something
which is a worldwide search for truth about the state of the art
25 years ago.

You cannot handle that through the judicial process.

A jury may come up with a decision but the only reason

it does so

is because it knows darn well it doesn't have to defend it publicly
but I think we have ....
MR. HIESTAND:

You indicated that if you had to do your

statute of limitations over again, you would be making some changes,
particularly in the exceptions area.

Are you in the process of

doing it over again or is your work with this statute
DR. EPSTEIN:
come back.

The work is never over.

As a matter of fact,

essentially ...

We will probably

I wrote one paper here because I

wasn't quite sure how the committee would evolve and when I came
to Los Angeles, I wrote another one.

This paper which I have given

you is, at this point, here it is, and I probably should write this
thing up too and when and if I do, I and the AIA committee will
start to put in some of the rework language for the statute of
limitations.

I am also quite happy to say if you want this, ask me

outside the committee, precisely how would we reword this.

I would

be more than happy ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
Anything further?

We will undoubtedly be in touch with you.

Go ahead, Mr. McAlister.

ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER MCALISTER:
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In Workmen's Compensation

law, there is a body of law known as cumulative trauma, where the
workers are recovering for,

for instance, ca

sed

to asbestos and recovery 30, 40, 50 years after
exposure.

exposure

initi 1

Are there tort suits?
DR. EPSTEIN:

Yes.

Let me give you -- there is one tort

suit which is not being brought.

I think

is in New Jersey

which has the following parameters which would indicate

•

enterprise has gone.

how bad the

Every worker in an individual factory from

1925 to the present, say several thousand people, who were a lot,
have brought actions in third parties against, a

i

I

, every

supplier of varnishes, paints, solvents, anything wh

izes,

and they have claimed that collectively they have cau
accumulative trauma which they have suffered.

What

ns is

the original action was brought by the thousand name pla
against 250 named defendants.

tiffs

After that they went

books and found other component manufacturers of

the
1

s

of all

of this stuff and they joined them and it turns out that we now
have literally squads of lawyers working not to dec

the merits

of the cases, all of which are individual and differen , but just

•

to coordinate the defense efforts between the parties.

And it

strikes me that those cumulative trauma cases are essentially
unworkable within the Workmen's Compensation bracket, at least
arguably in many situations, or have but limited viability within
that context.

In a third party tort action situation wherein fact,

you have to figure out what each defendant did and what each defendant
did not do, it simply is a case where in order to shi

hundreds,

thousands, ten thousands dollars worth -- many of these injuries are
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very small -- of losses, you are going to have to
injury wh

is f

very new.

t
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join 60 defe
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nts a

50 plaintiffs,

the ord

tive fees are vast

ss

300

framework simp
la

r

n

le actions and

means that

pass

administra-

recovery which might

be granted and I think that that is something which real
because if

be very high in
it won't be long be

has to

are in New Jersey,

they are in Californ

if

are not

already.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
attendance today.

Thank you very much.

I appreciate your

It is always very stimulat

in the morning sess

introduce another
man from Orange Coun

Aitken of the California

11 be Mr. Wyl

Trial Lawyers Associat

Our last witness

up, I would like to

While he is com
r of the

Bruce Nesta

Mr. Aitken.

, Assemblyse was

You know

for Professor Epstein, not for Nestande.
(See

VIII)

I have a

written presentation with the ....
SENATOR BEVERLY:
this morning.
hearing.

He

Mr. Chairman, I saw Wylie on television

ited the ent

San D

I don't know how they responded.
MR. AITKEN:

Thank you.

area to attend the
A good job, by the way.

Having heard the first three

speakers, I feel a little bit like the Appellate Justice in one
of the more famous appellate cases where he indicated in his dissent
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from the opinion, he had one sentence in the dissent
for

reasons stated by the major

what we've seen here this morning.
observations.

I think
I would 1

t I dissent
par

that's

to make a few

I am pleased, for instance, to hear that Firemen's

Fund is willing to admit that shoddy products may

some way be

contributing to the so-called products liability crisis.

Now,

if we would only get Firemen's Fund to go along with Truth in

•

Advertising and add that fact to their full page ad in Time
Magazine, we would all be a lot better off.

I think it is also

interesting to note that they have made it quite clear, I think,
through Professor Epstein's testimony and the test

we have

heard here this morning regarding the Mutual Alliance and the AIA
plans and proposals, that they have obviously made California a
target state for what they believe are proposals that will lead to
tort reform.

I have yet to see any proposal come out of the

liability insurance industry that was labeled under tort reform that
and

did not mean some limitation of the rights of inj

I suppose

basically, our Association, of course is conce

that we have been described by Professor Epstein as representing
those people who are now supposedly the haves
hold on to what they have.

are now trying to

I think there are some myths that are

present within the analysis of the products liability f
should be discussed.

First of all, I think it is qu

ld that
clear to

anyone who has ever practiced law in this field that these are not
cases that you file and suddenly somebody hands you a check or
some type of recovery to your client.

These are difficult cases.

The doctrine of strict liability is not a doctrine of absolute
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liability.

There are still many diff

and the case tha

Professor

nt

ry

ssues

te

case, to me restores my faith
and I bel

lt ev

llate
the

at these cases shou

s

had,

be

the courts.

Obviously, the jury made a correct decision

that case and

obviously the appellate decision was correct also, so

I

rather than speak against the system, I

stration

il

really supports the system as it now present
the so-called products liability crisis f

us, we

of tort

was and always has been a myth.

Basical
An opportuni

los ion

tort
on the

here to review the latest Judicial Council statist

down

s

us that 4.3% in the prior year was the percen

tell
c

that had to do with personal injury cases
That 4.

ion

that somehow was increasing and

causing the high insurance rates.

cases.

When

st came

were told, of course, that there was some
going on within this

exists.

il filings
automatic

represented all of your

ctice

1

cases, all of your products cases, all of

cases and

all of your government tort liability cases.
Judicial Council statist

think that

r

latest

s, that 4.3% of all civil fil

not dropped to 4.1% of all civil fil

s, or

the area of

products liability medical malpractice, etc.
hardly any indication that there is a so-called tort
within this state or any other state.
interesting to note that their own publ

s has

a crisis,
osion

Also, I think that it is
ations raise serious

questions as to why we allegedly have a crisis within products
liability.

Basically, the Business Insurance Journal, their own
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publication, carried a story where it indicated that a very large
broker was of the opinion that the insurance was being w
certain companies and certain small manufacturers mere

ld from
to create

a crisis and merely as an attempt to stampede legislators into
so-called tort reform which again, always gets down to limitation
of liability and taking away the rights of the injured.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

•

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

May I ask a question, please?
Certainly, Senator.
I would like you to give this Committee

SENATOR RUSSELL:

the reference of the insurance broker or the magazine or wherever
that was.

Can you do that, please?
MR. AITKEN:

I will.

Business Insurance Journal.

I will be glad to.

It is in the

I don't have it with me but I will be

glad to send it to the Committee.

I have the copy of the issue back

and I will be glad to send it to the Committee.

Also, I am well

aware ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. AITKEN:

Maybe we better subscribe to it.

It is a very fine publication, very

interesting information in there.

•

I also found during the course

of the so-called medical malpractice crisis if one looked at
Medical Economics, one found a great deal of interesting information
as well.

As this body is well aware, there has been the Interagency

Task Force Report on products liability and I am sure this Cowmittee
has received a copy of that report and have had a chance to review
it.

But what was very interesting about that study produced by the

Federal Government and not produced by trial lawyers, not produced
by anyone who supposedly has a self-interest in this particular
controversy, one of the conclusions that was overwhelming when one
69

reads the report is that it is impossible
sett
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hammers that ch
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the products liability

, they

s and the unsafe

for instance, at page 15 in that study tha

new te

ly

that one of the reasons, a

substantial reasons,

products that are be

t was documented

s.

I think that

overlook

terms

is that the tort system number

is geared to provide reasonab

and fair compensation

to those people who are injured through no fault of their own and
secondly, we overlook the fact that the tort

tern has been very

therapeutic in terms of preventing more of these unsafe products
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to be distributed throughout the community.
interview that was featured in the Los

I saw an interesting

~ngeles

T

s with the

Vice Chairman of the National Consumer Safety Council and he pointed
out, for instance, that with a slight change in the caps that we
put on medicine bottles, how many lives have been saved.

He

pointed out the fact that it cost one penny to the manufacturer to
put the plastic cap on the aspirin bottle to prevent our children

•

from getting into the medicine cabinet and consuming dangerous drugs.
It was quite clear that the technology to put on that plastic
one cent cap was present long before the industry responded and
put the cap there.

He also related a very interesting conversation

with a manufacturer.

This particular manufacturer came to the

consumer Safety Commission and proposed that he be allowed to
distribute a 50 cc motorbike to 7-year olds and they had designed
this bike for 7-year olds.

Now, that, of course, came as a great

shock to the Chairman of the National Consumer Safe

Commission

and it obviously raised the first initial question to this manufacturer -- do you realize how many young children will be injured
if you put out a 50 cc motor bike for 7-year olds and he said,
"Yes, I appreciate that.

But can you imagine what kind of profit

I could make with a product like that?"

That was the 8tatement

that he made and that's what we are trying to curb by the
existing tort system.
that to,

I think it makes it quite clear to all of us

in effect, to allow that product to continue to go on, tc

allow high rates, and to allow that type of product to be insured,
would be a dereliction, a failure of the duty of the insurance
industry.

I was pleased to hear the earlier comments by the
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testimony from t:he insurance individuals who are here today that
they are concentrat
sis on lo

now on loss controls.

prevent

were so many quali

ey are putt

g the

and I was pleased to hear that there

control engineers who are now going out into

the community.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Do you think it is appropriate to change

any tort laws in this regard?
MR. AITKEN:

I think that obviously there are matters

that we can look into and if this Committee ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. AITKEN:

IJike what?

Well, a question of what to do in the

workers' compensation situation.

I

think there have been

~orne

interesting questions raised as to what hC1.ppens V>Jhen someone puts
out a machine and that machine is then altered
that machine then injures an employee.

the employer and

Under the present law,

you may well have a third party suit against the manufacturer but
because of the Workmen's Compensation system being an exclusive
reme
rece

, there is no cause of action for the injured employee who
min

1 compensation through the compensation system to

bring a similar cla
tain

should look

against the employer.

I think that we cer-

to the question of whether or not either

in an indemnity action, after the original action, or part of
the action filed by the plaintiff as to whether or not some of
that cost where there is an abuse of the system, abuse of the
machine, should not be transferred to the employer and should not
be solely borne by the manufacturer.
look into that.
Association.

I think we should certainly

We do have a tort study committee also within our

We are studying all of these areas and we will be
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making a final report to this commission because obviously we
are dealing with a system devised by human beings.
imperfect system and an

rfect world

is an

re certainly could be

improvements in every area of the law, including the tort system,
but I would again emphasize the point that when the insurance industry
comes forward with so-called proposals for improvement, every single
one of them has to do with the question of limitations of rights
and limitation on the injured party.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

What's your reaction of Price v. Niagara

that was referred to by Professor Epstein where you had, as I
recall, a machine manufactured in 1931 which had been substantially
altered ....
MR. AITKEN:

I believe he indicated 1940.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. AITKEN:

1940 or whatever it was.

Some time ago.

Well, I think the reaction, as I indicated

initially in my testimony was that that shows me the system is
working.

I don't think there is any way we can pre-screen every case

that is going to come up and make some type of

islat

determina-

tion that these lawsuits will be allowed to go forward but these
will not.

The example he gave, where the attorney brought that case

and lost the case and then went on appeal and lost on appeal, to me
illustrates why the system is good.

Because that now is a bellwether

case which will advise other lawyers not to invest a great deal of
time, not to invest a great deal of their money in that type of case
because the leading cases are the bellwether cases that help direct
the system and recognize that lawyers who handle these cases have
no interest in spending thousands of dollars in time and money
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handling a case that they are going to lose at the jury level and
appeal and lose at the appellate level.
for those cases.

There is no reason

So that opinion to me illustrates why the existing

system works and illustrates why the juries listen to these facts
and make intelligent decisions, why we should leave these cases.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

What about a suggestion of say a 10-year,

or some such, statute of limitation with an exception for reconditioning for fraud or for duties to warn that could be built in?
MR. AITKEN:
number of reasons.

I really don't think you can do that for a

It's got a number of problems with it.

Number

one, I think that many major products have life expectancies beyond
ten years -- elevators, other types of products are expected to be
used beyond 10 years.

Also, in every proposal I've seen, it makes

no difference whether or not there are already many pending lawsuits
against that product.

Theoretically, you could have a situation

where at 9 years 50 lawsuits were filed and in 10 years the same
product that was just as dangerous the year before suddenly now
becomes immune from any further litigation and what happens if you
clearly find that some product is still on the market and still
being used,

is clearly defective, and the ten years have passed and

there is no incentive now to take that particular product off the
market because what you've done is granted immunity to the manufacturer of that product.
where basically the j

I think that the laws that now exist
judges the case based on the state of the

art that was available at the time the product was manufactured is
the best type of statute of limitations that can be.

That statute

of limitations was exactly the statute of limitations that was
applied in the Price v. Niagara case cited by Professor Epstein.
7A

Because basically what the jury obviously determined was that the
state of the art back in 1940 was such that this manufacturer should
not be held liable.

That is, in fact, a form of statute of

limitations and they found for the defendant in that case.

So

I think the system itself, which judges the manufacturer based on
the data that was available at the time of manufacture, is the
fairest form of system.

•

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

It is kind of ironic, as Dr. Epstein

pointed out, what you do in a sense is penalize the good manufacturers because they are the ones that are still in business
and have a deep pocket.

Those who manufacture the really schlock

stuff have probably gone broke and gone out of business and nobody
will bother to sue them.
MR. AITKEN:

That's probably true but the point is that ....

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. AITKEN:

I don't know what you'd do about it.

What would the 10-year statute of limita-

tions accomplish in that regard?

And I also would point out that

obviously one of the things we are concerned about is the question
of cost, and we certainly have seen no analysis that any such

•

statute would have any effect upon rate setting.
would not.

I am sure it

As a practical matter, probably .000 percent of the

cases we are dealing with involve any product beyond ten years.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
cedure?

How about reforms with respect to pro-

Do you think there is a little wastage in the -- I think

we discussed this the other day.
MR. AITKEN:

I don't think there is any question that

we have to streamline ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Is your Association going to come up with

suggestions as to ways that we can make this whole process a little
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less costly

both sides.

MR. AITKEN:
into the quest

We have a special committee looking purely

of court reform and court procedure because I

think the real tragedy in the products liability field is the fact
that the person who is injured has to wait two and three years to
get their case to court and wait as long as sometimes four or five
years to be compensated for their injury.
system.

That's the tragedy of the

That's why we have to do something about court reform and

procedures and more judges, because there is where I see that the
system has truly been neglected.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Question.
Yes, Senator Russell.
Professor Epstein indicated, at least

I understood him to say, that there doesn't seem to be in the case
that he mentioned and others, any standardized way of looking at
things, any rhyme nor reason -- everything is up for grabs when
it goes to the jury, and would you comment on that, whether you
think that's the way it should be or that is the way it is or ....
MR. AITKEN:

I don't think that's the way it should be

and that's the way it is not.

There is nothing in terms of up

for grabs as far as the jury system is concerned or the present
law of products liability in California.

The law is quite clear.

If one puts on a product, that is, on the market that is defective,
if that product because as a failure because it is defective and
causes injury then that person is entitled to recover.

That is

not an up-for-grabs system and obviously what is and is not defective
is a question of fact and that question of fact rightly belongs to

people picked at random from the community.
his statement that it is up for grabs.

These are very difficult

cases that are very clear jury instruct
loped in Cali

I seriously question

s that have been
is and g

as to what the

s very,

very clear guidance to the jury as to what they can and cannot
decide and I think that statement is fallacious.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

•

Well, Senator, as you recall, I had a

discussion with Professor Epstein up in Sacramento.
explosion in the field.

There is an

I think you will have to agree because we

have gone beyond just physical defect.

We are going into defective

design which -- or defect in design for the purpose intended or the
foreseeable purpose or whatever it is.
tion.

There is almost no limita-

It is a much larger field in the last ten years, eight years,

than it was before.
MR. AITKEN:

I think the concept of

has been applied in the products liabili

seeability as it

field is really nothing

different than when we were in law school and studied Palsgraff
and whether or not one could have anticipated the scale falling
from the shelf.

I think the question of foreseeabili

has been

applied in all kinds of various situations and it is certainly
true in the products liability field.

I haven't seen any radical

change or direction in the area of products liability since the
concept of strict liability was adopted by the
Court.

c~lifornia

Supreme

We are now just seeing case-by-case applications of what a

defect is and what one can anticipate.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

You don't think the defenses over the

last ten years have been broadened by court decision?
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MR. AITKEN:

In the products liability field I don't

think we have seen any dramatic change.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Then I guess I get from your statements

and others from your field who have appeared before this Committee,
and on medical malpractice also, that you really don't think that
there needs to be much change except maybe some streamlining of
action in the courts to do it more quickly but that the system is
working well, that there is really no problem.
MR. AITKEN:

Well, as I indicated, senator, there are

always problems in each area and we are certainly looking at it very
strongly, but I would submit to you and it definitely is the position
of our Association that the basic law as it now is,

is basically

fair and does not need any radical revision as suggested by the
insurance associations.

I think there is one thing that has always

been overlooked in this whole question of the so-called tort
explosion and the so-called change in law.

We have spent four or

five or six years of active propaganda in the area of consumerism.
We have bas

ally made Ralph Nader a national folk hero before

someone at least became concerned with his so-called ethnic background.
What I am saying is that what we have done is now,

in effect,

educated people on their rights, we in effect, we as lawyers, have
made services more available.

We are criticized for bringing too

many cases because we are supposedly contributing to the tort
explosion; on the other hand, I read numerous criticisms because
we don't extend our services far enough.
have the best of both worlds.

Now, I think you cannot

You are either going to have to decide

that consumerism was good, extending legal rights to everybody in

the communi

was the ri

to do and

th

le who are injured

the court

s the

s

I

ld not have
yet

the court system, not

stream1

the

ss.

Do

to

that are more

t

n 10

amazing when

manufa turer

and
f

That was

re s

th

t mach

suggested

tions

on machines

th

was

I

Here you are

poor worker in

that says

"after 10 years

is s

mach

respons

sudden

At 12

s

a

say,

1

if

ing to work on that

What will promptly happen, of course,

get a job somewhere else.

working

becomes

t that

fired and he will be out of a job and

le

Oh, I'm not going to work

I hurt myself on that machine, so I am not
machine."

if they have
post

ing to

your boss comes a

on that machine " and
on

t

old?

t example.

a factory sett

statute of limitations

statute of 1

t

laborers are not

MR. AITKEN:

to you," a

foresee that

t and as Mr. Epste

this is well

I

Yes, Ms. Gorman.

se cost to manufacturers in

10-year old equ

is 10 years --

22" s tuat

is.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

would actually

s and not

j

We are in a "

think there is where the

MS. GORMAN:

ism

ful

is he will be

, he

11 maybe

t's the effect of that kind of law

and that kind of notice, and I th

t highl

understanding of what the

ication of law is as

ical

opposed to the classroom setti
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ts the lack of

SENATOR RUSSELL:

How about the possibility of forcing

the manufacturer, the company, to buy newequipment every ten years?
MR. AITKEN:
of

Well, if you truly believe that at the end

10 years, that is going to be an unsafe product and there

is a reasonab

projection, then obviously it should be pulled

off the market.

I think it is interesting to note that we don't

seem to have the type of recall system for anything other than
automobiles.

We have seen a fairly sophisticated system develop

through the majormanufacturers of automobiles.

We constantly are

be

ised and warned about defects in automobiles and they

are be

recalled at the expense of the manufacturer and

then being corrected.
quest

I think we obviously have to look at the

of whether or not a recall system should be expanded

much farther than it is so that the unsafe machine is recalled
as fast as

unsafe automobile.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR.

recommendat
down the costs

HIESTAND:

Mr.

Hiestand.

Is your organization going to make any

regarding ways to save money in terms of cutting
t go to both defense and plaintiff's lawyers

for resolving these matters.

I know you can streamline the courts

and that might save some, but don't you have a feeling that, for
instance, we have heard testimony that for every dollar that is
actually paid
of them.

the products cases, 42 cents goes for the defense

In malpractice we have heard before that it is for every

dollar that is paid out, at the most 33¢ gets to the injured person.
That seems tremendously wasteful.

Isn't it possible to resolve these

disputes with say 10% going for the resolution, and the bulk of it

going to the injured party?
MR. AITKEN:

There are obviously a number of factors

involved in a premium-- broker's commission, attorney's fees,
litigation costs and a lot of everything else, but in the area
of attorney's fees,

there is no question that we can make

recommendations in our study on that point; for intance, we
have seen an explosion, if one wants to use that term, in regard to,

I

when one files a products liability case, I have seen many examples
where the other defendants immediately sue six other possible
distributors, manufacturers, component parts, other people they
feel are responsible, basically what we call complaints for indemnity,
if in fact they are justified at all, really should not arise until
such time as there has been a payoff by the defendant.

What's

happened is that we will file a case against the manufacturer.
The manufacturer will, in effect, file six cross complaints against
other entities and suddenly now you've got one plaintiff's lawyer
and seven defense attorneys.

Now, it's got to be a high increase in

cost to the system, so I don't think until somebody has actually
paid some money out of their pocket, they should be so anxious
to bring so many parties into the litigation.

I think what you

see in that instance is they are looking for somebody to share
the cost with and they are every bit as guilty as we have been
accused of so far as filing suits that I think sometimes are
frivolous; that is, they just file and bring in a bunch of
other people hopefully to get a contribution to cut the cost to
that particular manufacturer; so we are going to propose that
in terms of indemnity, if it is a true indemnity case,

it should

come out after the payout and not increase the operation of the
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system and not prolong the trial, not overly complicate the
issues

se I think there is one place we can pick up some

of that cost.
MR. HEISTAND:

That could make it more expensive though

because you would haveessentially, if you've got an award for
the plaintiff, you would be retrying the case later for indemnity
to save the case ....
MR. AITKEN:

Well, the facts have already been established

and most of those cases are tried through a court and not with
the jury and most of those cases are resolved by the insured themselves.

Most of the cases, in effect, mount the contribution of

defense costs and then they resolve the case.

I think once they pay

and the case is over, they are going to be very reluctant to get
involved

major additional litigation when they recognize the

indemnity wasn't even proper in the first instance.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Thank you very much.

We appreciate

your attendance here today.
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Jack,

just a short question.

Oh, I'm sorry.

ASSEMBLYMAN MORI:

You mentioned the manufacturer

bears the cost of recalling automobiles.

We talked of costs.

It seems to me that we want to minimize the costs.

Then the

manufacturer's cost only becomes the next season's consumer
costs that whatever the cost is, the consumer generally ends
up paying it anyway.
MR. AITKEN:

Not entirely true but oftentimes it is

true.
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI:

Well, through increased prices or
R2

diminished liability or rights or whatever.
MR. AITKEN:

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN MORI:
question.

I don't think 1

ili

to be liab

I think certainly people are go

problems that exist.

becomes the
for

To me the question is, how do we minimize

the probability of a problem occurring rather than trying to
decrease the court costs and decrease attorneys fees in whatever
event?

It seems to me we need to diminish the probability of a

problem occurring with the product.

The cost is going to be borne

somewhere, some place, and I think we all have to realize that
if we want safer products, it is going to cost us more either
through the courts or through the product

self.

I think it is

up to us to determine, where do we minimize those costs -- in
the product itself, in the courts or with lawyers or where.
MR. AITKEN:

I don't think there is any question,

Assemblyman Mori, that you are right, and that the real solution,
at least the long-term solution should be hopefully to produce
safer products and eliminate the injury, eliminate the 30,000
deaths that occur every year because of consumer products.

Let's

eliminate the 110,000, the speaker mentioned disabilities, that
occur every year because of consumer products.

There is no

question in my mind that I would rather have to close up my
doors because nobody is being injured than to,
away the rights of the injured.

in effect, take

So hopefully through a loss

prevention program and with better quality control, that will be
the best control factor possible.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Thank you very much.

and be back here promptly at 2 p.m.
(BREAK FOR LUNCH)
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We will recess now

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
Management Ana

is Center.

How about Mr. Norman Lynn.
Romney?

Mr. Behr or Mr. Bonaso, of the
Are either one of those gentlemen here?
Mr. Lynn here?

You want to come on up.

California

Mr. Cashion or Mr.

You gentlemen represent the

Liability Task Force.

Is that correct?

All

right.
MR. GERALD CASHION:

(See Appendix IX)

Chairman Knox

and Committee members, I am Gerald Cashion and I am President of
Meyer Machine
a

Company located in Los Angeles and Redwood City

I am the

sentative of the California Product Liability

Task Force, wh

is an unincorporated organization, association,

and we are a group of wholesalers and distributors in the State
of Cali

, working together for one common purpose, that of the

enact

of

islation at the state level to provide product

liabili

laws.

by this?

In the 1972 census there were approximately 24,000

wholesa

a

And how many businesses in california are affected

distributors that generated some 28.9 billion dollars

worth of revenue for our state and employ some 269,000 people.
our op

ion,

for small bus

In

t liability has reached a crisis in this state
sses.

The proliferation of product liability

suits poses a threat to the industry and especially the small
businessman, a
It is driving
It is fore
the foundat

reat unequal to that of the medical profession.
surance rates out of range for many small businesses.
some companies to close their doors.

It is eroding

of the industrial system and common marketplace.

It is, as a result of this, pumping millions of dollars worth
of inflat

to the economy annually in the form of higher
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prices for goods manufactured that must be pa

the consumer.

This ta

f 149 companies

force

a

as o

that re

8,

had a 50% increase
a 100% increase.

the

i

1

insurance

s and we feel

small bus

to share some of my own exper

company that I now own is 49 years o
rs our

for products liabil

to $27,000

s

'

the speci

Wha

here -- we

we

the attorney.

I

we are

di

f this problem.
to do about it.

We, as a task force, th

have a statute of limitations.

terrupt

1

What we are interested in is what
MR. CASHION:

equipment.

to

experience, but we are well aware of the severi

I

cation that

any

I

you but we have a long agenda this afternoon.
teres ted

The

some 30 people

not sel

Mr. Ca

you.

s increased from $2,400
on

I cut one-third of my business off
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

ss of our state.

It emp

surance

Those

l

less

that it is a good cross section of

and in the last two

that a 3-year

l

s

reporting were companies that had 25

I would 1

a 500% or

We

sed these

survey would have

primari

8% of this

rease and 24% of this group

better increase

them
1 9"/o had

i

The other 19% had a 300% increase.

group had a

•

o

r

t you should

ree with our learned friend,

If he thinks there is no need for

, then why do the

attorneys have a bill before you now for a statute of limitations.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. CASHION:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

A very good point,

I voted for it.

Then the other thing is ....
I have sa
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, Mr. Cashion, now that

a

are being sued, the time has come to do something about

this problem.
MR. CASHION:

We think you should be in the same boat

that we are and we will go on forever, because in 49 years we
are still being sued for machines that were sold before some of us
were born.
arts.

There is no statute of limitations nor state of the

We need a state of the arts in this country because I

am certainly sure the engineers that are designing equipment and
products for the consumer today are doing the very best they can.
You can see that in your automobile.
law.

We need a reform on tort

We would need our Workmen's Compensation laws revamped to the

point ultimately that could be the answer for any liability on
injured persons.

We feel as a group that these measures have to

be done and have to be done now.

We can't go on for three or four

more years dragging along because some of us will not be here to
be in business.

We cannot pass on to the consumer as wholesalers

and distributors the cost of this rising insurance.

It has to

come from some place.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
the statute of 1

Do you have other suggestions besides

tations and the state of the art approach?

MR. CASHION:

I would say that your workmen compensation

laws, if we could change those, and also the ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. CASHION:

Change them in what fashion?
Well, 30 years ago that was the method

that protected the workman against injury.
that was the avenue that he ....
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If he was injured

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Outlaw the th

pa

cla

MR. CASHION

these

ts a

1 over

we sell

if I sold you a cha

walked

to your home,

and 10 years later it had a cracked leg on

it and I am sorry, Senator Knox, you can't s
anymore, you would throw me out of
when we go back to a plant that
whatever

in that chair

home.
us

same thing

this equ

, or

t be, and we tell a man not to use that

machine anymore that it is not safe because he had done this or
done that to
control.

ification, he runs us out, so we have no
middle man and we are

We are

this to

t

profits that we do make go for insurance.

the point where

think it is time now that we do someth

I

this and that's

about the summary of it.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Okay.

We

that.

c

Mr. Romney,

is it?
Ye , sir.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

See

ndix X)

someth

Do you

would like to

add in this regard?
MR.

ROMNEY:

wherein you a

I am answering

me three questions.

letter of June 6th
I am Dick Romney.

I am

President of Pac-Power, a firm in Walnut Creek and Woodland,
Cali

ia.

We sell, service and rna

and mobile d

tain aerial manlift equipment

rnrrick equipment like the public utilities use.

Our customers are public utility companies, municipal governments,
the State of California, the Federal Government and so forth.
employ 27 people.

We are licensed by the State to
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perform

We

mobi

crane certification.

manufacturer
only been
ment f

We represent two of the leading

the midwest of these types of products.
business since 1973.

ld

33 years.

addressed to me.
since 1974.

We have

I have been in the utility equip-

You asked three questions in the letter

The first is how much have our premiums increased

When we were founded in '73 with a major insurance

carrier, we were able to obtain $500,000 primary and $1,000,000
umbrella for about $3,000.

In '74 the carrier declined to renew

coverage and we had to seek an eastern and southeastern firm for
the same $500,000 and $1,000,000 which ran us up to $3,220 for one
and $3,112
polic

the other, or an increase of 100%.

s expired, one carrier cancelled.

expire
carr

Before those

The other one did

then we were able to get no help from any major
We were finally given coverage with a Michigan firm

for $21,250 for $300,000 coverage, with a $500 deductible.
this is a mill
that isn't

Now

two hundred less coverage for a 335% increase but
bad part of the story.

The Insurance Commissioner

of Michigan forced this company out of the California market and we
were cancelled ten days before Christmas.
agent's ha

We had an audit in our

s the night of the lOth day, yet it took us better than

two months to get a refund on our unused premium and we received it
on a short-rate cancellation basis.

I was informed last week by

a reliable insurance firm that this company is still selling
insurance in California but many of the firms that were insured by
them have not received return on their premium as yet.

The second

question was, have you been refused coverage by any insurance
company and my answer to that is, yes.

00

We have to date approached

vigorously 42 carriers.
I may back

We have received coverage from none.

for one moment.

since we've

d one 1

ili

action

iness and we have suffered $900 in

liability loss.
I mentioned.

We have

None of the major carriers would insure us, as

We have utilized a small-town agent.

a specializing broker in transportat

We have utilized

equipment that knows our

field very well and we have utilized three of the largest

•

brokerage houses in San Francisco and to date we have been able
to get no decent coverage.

Three weeks ago, after a detailed

plant inspection, documention and testing review with a carrier,
we received this quotation, three weeks ago, for $100,000 coverage,
and this is all they would offer us.

With a $10,000 deductible

per occurrence written on a claims made basis, they would be
happy to extend us coverage for $63,000 premium.

Now, I'm not

very bright ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

You are

ing close to where you should

book it yourself.
MR. ROMNEY:

Well, that's --

I'm not very bright but that's spend

•

S

1

S

-- this, as you say,

73¢ to protect 27¢ and

that makes no sense was my conclusion.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

What do you think we ought to do about

this?
MR. ROMNEY:

I don't know.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. ROMNEY:
the first thing.

Oh.

All right.

I think a statute of limitations would be

I only have one more short point to make.
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CHAIRMAN KNOX:
MR. ROMNEY:

All right, go ahead.

We have been repeatedly turned down by

major carriers and both these gentlemen who spoke for the
insurance industry this morning, I can speak to personally,
who write firms in other states doing the same job, representing
the same lines we do that now have realistic premium costs.

Salt

Lake City, Denver, Portland and San Antonio, Texas are all
examples.

The Colorado Company in June saved some $19,000 in

premiums in anticipation of their July first law that was passed and
Texas efforts have been through the Insurance Commissioner.

We

have gone so far now that twelve of us western utility equipment
dealers are investigating a captive insurance company.

The money

up front in an offshore Colorado company is staggering and it seems
to me totally unrealistic that I must go into the insurance business
to survive.

The third question you asked -- do you know any

companies that were unable to obtain coverage due to the cost of
premiums.

Yes, I know three here in California.

is the most serious problem we face today.
a new partner in our business.

Product liability

Premium costs have put

The lack of product coverage is now

spilling into the general liability market.

We must have legislative

relief in California or the legitimate dealers will be no more.
Thank you, sir.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

appreciate your attendance.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

We

Oh, excuse me, Senator.
It is not a question but an observation.

It is interesting to hear the gentleman representing the trial
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lawyers say

was real

are here indica

no

se

Yet

ntlemen

tha

ind.
la t

s

arra

in

s

MR. CASHION:
the a

•

30 years we

t

rs of business pr

19671 30
suits

st

rs.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:
te it.

Universi

no

to that,

su

Since

s, and 40

To me, that's a

, gentlemen.

Thank

We now have a dist

We

professor from the

of Tenne see Law

fes

Gerald

te your ask

illips.

n, Members of

Mr.
the panel, I

lem.

I would

SENATOR RUSSELL:

apprec

is no problem

Senator Russel

here.

me

Mr. H

stand

asked me
Epstein
some more specif
sta

so

comments

re is no satisfactory

t

te of the art,

f

nts and

and post act

•

s we

wa

do not take into account issues of foresee
statutes, I
will ment

more detail

to foreclose issues
should not be.

ter,

forseeabili

My own b

would be to
both for

to forec

a

s

iffs and de

many
in s

terms of a

a comparative
a

those

nts.

lt

ions

t

il
st

s to which

stances, attempts
tions where they
r solut

at least,

ch across the board,

Such a proposal has been put

forward by the Commissions for Uniform State Acts and we are in
the process of drafti

such a proposal now.
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I

SENATOR RUSSELL:

I don't understand that, Mr. Chairman.

Will you explain that?
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Senator Russell, thats ....

Well, go

ahead, Professor.
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS:

If the plaintiff were found to be,

for example, 30% negligent and another defendant found being 60%
and the other defendants the remainder, the plaintiff would
recover all of his damages less 30% and he would recover them in
proportion against those two defendants, according to their degree
of
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

The Li v. Taxicab case in California

has abolished the old common law principle of contributory
negligence as far as the plaintiff's action.

If the plaintiff

were even a little bit negligent, he was totally barred.

They

substituted comparative negligence but the problem is, of course,
in products, we have what is called liability without fault,

so

there is some question as to whether the Li case applies in
that situation.

What the professor is suggesting is that we might

want to have comparative fault,

that is,

if the plaintiff is 25%

at fault and somebody else is 35%, and somebody else -- the fact
the jury can make that decision.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

You can have a multiple suit then.
Well, you have a multiple suit anyway.

This would just allow the jury to say -- to parcel out the fault
as they felt it -- as they felt it lay.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
previous ....

They wouldn't be able to do that under

PROFESSOR PHILLIPS:

't th

I

it

s been done in

Cali

rative

fault or

causat

so-cal

str

l

actions.

ili

SENATOR RUSSELL:
it is not be
liable

Excuse me.

current situation,

r

he would be

A person would be sued a

the

•

nded to

ing?
pla

PROFESSOR PHILLIPS:

would not

ff's

be taken into account as I understand the present California law.
CHAIRMAN KNOX

t's

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Thank

PROFESSOR PHILLIPS:
substantial and has been
today, has to
remember

several of the

fact f

negl

r
t, a

in that case, the courts saying, we cannot do a
It is a quest

for

Legis

ture.

Epstein put forward or the Amer

third party.

I th

d from

1

ility

ing about this.
sal

n Insurance Associat

is that there be no subrogation l
be

Now the

some
manufacturer

r, yet the manufa turer paid the ent

rem a

compensat

I can
tha

r found the

nee, and the

s

situat

sat

a recent case where the court

employer, or ra

for

on

the '..Yorkers
i

65% negl

lem that I think is

Another

t Mr.
put forward

and that the amount of worker's
amount

f recovery against a

that is a good proposal so far as it goes

but it does not go far enough.

It seems to me if you adopted an

across-the-board comparative fault, comparative causation approach,
you would let the worker collect from his employer the amount of
worker's compensation, whatever the limits may be and then sue
93

r

ba

aga

the recove

t the manufacturer reducing, however, from

amount of employer's fault, plus the amount of

the

t, if any.

collect

's compensation $20,000 but the percentage of

fault attr
be

So that, for example, you might

le to the employer might be $100,000.

so far as

should be.

That would

recovery against the manufacturer but it

The manufacturer is not responsible for that fault

and should not bear it.

If it cannot be borne in the present

worker's compensation system, if the rates cannot be raised,
then there is no reason to shift it to the non-fault party.
some of the proposals specifically, the statute of

ss

lim

Now,

sal an outer cut-off limits has been adopted in

s

t

a number of situations; in medical malpractice cases,
construct
is

industry statutes and under the Uniform Comrnerical Code,
so

basis of recovery, a 4-year statute of limitations

running from the date of sale.

Some constitutional question has been

raised about these outer cut-off statutes and in some jurisdictions
they have been declared unconstitutional.
there as was discussed this morning.
cut-offs sugges

The question is certainly

I think the three time period

by ....

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Was that on equal protection or due

process ....
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS:
per

s that Dr.

presents a canst

A di

rent t
the

tei 's

Due process.

The three time cut-off

statute proposes, I think,

in itself

ional problem of inequality in protection.
period for the retailer, for the manufacturer
nt part manufacturer.

A sort of problem that

bothers me with the statute of lim
to do with the

f case l

Mathos of

tha

of

vs.

, several years

Company manu
lever.

s absolute cut-off has

t

plast

The

ball to be

Motor

on its gear shift

They used black and they used white.

White, it was known,

was subject to deterioration by the ultra v

let rays of the sun

so that within a period of a year or a year and a half, the knob
would become total
of impact.
lever.

useless as a

ice

Underneath the knob was a

It came to a spear-like

wi

i

a

tiff was impaled

a year or a

r and a half

because no one was so unfortunate
cases, it seems

in a collision.

st

Now,

been exactly the same.

would

It lay dormant for 13 years s
as to be thrown

ted gear shift

se of the automobile.

car,

after the sale of

pla

int

on the knob 13 years after the
if that accident had

sharp-po

the event

to me, that type of case, where the

s

a time bomb

from the beginning and simply does not manifest itself until 10 years
later, it strikes me as

a substant

sen

I do not think that you can equitab

1

Moreover,

and perhaps not even consti-

tutionally foreclose the various loopholes that may eat up the rule
to continuing duty, loophole
loophole.

, the fraudulent concealment

If your wrote a statute without those exceptions in it,

the courts would e

statute and if you expressly

them on

said they were not to be exceptions, I think you would raise a
very serious constitutional problem.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Question very briefly.

Are you saying

that if somebody had been injured the year or second year afterwards,
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it wou

fact

tha

t no

jury occurred in 13 years,

as

year.

Is that what

you are
PROF
defect

as it was 13 years later.

a

tous that

nt came on

c

a sta
on

It seems to me the product is just as

PHILLIPS:

tute of l

13 years later.

tat

s

out of

this state.

really benefit your manufacturers

Their products, I presume, go as much
more

te

e

they stay in the state.

would be
1

ta

wou

e

disa
a very

pe

ge to Cali
stantial adva

IRMAN KNOX:

ia plaintiffs with
to California defendants.

t's the ultimate question, but

re are a number of cases also

SSOR PHILLIPS:

If you take a drug, for example,

con inued use of a

involv
over a 5,

r period, those cases, I presume, as the

statute is wri

would

contr

i j

al

t
a

for recovery because a sale
occurred within the 10-year period
ion of the sale contributing to the

tan

period.

injury would fall

1 right.

CHA

PROF

If I may, I will

tion statute.

if

move on to

for see

It seems to me those cases

coverage of the statute.

would rema

It

him that until we get through.

't a

I

Well,

If

ect to statutes of

iding not this kind of protection.

re

result

Another problem

s, and Professor Epstein touched

is, is to what extent would

and sel

It was fortui-

PPS:
s wh

And

is raises the whole question of
the proposed statute does not take

account of.

We

the

a case out of Tennessee wh
th

11

350

1

Sect

378.

applying Tennessee law.
manufacturing

demonstrates

It is a
There the

5,

fendant built a cement

for an

llat

se

~

and constructed

conveyors of cement high off the ground and

constructed

r

them so that the stone and the cement and so forth
over out of the b

onto

a

were watching the operation.
the employer negl
of the platform.

nt

I

be

spilled

where the workers

In

apparen

roof was not

the collection of the droppage
periodically as
of the mater
neath.

should have

n.

1 on top of the roof,

was held liable for the ent

of situat
measures?

the build-up
rs under-

bins in

f

to

st instance
s

Why?

seeable that if someone constructs

, someone wou

to avoid

a

The court held, yes, I

foreseeable case.

wi

t fell on

faul

The manufacturer of

Because was it not

Eventual

, to

t type
remedial

that presents a good

There is the inv

if

tion type of case --

, 501 Federal Second 617,

1.s an Eighth C
on top of a mach

it case of 1974.
used for mixing

water and so forth for sowing of grass.

was a protect
cellu

guard

se fiber seeds,

The protective device

there was such that it got in the way when you were trying to
feed the machines.

It made the machine practically unworkable.

The employees naturally removed it, they folded it back, in order
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meant to be used.
when

was

se cases
a

to kick

it seems to me,

foreseeabil
that is do

sent

of alterat

Where

and does not impede

its j

and it is

t

r got

less

taken off by an

ing the manufacturer 1

le.

If

cases but bad cases cannot be

are
statute

There is another problem

able

Cali

ia has the landmark
1964 case involv

retai

11

r of an automobile.
quite possib

t
dealer, not I, when
was not

left my hands.

In

alteration did it.

1

a nondelegable duty of

court sa
rule has bee
to a situat

lowed
where

1

wou

New Jersey.

It

product was sent to

the user.

be as

sure

resul

ili

There is a subthat type of

want to eliminate it.
art, this to me seems to be

state of

most unjustified measure
And I doubt that user ex1 as sta
t

the state of

in negl

in this supporting

art will control liability

law, not just str

t

liability,

but negligence dating I think back to
T. J.

r case

Lea

30's.
e

Ha

practice was sa

famous
i

so find.

beh

If the ent

does

be left to the indus

stry

s

The courts have to be

cannot

final

arbiter in this situation; otherwise you would have turned over ....
SENATOR RUSSELL:

•

behind?

nt, sir, do they lag

In

makes that decis
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS:

depending on the

?

The expert testimony may be required,
case.

tion of

that it is a situat

You don't even have

of common

to have expert test

been,

It could

been done more safe

It would

All I'm saying is

re

should have
s of the case.

on the

cannot leave

the person who is sett
it seems to me.

Some cases are such

st

his own sta

s.

not be a

ultimately to
It is very unsound

cases where

of the art will not control, but there is a suf
that to

se out entire

state

nt residual

it seems to me would be very unwise

as well.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

irman.

Mr.

Mr. McAlister.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

As I understand it, the objection

that the industry raises to the state of
lack of the state of

art defense or the

art defense is that they are judged

today by standards of today when they made the machinery a long
time ago.

Am I incorrect on that?
PROF. PHILLIPS:

That's r
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t.

I was addressing myself here

f the state of

art as it is defined in

it

if the

any

of the
t

try that will

raised goes more directly

statute
s.

is the non-introduction

t is most

turer be

is

ly the situation
st hoc standards.

j

you could not introduce evidence of
a

de to improve your product taken after the
se it was not necessari
the

l

at ev

California,

ld that it could come in,

of making the product sa fer,
considerat

at least in design cases

cases as well.
to me d ff

If that is the main issue
to s

that it is indeed

and says, this could not

nu

worked, the trade-offs would have

not
you re

to
now.

ng

t.

t lie in a

unsafe defense.
t, very

it is

shift the burden to the

it was sc

m

You say,

If it can be done now, why

done then?

t

of encouraging

nee to come in.

case,
il

probative

invo

reason or a

ntifically impossible
of jurisdictions
But most of these cases
scientific impossibility

r decisions of production,
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research and development or whatever

it

not done then until

later.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
by having a j

ra 1

We used

cases

view of the crossing to show that they put up a

crossing subsequent to the accident.
strong view for a

It was definitely, it was a

time that you cou

PROF. PHILLIPPS:

•

ss

To prove

not bri

subsequent ....

nee, but you can use it

1

for other purposes.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

. .. in fact, got it in.

PROF. PHILLIPPS:
major problem.

o

Where the su

is made by the de
lad

This

course,

is

is a
or improvement

ir or cha

t

ndant himself, and the j

is ins

I

s and gentlemen of the jury, this is not an admiss

negligence or fault on the

of

the other ear.

great da

low tha

knows.

or not
wou

If

But I personal

ink that post-ace

~

be no

of
jury probably

defendant

hears that in one ear and it goes ou

now

is the

t
t

I

nobody

I suppose.
ts at least when

nt

made by the defendant raise a very severe risk of undue prejudice
't see how you can solve the prob-

to the defendant himself, but I
lem at least where
impeachment.

evidence is

ing used for

court and says it would

defendant comes

and he has made a change in

not be feasible to make a safer
his own product subsequent to

injury.

him in that situation on cross-examination.
not feasible?

s of

You did it yourself.

What

naturally ask

How can you say it is

To cut off the right to ask

that question, I think would constitute a very severe incursion
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wh

t

1

s at the center of our

se
ace

oc

the

s

the manufacturer cou
he just didn't realize
to cause that kind of an

to the

to warn

at least

al, Professor

his commentary, an admission

have been

in more areas than here; namely,

at

ast

de

s

ctable or incapable
the cases depend

t

nces of each
He

, which is typical of tort
, dete

s

warned, and the
s
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th of the warning, is

down

a mean

, doe
f causa

ning by

ful standard way

ss a couple of questions,
, and he suggests that the

ld

immed

te cause of the

uage

make any

It is used somet
substant
t more wou
ses are a

l cause,

I

make any difference.
complicated questions of

that the quest
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s by some

s can or should be

are not capab

of

an example of a case
in

nvo

the sale of charcoal briquets.

Up until a

le of

rs ago

the industry

was and
use, cook on

s were used

-ve

indoors in a non-well-ventila
of an ent
allegat

area, resu

intiff's a

of the

have been more str

t the warning could
if

s

a

Federal Government now requ

s,

been on that

se

a

have

Wou

on anyway,

era
Would

well
s

?

take

te warn

those cases,

that
case

se we don't

d a

i

order to do just

or to the fact fi

The warn

restr

st retai

ts recovery aga

'

have to be le
statute

rs a

see no reason why at
~

st you would
there are s

in the shoes of manufacturers

to the court

so effect

non-manufac
or

tors to a situat

for retailers and

thing

the on

that

would have

know if

f for lack

bill.

ted e

it is an

i

had to have the

t

they had to heat

Who knows?

Well, suppose that warning had
were

of payment of the utili

the

by asphyxiation.'

electr

s

assuming

s," wh

"you may suffer dea

That is now the present warning.

venti

a

carbon monox

heating

death

ctual mi

ot retain a
t

distribut.
l

I

nt standard

s where retailers stand

re they hold themselves out as the

manufacturer of the product itself.
you would treat them and should treat
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In that s

t

, I suppose

like manufacturers.

tute is 1

tat

on

s recoverab

nsa

aw
be recove

damages and Dr. Epstein's

the

illam case where a television

ision

es of

s to whether or not

However, you do see cases which

of

c

re

at all, they being

so forth.

cont

itive damages to

of the extreme risk of fire

them even though there were repeatedly
case simp

required imposition of punitive

seems to me

t one thing you might want to

r not, as a matter of

If
sm and

can be absorbed, due to

ssed on

s avo

lie policy, such

, the very punitive

I th nk this is the extent of

my
I will ask Senator Russell's question
a

ny substantive changes in

ili
st 10

as it has developed in the

to make?

that we

than the workmen's compensation

PS:
and
Yes.

Well, no I understand you made a

t we look at comparative fault but do

construct

other cha
PS:

I th

s

t we should look
t

at?

in carrying that forward,

amount of recovery by the amount of the

employer's fault.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

What is the workmen's comp case?
Well, he

suggesting that a typical

case is if a worker gets hurt on a machine and he had his
Workmen's Compensation benefits and his attorney also files an
action against the manufacturer and it is argued that if you had
comparative fault that the jury could ascribe certain damages
against the manufacturer but would also look at the amount of
fault of the employer, for example, in taking off the safety
guard or whatever else the individual has done, perhaps the
place where the machine is or any other kind of fault.

Is

that the proposal?
PROF. PHILLIPS:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
carry the full load.

Yes, the result ....
So that the manufacturer doesn't

He carries whatever the jury thinks is

appropriate.

•

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
concept of worker's comp?
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

•

Something that encourages the

No, he still gets his worker's comp.

Of course, that's ....
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Encouraging from the employer's

standpoint.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Yes, encourages the employer to be more

careful, I assume.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Also, violates the principle

that the employer is liable only in the no-fault system of
worker's comp.

's

know if

PS:

The

or

al I was putting forward

ent worker's comp liability of the employer
against a third party.

1

effect,
be

employer is at fault, would

amount of

worker's

of the employee, if the

did not equal the amount of the fault of

KNOX:

Let s

concrete case because

1 understand

I

Let's say there is $100,000

the jury

of

The

gets $25,000 1n

1 care

lity rating and what

c
I

leav

i

t $25,000 goes to the

the

0 for the employee.

$75

the emp

now if you recovered

was 2

at fault, what happens?
that the jury finds them

Let s s

. PHILLIPS:

be a col
the

The

Now, if

of $50,000 only from

would end up losing $25,000 because
of the

on who

actually at fault, the

on
I

use

am not sure I understand that.

100,000 the J
ffered.
's

He

Let's

finds that that's the

He has received $25,000 from
$75,000 but the first $25,000

10

collected goes back to the worker's compensation carrier under
the present law

California.

comparative

Now, what

that

are

under the
ting, if the jury finds

that the employer is 25% at fault; in other words, $25,000?
PROF. PHILLIPS:

No, it wouldn't go back if you

eliminate the subrogation lien.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

You eliminate the subrogation lien.

PROF. PHILLIPS:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Yes.
Okay.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Is that what you advocate?

PROF. PHILLIPS:

Yes.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Why?

PROF. PHILLIPS:

The subrogation lien apparently has been

a strong incentive for the breeding of litigation and indeed for
the financing of litigation where the employer who is partly at
fault, urges and cooperates actively with his employee in an action

•

over against a third party.

But

what's most offensive about it, is

the situation where the employer is substantially at fault.
knows of the dangerous condition.
whatsoever.

He leaves it.

He

He does nothing about it

He has been warned,

(the Balito case,

for example) and he brazenly goes ahead with the situation and yet
he is being the one at fault is entitled to recover over.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
PROF. PHILLIPS:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

The third party being the manufacturer.
He gets his money back.
There is no equity in that at all.
The employer gets his money back.

gets the first money back, even before attorney fees for the
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He

I understand the California
where the

at

t the
the

, the

for the amount of
a contribution to

There
to that extent.

, unless the law has
since I've looked at

or s

t

t an employer for fault now is willful
ed to be a 5

, but it is almost

iforn

It

very difficult.

All right.

questions?

Well,

Thank you,

Oh, excuse me, Fred

be

Could you

ust c

the state of the

comments for the committee, because,
state o

art defense would not pre-

as to what the state of the art is.

c

remarks

that if you adopted the

tate

't have any expert testimony

as
whether

I

of the art actual
was

to the

was at the time and
circumstances of the

No, what I was directing my attention to
speci
there are two

statement
re poss

the proposed statute.

le

1 use

When

designs, the adoption of
the defendant's trade or business

lOB

or an allied or similar trade shall be treated as being in compliance with the state of the art.

So defining the state of the

art at the time of manufacture leaves the determination of what
here, substantial use.

is adequate to the conduct of, as
MR. HIESTAND:

So the law is a common denominator.

PROF. PHILLIPS:

Exactly, exactly.

This does not address

the separate question of whether or not you should have a state
of the art defense determined at the time of manufacture and if
so, what would be that standard.

That standard I suppose would

be determined by, not law, but what was actually being done at the
time and what was capable of being done.

That is the true state

of the art standard, it seems to me.
CHAIRMAN KJ:iiOX:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Okay, Senator.
What you are saying -- your proposal

then rests solely on the comparative negligence approach.

That's

what you feel would be helpful in addressing this problem ....
PROF. PHILLIPS:

And extending that to worker's situation,

worker's compensation situation.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

The other statute of limitations and

warnings, and so forth, you do not support?
PROF. PHILLIPS:

I think that you will have so many, of

necessity, so many exceptions to an absolute cut-off period that
you will not accomplish the purpose set out.
addressing, that's without even address

That's without

the fundamental question

of why should you cut off a valid claim that can be well shown
such as in the Nicole Blackman case I mentioned in South Carolina.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So you would oppose then a flat statute

109

of

?

PROF. PHILLIPS:
RUSSELL:

Yes.
And to add exemptions would be too

?

PROF. PHILLIPS:

Well, if you adopt a flat statute, I

need at least the three major exceptions
or four, and therefore, I am saying as a
matter you won't accomplish what you set out to do
th

statute.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

no

You do not agree then that there is

You do feel there is a problem that needs to be

addressed.
PROF. PHILLIPS:
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
or

so

Mr

Apparently there is.
~hank

Okay.

are you here yet?

you very kindly.

Norman Lynn?

Mr. Behr

Berry Griffin?

ff
MR. BERRY L. GRIFFIN:

members of

(See Appendix XI)

Mr. Chairman,

Committee on Tort Liability, my name is Berry

Gri

and Benefits Manager of Baker International Corporation
, California.

I appear here today as a practicing

, as a member of the Orange Empire Chapter of the
sk and Insurance Management Society, or RIMS, and also as the
1

Pres

of RIMS in charge of Government and Industry

Rather than telling a lot of goodies about RIMS, let's

Re
down to

I'll have the goodies in the passouts.

We

are charged with the responsibility of protecting our
's assets
losses such as

t the risk of loss as a result of static
, earthquake, auto liability, products liability
110

generally considered as insurable risks, either through selfinsurance, or the more traditional purchase of insurance.

In

other words, the professional risk manager spends 40 hours or
more a week dealing with nothing but the management of the risks
of his firm.

I can assure you that we risk managers are very

aware of the products liability problem facing not only the
business community, but the entire citizenry of the State of
California and the nation as a whole.
we face this problem daily.

And I can assure you that

Much has been written about why we have

a products liability problem today.

Because so much has been

written on the subject, and in the interest of brevity, I will
not rehash the many reasons why we find ourselves in this position.
What I would like to do is to propose solutions to the products
liability insurance proposal so that manufacturers can find
adequate insurance at an affordable price.

Firstly, manufacturers

should be producing products free from defect.
continue these efforts.

Industry must

Several governmental agencies are care-

fully watching industry's efforts and believe me, they are.
Secondly, much more must be done to educate the public concerning
the tort system.

Let the public know what happens to their

insurance premiums and to the price of any product purchased when
tort liability is abused.

Thirdly, the insurance industry must

get a handle on products liability.

They must develop meaningful

statistics that substantiate the enormous premiums that they now
demand.

Lastly, the American tort system, encompassing the

judicial mechanism, is a viable concept which should be retained.
The erosion of the fault concept of liability, the increased use
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cost

s and inefficiency
the

We

and action which will
lity problem.

our tort

Among

One, enact a statute of limiuations
statute from

time a particular

stream of commerce.
KNOX:
6

mean by 6-10?

What do

Do you mean

between 6 and 10?

6 and 10.
a

We don't

our repres

KNOX:

I

unders
court awards to economic loss,

Two,

fees, thus eliminating pain and
awards and permitting
l

This, we feel will

source

more reasonable

s

of cla

trial.
all state worker's compensation

recommend

and recoveries of

to an

ted to the statutory worker's
against fellow employees

j

and manufacturers should be

neg

RIMS supports this as
, under which awards

a

be reduced

12

ly by their

negligence in causing their own damage or injuries.
Fifth, state of the art -- a

prohibiting the
in products

introduction of evidence of
resulting from advancements in technology.

Sixth, enactment of a statute which would regulate plaintiff
attorneys' contingent fees.

We recommend a graduated scale or

possibly in the alternative, court-awarded fees.
Seventh, compliance with federal or state standards
such a compliance should be at least a rebuttable presumption that
a product was not defective.
Eighth, contribution among tortfeasors.

We support

meaningful contribution among tortfeasors.
Ninth, advance payments -- RIMS supports evidence rulings
which will exclude such payments from being disclosed or imply
admission of liability, and permit such awards to be offset against
subsequent awards.
Tenth, bifurcated trials -- we support the use of bifurcated
trials, or separate trials, where the

sues of liability or

negligence are first tried and if liability is found, a second trial
may be held on the issue of damages.

This will separate the

emotional issue of damages from the more objective issue of
negligence.
Eleventh, advance notice of claim -- we will support
a requirement that prior to any liability suit being filed, a notice
of claim must be filed with the other party and a reasonable
opportunity given to remedy the defect and compensate for economic
loss to the claimant.
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we

11 support a requirement

both as

and damages in

as to 1

caseload on

courts.

to the smaller cases.
fee

tern,-- we recommend the

so as to reimburse the attorney
on that

of the award or settlement

t settlement offer made by defendants
was engaged

claimant.

payment of winner's costs --we recommend
1 court costs and attorney's fees

11

law

and encourage more

before trial and more important,

the elimination of

ad damnum -- we
because

-- because of

means that

can't say, I sue
you just say, I'm suing

or s

' t we do that

MCALISTER:

Yes,

done

medical

the medical -- AB lXX,

tallment payment of awards
of awards to periodic

of
as an a
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to large sum payments

and possible reduction of awards in the event of the early demise
of the claimant.
very much.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Thank you for those modest suggestions.

We will take them under submission.

I'll submit them to the Trial

Lawyers Association for their comments.

No, I think you have

raised an inventory on some of the issues before us and we
appreciate it very much.
MS. GORMAN:

Are there any questions?

Ms. Gorman.

Do you represent self-insureds?

MR. GRIFFIN:

I am a self-insured, yes.

my worker's compensation.

Baker does.

I self-insure

Many, many RIMS members

self-insure, at least a portion of their risk, if not all.

My

goodness, Standard Oil of New Jersey self-insures the first $10
million of their risk.
MS. GORMAN:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KNOX:

•

If I had $10 million I'd do it too, but

I don't have $10 million.
MS. GORMAN:

What's been the experience among, say

Standard Oil -- companies like Standard Oil of New Jersey in

•

recent years?
MR. GRIFFIN:

Well, I can't speak for Standard Oil.

think I can speak in general.

I

They wouldn't be doing it if it

wasn't saving them money.
MS.

GOR~~:

No.

I understand that, but if they had a

dramatic increase in the cost of claims in the last two or three
years ....
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have an increase in the
near

the

premiums if they had

KNOX:

You are

to give us a copy of your

Sure.
KNOX:
Mr.

Thank you very much.

s

11

Thank you very

, of Simpson's Safety
Applicants' Attorneys

of

Mr

, members of the

and I am appearing on behalf
Association.

Attorneys

ured employees, both for
and on occasion for third party
lege to in the past to
or employees in actions against
, some successfully and some not so
1

to share some perceptions that I have

as

with the Committee in an
tance to the committee in that area.

after

I feel

, both this morning and
there are c

misconceptions that may be

what exact

going on in the battlefield and

s myself br

that area.

6

It appears that

have surfaced

the two major so-called reforms

the discussion

so far here today
actions and statute limitations
state of the art.

s

, with the

As a matter of fact, the law today in California

is that the injured employee, the injured plaintiff is required
to prove that an article was defective at the time it left the
hands of the manufacturer.

•

It is my feeling in this area that
this area.

we have a built-in statute of limitations

Because of

that and also because of the instructions that are given to juries
in these cases that have been formulated by the various decisions
of our appellate courts as to the

of a manufacturer.

Now, with

respect to the state of the art problem which has been presented
here, I would like to quote some rather direct language from the
decision that has been mentioned

before Balito v. Improved

Machinery, Inc., which was a case dec
of Appeal in 1972.

•

the California Court

It was a design case.

digress for a moment,

, if I may just

seems that from

has been presented

here today that the problem lies not so much

the area of the

manufacturing defect where the article that was manufactured and
sold on the market just in a certain period of time fell apart
because of the fact that a part was not up to the manufacturer's
own specifications or was underspec
objections from the manufacturing s

in some manner.

The

, from the insurance carrier's

side, seem to be directed more of a design case and Balito was one
of those cases.

It contained some important language as to what

an injured employee must prove in the course of his presenting
his testimony.

It says that strict liability for deficient design
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ed on a f

f

the product was
e and
must neces

the art at

turn, the

ly be derived

time of its design.

A danger

and the manufacturer's

fores

or potential, to forestall unreason-

ab
measure of

A manufacturer's
and

duty

lure to achieve

foresta

the design of its·product
full potential and design

unreasonable danger forms the basis for its
tort.

I

that this is the -- if there

that

ts as to the responsibility or

manufacturer under current California law, it is the
us

extracted and read from the Balito decision.
that

to state of the art, we

We a

have the language of the Ccurt

state

that the responsibility of the

be determined on the basis of his potential
des
f the art

and be

in part by the state

ted at the

of the products manufacture.

is,

there be one, or the
a self-correcting one.

the courts

~~~~~

and

I believe

and Vandermark in 1963

us out of it with cases such as
Professor

referred to earlier.

forgot to tell you, or emitted to tell you,
was that the

lved
s

Price case was an open-back

was,
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fact, manufactured in 1940

and was in fact manufactured

State of New York and

ultimately

the loss of

s

a young

from

subs

's

But

at the time it was manufactured in 1940 in the State of New York,
it was manufactured in violation of existing statutory safety
standards that existed

that state at the time and the evidence

that was produced in that case brought out the existence of those
standards, brought out the fact

what those standards were,

but allowed any trial judge, as any court would allow, the manufacturer to state
and he presented

p

ce,

and he

and he presented his case,

well, and he presented

the jury decided in that case
responsible because

manufacturer wasn't

was a multi-purpose machine and perhaps

the responsibility rather than being
should have been
possession

upon

sale of

and the subs
am not
a

sue would result

a case to be made on the part of the
to be exonerated,
that.

I think

And there are other

ier stated that

something like five or ten years

we had no claims.

I don't

I don't think we can go back to

exonerated, we

is this, that it has

been stated here, that as one

we had 40 claims

lving the

What I am saying is

see where Price v. Niagara
cases in the same

chain of
ting that

s and
same

that certainly where
manufacturer and

on the manufacturer

equ

every case
same

effectively, because

This year

statistics he cited.
195~

This has been a recent phenomena.
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or 1962 for that matter.

It wasn't until 1960 and a

But

California Supreme Court that an injured employee
had the right or even the standing
an

against a third party manufacturer

had no connection whatsoever other than it was using

a
a

that

once sold, that there had to be a direct contact,

re

direct hands across the table agreement between
consumer, the injured worker and the manufacturer.
something very recent.

and

So

It wasn't until 1963

the landmark cases in California and Vandermark v.

v.

Yuba Power that the rule of strict liability
Now, it wasn't until a few years later

that

saw an

rease in the number of losses being filed because

th

available to injured consumers and injured
I

we

are saying perhaps that the crest of

t and a pressure on this type of litigation
like Price v. Niagara with another look at
the
has

an ebbing in the consumerism movement which
ed here earlier -- I strongly feel that the
to kind of seek its own level and it is going
I think

have

respect to most of the problems that

, with respect to most of the reform that has

been

t and they are working.
negligence situation.

Professor Phillips
That issue is

ifornia Supreme Court right now and we are
momentarily ....
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Is it a products case?

120

MR. STEINBERG:

not

A products case -- forgive me,

a products case -- that one case.

But there are several cases

presently before the Supreme Court dealing
comp subrogation, number one, dealing also

or worker's
the application

of comparative negligence in a product liability case.

As soon

as there are decisions in these several cases, we may end up
a decision from the high court momentarily, bas

lly holding what

Professor Phillips has suggested with respect to the subrogation.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

How do you feel about that?

MR. STEINBERG:

Well, I have to concede that there

nothing today which, except the Occupational
Administration enforcement procedures, that encourages employers
to update their equipment, to do something to encourage them to see
that a safer product is operated within their own
\

from the

environment, that perhaps if the employer
limitations of the worker's compensation system where he
guilty of a violation of the safety statute or for

s

or something of that kind, perhaps we would have some
deterrent focusing on the employer directly that might relieve
the situation.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

All there is now is Cal-OSCHA and

collective bargaining, I guess.

Did you ever get that willful

misconduct recovery?
MR. STEINBERG:

Yes, we do but you are talking about

a relatively small amount of money.
economic deterrent involved in it.

It really doesn't have
It doesn't have any economic

bite, and it is my position that we've done a job in this field.
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I am talking about the plaintiff's advocates, the
themselves.
many

lds

suits.
I

we have seen corrective measures being taken

I

in many areas as a result of

liab

ity

There have been changes in approaches by manufacturers.

receive calls constantly from manufacturers of new

knowing I am involved in the other side of the fence

this

litigation, saying I am coming out with this product

what

do you think of it.

Where are my problems?

warning should I put on it?
designs.

of a

I've got those three alternate

What should I do with it?

or 15 years ago.

What

This was unheard of 10

I think that certainly it is a social problem.

We decided with agreement in the Vandermark decisions

3

and 1964 to afford this remedy.

there

My point is, I don't

any way we can go back on that, that some of these problems
are basically self-correcting.
CHAIRMAN KNOX:
Mr. Steinberg.

Okay.

Questions?

Thank you very much,

We appreciate your attendance.

I understand that

the electronic importers and the furniture manufacturers are
to submit written statements.

We have about 10 minutes, and I

suppose it would be fair if we let Dr. Epstein raise a point of
1 privilege at this point.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN:
qu

In 10 minutes, Epste

, now.

You know I don't know where to beg

, so I will probably begin at the top of the list.

I will

deal, I think, first with some of the remarks Mr. Aitken made in
the way in which I would want to respond to them.
now fabled case of Price v. Niagara.
about that case is, are several.

my point

I think that rea

First, that I don't
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concern the

t

same

message as he gets.

I get the message, don't

directed verdict on the cases of
the court was quite sure

t

a

sort

seems

was

tre

the j

those facts presented in that case, entitled to

ind for

tiff and if so, no directed verd

n to

So in many ways I

wou

be g

als

e plaindefendant

think that the case could be read as a

to the initiation of these suits even
as a spur for the appeal.

s not treated

The second point that I wanted to make

about that case was that it seems to show, to illustrate

real

fundamental difference in approach between

th

on the

on the o

r.

elf, I

one hand and Professor Phillips and Mr. Ste

That is that's a case which 10 years ago, and here I
the problem is not Greenman v. Yuba Power,
it is the erosion in defenses and
to warn cases, all of which

r

it

e

think that

not

l.S

s

defect 1.

followed the

strict liability and the abolit

•

seek a

of pr

of
tate

1.

and written statement which I have goes into
detail.

But that was the case under wh

I

grea
a

here

the manufacturer was not in violation of the statute.
statute referred to in-state use.

It d

not refer to

facturer's duty to make the machine con

To that extent, I

manu-

to that 1.n- tate use

and that was clearly discussed and debated in
opinion.

The

course of the

disagree with Mr. Steinbe

was a case in which custom, the state of the a
practice would have been a directed ve

ict

as to
r that k

system, I think; that the open and obvious nature of the da

ry
of
r

would have been a complete defense in this state before Olsen and
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Cronin

that the question of whether or not there has been a cure

of the original defect by the imposition of whatever safe
st on wou

in

have been a complete superseding the cause defense

as a matter of law.

And if all three of those things had been taken

and had been pushed into some kind of a foresight reasonableness
test and what you really want to ask yourself is whether or not
a system would withstand that kind of uncertainty.

It may well
liable

be the rule which says that defective products hold

is a strict and clear one but when you get to the definit

of

what counts as a defect, you get yourself into the kinds of
reasonableness that is required which it seems to me to be very
difficult to deal with.

The second point I would want to mention

concerns our elevator case, which was talked about this morning.
I think that really illustrates the opposite point.
are
in
s

Elevators
annual

kind of heavy equipment that have to unde
ction by the state.

They are always installed a

and they are repaired by somebody.

that elevator g

by

If after 10 years

s out, the beauty of this statute of l

tat ion

I think is that it may exonerate the original manufacturer but
certainly leaves action against owners and occupiers under an
occupiers liability theory and against inspection and maintenance
irmen under some other kinds of substantive theory.

You knock

out one defendant which does not mean in many cases that
out a plaintiff's recovery.

In addition, if there

notice or an OSCHA notice or something of that sort

knock

is a recall
tha

also

would start the treatment of the statute anew, and it should.
So, that under those circumstances too when you understa
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the

statute not only as it is construed but with some fa
well drawn out and well thought out

t

to be a pretty sensible accommodation and a
Moving on.

I think
i

sta

I disagree with Professor Phill

about the

desirability and foreseeability as a concept of organization.
far as I am concerned,

there is simply no

that that cou

be

reduced to a set of standards which tell you wha

you do

not do.

art statute and

We spent a long time in our state of

in our product modification statute worrying about cr

do

to

that kind of language in there; but in the end, we
you use that kind of language there is no point
legislation.

that if

n going for

If you don't use it, you may lose the odd case but

at least you will be able to get the 95% cases wh
by the statute correctly dec

and to

are cove

Mr.

an imperfect world you get that kind of results, I
doing very fine by the legislation.
I

In part

are

1 r,

ink

the Guffy case, which he mentioned, would be dec
under this statute than it is there.

Certa

if

s

tion wasn't of a product but of a protect
I

As

It seems to me
takes

very difficult for a manufacturer to say if third
efforts to prevent him from suffering liabili

wh

fa led that
the

he ought to be exonerated so that in my mind unless you
operation of the conveyor belt in the bus
the statute would say, this is one where

ss it seems to

tha

inal condit

resulted in the harm in question and that you could recover from
somebody under it.

At least, I would want to inte

although again, he is quite right to say s
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it that
could quite

ssibly read the statute in the other kind of direct

I mean

that kind of thing is something which is in principle possib
ch

Dealing with some of the o

ment

briefly.

imitat

s

I

I

po

to

s that have

n

Another point about the statute of

ink is very nice is

t to the extent

t you

re dealing with new products and a changing env

t, the

statute of limitations will give no comfort to a k

of manu-

facturer who ought not to get it.

It is the kind of
t will

I think, where what you say about it is the statute
protect products that are around and

11 not possibly come to

bear on current products until 10 years afterwards and even then
exceptions.

it would be subject to a number of possible regula
So it seems to me you have very few incent
to current activity where I

s w

ef

respect

am not really interested in cutting

our products liability law, but that it will have effect
re

ct to older products.

With re

South Carolina case about the c

th
s

ct to Mr. Phi 1
tch box,

it seems to me

that that is the paradigmatic case where the statute falls short.
I

don't think when I put the statute forward that I

that

te

you were going to get every case right with a statute of an automatic
fects

r cut off, and oddly enough the ones that you want are
or
thout a

1 conditions that are latent in which

injury occurs

fault or participation of the plaintiff.

to lose a couple of those cases.

You are

You may well even in the

automobile case have another defendant whom you could sue to
recover some of it, or it may well be that a

r

is so much more rickety than otherwise that even

13

the car
gear

assembly was not changed over that period, the rest of the
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automobile was.

So that I am not quite sure

that case completely, but

could handle

the end it seems to me

make a judgment as to how rna

to

cases there are

how many there are of the sort 1

art

and

lated cases.

Dealing with the state of the art, what gets me troubled
the capability standard which has been proposed is essential
I don't know how you really lit

•

te

any pr

led

seems to me to talk about capability, informat

about sub

improvements come in as evidence as to what you m
then, and

th~t

It

t have done

you get yourself into the type of situat

every case becomes completely open-ended as to what
cannot do; that is, in California for
would be quite possible to take the leg
example by the National Traff

where
can a

, or in a
lat

state, i

ndard propo

Safety Statute of

966

re d

them back into pre'66 cases or
example, it is always technical

•

pass

on the back of an automobile

t

le to

is not

Is any car which doesn't have a headrest

i

going to be defective because it was w

the s

do that?

I am terribly worried about

of

k

on the one hand and statutes on the other hand.
To go beyond that I th

uncertainty than it is worth.

Admitted

Go a
c

you w

cases, although I am always impressed when
Learned Hand formula of which I have a
in the T. J. Hoo12er.

--

is lagging.

I

to the

tes
lose some
s at the

bee

don't know of a case in wh

I haven't read any.

t

of market me

It seems to me that we have to rely on a

state of the art ....

te o

a

nt
the

It has been sort of demons
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nt
stry

It seems to me that what happens just so that the indus
some

ing else a

that's
c

ss

cou

to be suff
1 econom

s

is very hard to find that situation existing over
time.

of

The industry contains all sorts of ind

act in opposi
it is

who

to one another and to the exte

e

ing, somebody is going to have a ve

nt

to go forward because you could sell sa

same way you could sell any other kinds of view.
s abcu t

rative negligence.

comparat

negligence.

It is clear

st point
r fan of

I am not a part

This is not to say I am

to
with

better than the current Californ

rd to plaintiff's conduct in these types of lawsu
t as a true travesty.

The question

taken

to account, what does it mean?

we

not

comparat

o

the total

One of the th

is that when you look at states tha
1

latant, usual

have

once

,

the plaintiff's conduct no

comes into to be someth
ss.

like

Even if you allow comparat

there is always a danger that the jury could tack on
more on the
the offset.

Also, I'm not very sure about how

present in the action and some parties are not.

to me
po

t
e

it is not a triv

well be that comparat
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1 point,

are

That was the

ft open by the California court in
ts,

It

ffect

s so as to completely eliminate the

negligence works in multi-party suits where some

poi t that was

ttle bi

it

negligence

seems
nt

reasonably well on an automobile type situat
more

s princ

are other
scheme.

I have much

its operat

ections I could raise to this k

f i tellectual

My own preferences sort of vacillate from time to

between the efficiency of the complete bar

I

't think

to be terribly unjust; after all, the guy did br

it

self and one would say, yes, we do have a comparative negl

nee

system but instead of trying to figure out the facts of each
lature

individual case what the comparison ought to be, the

should say in each case the plaintiff is going to have to eat
50% of his losses to the extent that he has caused
eliminate from the fact the way in which the

t.

to

rees of causat

blend in with the nature of the wrongful conduct and the seque
of the occurrence.

I don't

how you

in anything other than an arbitrary way.
arbitrary,

it seems to me it

0

And

to be done

so at least you have uniform

oi

f it
and

danger

to
11

t

negligence as a jury matter is it opens up the tria

even broade ,

increases the litigation expenses, makes it more diff

lt to reach

a settlement at the outset and in the end may result in no re
relief because of the very tiny verdicts, or

e very

reduction which is going to be attributable to p
the final statement, and I th

this is one wh

intiffs, And
the AIA

I think it is a tragedy we have to be here

egislation.

It seems to me we have gone so far off the rai

from

and from Vandermark-- not Vandermark, that's

bad case -- from

Greenman v. Yuba Power, which is a good decis

, and a fine case -
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o far from it
as it were
c

that we are now forced to try and do common law,
the abstract.

I would much prefer to have

to go back 20 degrees from where they were.

courts

ere is no

way you can turn back the clock, but if you've got 20 or 30 more
decisions -- it may take that many, not only from the intermediate
courts but from the Supreme Court, which started to give you a few
directed verdicts for defendant and started to affirm the current
situation.

is statute.

I might say, let's hold off a little bit on

But at this point, it seems to me you don't have that type of
situation and that given that I find so many results to be
just frightfully unjust in the individual case, I am very
reluctant to say, well let's just let the whole thing sort it out
from the time.

You know as Mr. John Kane

said, in the long run

we are all dead, but in the short run a lot of people have a
rea

many problems which, of course by varying .... Okay,
CHAIRMAN KNOX:

Thank you, Professor.

Very

nk you.
I

think the upshot of this is that we should just keep this
committee in session for about five more years and the
care of everything.
very much.#

#

The meeting is adjourned.

#
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John T. Knox, Chairman
Joint Committee on Tort Liability
State Building, Room B-109
1350 Front Street, San Diego
July 18, 1977
Today's hearing on products liability lS the second in a
serles of hearings by the Joint Committee on Tort

• -F
•
l"-ornla.

varlous aspects of tort liability problems
July 11, in Los Angeles, we heard testimony on

•

ability on

On

fessional
cisco to hear

liability, and on July 22 we will be in San

lces.

testimony on insurance company underwriting

The particular problem we are considering today lS this:
California manufacturers and consumers have, in recent years, been
confronted by a crisis of potentially disastrous dimens
1974, the latest year for which statistics are

lable, products

liability losses and loss-related expenses totalled almost $200
million nationwide.

If current actuarial studies are correct this

figure may now be approaching $1 billion.

Whi

the breakdown is

not precisely known for California, it is clear as in medical malpractice and other liability areas that California's share accounts
for the largest portion of this amount.
133

It is also clear that most

sured manufacturers in California have had premium increases
ranging from one hundred to five thousand per cent.
We are told the cost of products liability insurance

many

tances may exceed 20% of the manufacturer's sales receipts for
essential products like medical supplies and packaged food items.
simple household products such as chairs and ladders this cost
may be as much as 40% of their receipts.
These charges, of course, are eventually reflected 1n higher
retail prices.

As a result, an added burden is placed on the

consumer's pocket book in an era of chronically high inflation.
Small and medium size manufacturers, lacking the bargaining and
economic power of the corporate giants, in many cases have been
d to go without coverage, or a funded self-insurance program.
Still more serious are the reports our Committee has received
that several manufacturers have ceased production altogether.
e obviously, if this denotes a trend, we are on the

of

a calamitous situation for California business.
We are presented here with a dilemma:

On

the one hand, if

do nothing, the result could well be economically catastrophic;
on the other hand, presently proposed legislation may only immunize
manufacturers from suits, leaving large classes of injured parties
manufacturers receiving a
thout remedies and without/meaningful reduction in premiums.
Accordingly, the purpose of today's hearing is to consider
causes of and possible solutions to the problems facing manuurers while also assuring victims of faulty products that
will be fully compensated for injuries they suffer.
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Our witnesses include distinguished scholars and representatives
of manufacturers, insurance underwriters and the legal profession.
Their testimony will form a basis for interim recommendations we
intend to make for legislation before the next session of the
Legislature.
We are aware that the blame for the present situation has
been laid on all sides.

Responsibility has been fixed upon a myoplc

judiciary, avaracious insurers and lawyers, and careless manufacturers.

The problem is indeed complex.

We ask only that witnesses

give primary consideration in their recommendations to the public's
interest, even though this may not always coincide with their
immediate economic interests.

#

#

#

PRESS NOTICE

FROM THE OFFICE OF:
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN T. KNOX
STATE CAPITOL, ROOM 2148
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
CONTACT:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 14, 1977

FRED HIESTAND -- (916) 445-0118

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATES
PRODUCT LIABILITY CRISIS

•

SACRAMENTO--Products liability problems will be the topic of
a public hearing to be conducted by the Joint Legislative Committee
on Tort Liability in San Diego on Monday, July 18, 1977.
The Committee, headed by Assemblyman John T. Knox (D-Richmond),
will hear testimony on the high cost and, in many cases, unavailabi
of products liability insurance and will consider proposed solutions
to the current crisis.

Products liability insurance costs, which

may exceed 20% of a manufacturers sales rece

, are passed on to

the consumer in the form of higher retail prices.
turers are the hardest hit by the rising cost

Small manufacs

A rapidly increasing number have been forced to
coverage or shut down altogether.
The hearing will be held in the State Building, Room B-109,
1350 Front Street, San Diego, from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., July 18.

Attachments:
Press Release for July 18, 1977
Agenda of Witnesses

136

APPENDIX II

I

137

Statement of D K.
To The Joint Legislative Committee on Tort Liabili
State of California
San D
18, 1977
My name is Ken Holliday. I serve as Vice President
for
Commercial Lines insurance for
Insurance a Mutual Company.
My background includes almost 19 years in the Insurance Industry,
with the majority of that time involved with the underwriting
function on Commercial Lines of business.
I have a B.B.A. Degree, with a major in insurance, and an L.L.B.
Degree. I am a member of the Georgia Bar. I also hold the C.P.C.U.
designation (Chartered Property and Casualty
I have been active for the past year and a half in several Industry
Committees dealing with the subject of Products
At I.S.O.
(Insurance Services Office), I am Vice Chairman of a Products
Liability Committee that is involved in several
of the
Products Liability situation, including a
or closed claim surve~
which covered over 20,000 products claims closed
23
from
July, 1976 to March, 1977. The final
on this survey will be
completed by the end of the summer.
I also serve as Chairman of a Subcommittee of thi Products Liability
Committee t..rhich did a complete review of the standard insurance
coverage being provided for Products
At
Alliance of
American Insurers, formerly the American Mutual Insurance Alliance,
I am a member of a Products Liabili
Residual Market Task Force.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ast year
established a Task Force to study the Products Liabili
situation,
and I serve on an Indus
Committee to that Task Force.
This Advisory Committee was asked last December to
methods
for the Insurance Industry to voluntarily work to solve the
lems
of availability of Products Liabili
insurance coverage. The
Committee recommended that each state Insurance Commis
an Advisory Committee to review Products Liabili
and
find markets willing to provide coverage.
In February, such an Advisory Committee was established in Wisconsin
and I present
serve as Chairman of that Commit
For this Joint Legislative Conmittee's informati
two copies of material dealing with some aspects o
Liability situation which I think you will find in

38

(1)

an I.S.O. Report on Products Liability Statistical and
Rating Procedures

(2)

an American Mutual Insurance Alliance pamphlet outlintng
the problems with proposed mandatory residual market
mechanisms for Products Liability.

(3)

Sections 3 and 5 of the Advisory Committee report to
the NAIC Task Force on Products Liability.
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P R0 DUCT L I AB I L I TY I NS URANCE

Background Report on Statistical
and Rating Procedures

Prepared by the Staff
of
Insurance Services Office

December 1976

***
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At the June 1976 meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
) representatives of ISO alluded to a "Bridge Document" currently in preparation
which will relate past history to the present and future product
environment.

insurance

Its purpose is to bridge the gap between past standard ratemaking and

statistical data, including the Closed Claim Survey as it reflects recent legislative
and judicial action, and future conditions likely to have an impact in this area.
Since it will be well into 1977 before the Closed Claim Survey and a valid analysis
will be complete, and therefore, until the final Bridge Document can be prepared,
the ISO staff has prepared the attached material to respond to immediate needs.

Many

of the topics addressed in this document are under study by the appropriate ISO
insurer committees.

It is entirely possible, therefore, that some of the procedures

and descriptions contained in this paper may be superseded at a later date.
Many of the questions being asked today concern the availability of statistics,
the types of coverage and the procedures used in pricing product liability insurance.
The information which follows focuses on those concerns.

None of this material is

new; it has been available previously in the manual rules, policy forms, staff memoranda, statistical plans and the like.

We hope that assembling it in one document

will be educational and responsive to the questions about product

insurance,

and IS0 1 s functions and activities in that area.

ISO?
Insurance Services Office (ISO) is a non-profit, unincorporated association
of insurance companies providing extensive statistical, ratemaking, and research
services for the property-liability insurance industry.
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ISO functions involve 13

-2-

different lines of insurance and 52 jurisdictions.

An insurer may affiliate with

ISO for various services for a single line of insurance, e.g., private passenger
automobile, in a single state, for all lines of insurance in all states, or various
combinations of lines and services in the states it desires them.

How is Product Liability Coverage Afforded?

•

Insurance contracts under which product liability coverage is afforded may
be broadly categorized into three different types:
1.

Monoline policies -- liability insurance policies which include
coverage for the product liability exposure;

2.

Commercial package policies -- insurance policies which include
a standard combination of property and liability coverages generally
sold to small and medium sized insureds; and

3.

Composite rated, loss rated and large (a) rated policies -insurance policies which may be of the monoline or package type
but for which specific rating techniques are employed to determine
the price to be paid by usually very large insureds.

I

Monoline Policies
These policies provide bodily injury (B.I.) and property damage (P.D.)
liability coverage specifically for the product liability hazard of the insured.
The basic limits of liability are $25,000 for each occurrence and $50,000 in the
aggregate for all bodily injury claims arising out of occurrences during the
policy period and $5,000 for property damage resulting from one occurrence, subject
to an aggregate policy limit of $25,000 for all property damage claims.
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Increased

-3-

liability for both Bodily Injury (B.I.) and Property Damage (P.D.)
be provided to those insureds desiring additional coverage.
The rules, classifications and rates for product liability coverage are
found in the Product Liability Manual.

The current classification plan defines

over 400 separate classifications reflecting the major revision of 1974.

At

that time, approximately 120 of the then existing classifications were deleted and
replaced with over 220 new classifications to provide a more refined breakdown
the types of product risks.

In addition, many classes which had been (a) rated

became manual rated and several manual rated classes became (a) rated.

(The

difference will be explained shortly.)
The most common units of exposure, that is, the bases used for determining
premium charge, are each $1,000 of sales or each $1,000 of receipts.

There

are several product classifications which have a specific unit exposure base more
directly related to the particular class, e.g., number of tons,

of fillings,

number of gallons.
For most of the defined classes (approximately 65%-75%) a rate will be shown
the rate pages of the ISO manual.

For the risk (insured) assigned to one of

classes, the premium is calculated by multiplying the number of exposure
units by the appropriate rate.

This calculation produces the basic limits premium

coverage, i.e., B.I. or P.D. and if higher limits of coverage are desired,
increased limits table is consulted to determine an appropriate factor by which
raise premiums to reflect the increased coverage.
The product liability manual rates are based on a review of countrywide
under previous product liability policies.
the ratemaking procedures used by ISO is attached.
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A complete explanation of

There are many classifications defined in the ISO product
for which

manual

no rate is indicated on the rate pages, but the

Approximately 25%-35% of the total number of classes are

) fs shown instead.

rated

For the risks

(insureds) to which these classes apply, the responsibility for
appropriate rate lies with the underwriter
is responsible for risk acceptance).

the
of the insurer who

A statistically valid manual rate which would be

appropriate for each insured in the (a) rated classes cannot be determined because of
the extreme variability in their underlying hazard.
A good example of an (a) rated class is "valve manufacturers."
this classification differ widely in the hazard that each

Risks within

, since such a

variety of valves is manufactured, all with completely different applications.
It is intuitively obvious, for example, that manufacturers of valves to be used
in jet aircraft present a different risk than manufacturers of valves to be used
in plumbing in private homes.

In addition, different valve manufacturers may

have different degrees of design capability, result

in differences

Because of the importance of these and similar factors, rates are determined for
each of these risks separately, based upon judgment and

of al

char-

acteristics peculiar to the risk.
ISO does make available to its companies suggested

rates which are intended

as a rough indication of the average rate that would be
fication as a whole, but might not be appropriate for any

for the classirisk defined

classification.
While insureds covered by a monoline policy may be small, medium
risks,

those purchasing a package policy or those

loss rated, and large (a) rated are large risks.
covered by monoline policies

145

Also, within

are

even
te rated,

group of insureds

statistics
summary

statistic
data

is exposures

were not

The ISO

risks so
all

the

1

-6-

The package policy premium is generally determined by using the monoline rates,
modified

a package discount.

The large body of

these

multiline policies is currently not included in the monoline

data base

since the statistics are not recorded in sufficient detail to identify sublines.
Although aggregate figures are unavailable, it is generally believed that multiline
policies do generate substantial products experience.

•

The new ISO Commercial Statistical Plan (CSP)

being

for

implementation will capture complete detailed product liability statistics on a
monoline basis for all multiline policies.

Consequently, in the future it will

be possible to combine-the data produced under CSP with the monoline

and

(a) rated) data for ratemaking purposes.

Composite Rated, Loss Rated & Large (a) Rated Policies
These insurance policies may provide coverage on a monoline or multiline
(package) basis and are distinguished from the prior two broad
distinctive rating procedure used in determining the

Insureds rated under

these procedures tend to be very large and the rating

may be

tiated between the insurer and insured.

Composite Rating

Composite rating was developed as an alternative to manual
larger risks which present many different types of exposure

for the
under

smaller risks.
of

Product liability has changed
and :its

the

to current

ISO :insurer committees.
This third group of composite rated, loss rated and
generates a greater volume of total experience than

rated risks
of the

two groups

previously described, but that experience is for all of the coverages which are
included in those policies.

The product liability

of that

but it is known that a significant amount of the

not be

hazard is insured under policies rated by thHse devices

of Data?
sources

•
other than automobile

the line

are not
The

or source of

sufficient detail so that
to evaluate the

can be used

results for

insurance
The most

9

a

less than
review of
summarized

This

available

Commercial

Plan which

line and

data for

ISO and its insurer committees have

•
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and

1.
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below:
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The new Commercial
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for claims
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made,

quality

more

and thus produce a
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3.

For

with substantial
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than an inferior

for less.
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unlike mos
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has been, to a
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loss

different

, influenced

For example, a tire manufacturer
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accident
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Attachment 3
Sheet 1
The chart on the next page shows the steps required to process product data after

end

a

year

It explains the time necessary to collect: edit, summarize

these statistics properly.

The time intervals shown on the chart are

, and anticipate no delays due to erroneous reportings that cannot be corrected

the reporting company within a reasonable time.

The

at the top of the chart refer to processing of premium rather than

loss statistics, since premiums are reported last and therefore have the significant
upon the production schedule.
Explanation of Processing Phases
A policy year experience period includes all policies written in year 1 which ultimately
during year 2 •
. Exposures and Premiums are valued by companies as of June 30
Six months are allowed after the end of the polity year to audit the insured's
sales during the policy period.
Exposures and Premiums are Reported to ISO
Company submissions are due at ISO 4 months after the June 30 valuation.
Balance, Edit and Return Errors
The company submissions are balanced to letters of transmittal and edited
for statistical accuracy. Invalid data are returned to the
company
for correction.
are corrected by the reporting company and returned to ISO,
where they are reprocessed (including re-examination).
Consolidate with Existing Data Base and Produce Preliminary Reports
The data for the latest accounting period are sorted and consolidated with the
for prior accounting periods. Preliminary reports of the
data
are produced for analytical purposes.
Review Preliminary Reports
The preliminary reports of the ratemaking data are edited by the Data Services
Division of ISO for reasonableness, based on guidelines established by the
Actuarial Division of ISO. Questionable data are tracked to the
source
verification or correction.
reports have been edited, and any errors found corrected,
exhibits required by the Actuarial Division are produced.
and Develops Rate Level Indications
tuarial Division evaluates the ratemaking data and develops the rate
level indications.
rate level indications are presented to the Governing Committee for approval.
- Rate fi
are prepared, rates are calculated and fi
sent to the
rooriate ISO state office for filing with Insurance
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P~oducts liability Insurance
Present Schedule for Processing Products lfabilfty Insurance Statistics

Year 4

Yec:.c 3
Process!

Phase

Experience Period
~

E.,oosures and PreMiums are
va1•Jed by companies as of
June 30

·- . -· ·~· -···

··-

Exposures and Premiums are
reported to !SO

bposures and Premiums are
and edited errors
retur·ned

bala~ced

(o~any

e

corrects and return'

errors

=~

p

Error corrections are processed
at I
Consolidate with existing data
base and produce preliminary
reports

I
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Attachment 4
PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE
RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES

To appreciate fully the product liability insurance situation, a basic understanding
of the fundamental principles used in pricing this line of insurance is essential.
This memorandum presents the ratemaking procedures used
Insurance Services Office
(ISO). Several companies which write product liability insurance do not use the
rates developed by ISO, but employ their own ratemaking methoaology. The basic
concepts and teminology in determining manual rates, however, are common to all
insurers. Additionally, it must be kept in mind that many product liability risks
are subject to (a) rating.
The price, or rate, for "basic limits" coverage is determined by an analysis of the
actual countrywide experience under policies written in the past, separately (but
using the same procedure) for bodily injury and property damage. Basic limits
coverage provides up ~o $25,000 for each occurrence and $50,000 in the aggregate
for all bodily injury claims arising out of occurrences during the year the
is in force. ISO uses this 25/50 coverage as its base for ratemaking purposes.
The corresponding property damage basic limits are $5,000/$25,000.
For product liability insurance as with other liability lines,
is
reviewed and analyzed on a "policy year" basis. That means that losses incurred
on policies written in a given 12-month period are compared with
earned
on those same policies. The experience for policy year 1972, for
, would
consist of the premiums and losses on all policies with effective dates from
January 1, 1972 through December 31, 1972 and expiration dates varying from
January 1, 1973 to December 31, 1973, assuming all
are in effect for one
year .

•

•

When analyzing experience for ratemaking purposes, the premium used in the
is that which would be produced if the current rates were to be charged to each
insured. The losses used in the formula are incurred losses, as describEd below.
As stated previously, the rates are for basic limits coverage so that
used in the formula are based upon the current rates for each clas fication
insured and the losses are also considered only up to that limit .
The incurred losses may be defined as the amount of money
or
le
claimants including the amount of expenses involved in handling the claims.
This figure consists of those losses and related loss
ustment expenses
paid and reserves set aside to cover known occurrences. Such reserves represent
the best estimates by experienced claims persons for each individual case that
has been reported. Each case reserve gives consideration to the nature and extent
of the bodily injury and/or property damage involved, the merits of the case,
current jury award patterns, the state of the law, and all other relevant factors.
The first report of thes.e incurred losses and their related expenses, called loss
adjustment expenses, encompasses losses evaluated three months after the close o
policy year, which is 27 months after the beginning of the
year. The first
report of policy year 1972, for example, covers losses evaluated as of March 31,
1974. All such reports submitted to ISO by individual insurers are consolidated
and the aggregate figure is used in the ratemaking process.
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the use of loss
factors.
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~lity

AMERICAN MUTUAL
INSURANCE ALLIANCE

Rising claims,
lawsuits

Both

the insurance

voluntary
propriate

Price reflects
loss

cannot obtain products
price of many products."1
report says that only
tain products

Cost less than
1% of sales

2. The cost of
insurance has not had a major
impact on the purchase price of most products. Research
ducted by McKinsey &
for the Federal Task Force, and
separate research conducted
the Insurance Services Of·
fice,2 both document this conclusion. The Federal Task Force
report says, "our data shows that aside from a number of limited
situations in the
products
in·
surance accounts for less than 1 % as a percentage of

3. The casualty insurance
has sustained
finan·
cia! losses on its products
business in recent years, and
is now taking steps to obtain more
and more detailed
information3 on the risk exposures
those losses.
4. Rising costs of
insurers to devote more
liability prevention

availability problems.
from a variety of sources:
0 Manufacturer groups have testified before
Federal Interagency Task Force, NAIC
legislative
statutes of limitations,
ucts, and other
reforms.

1C::'1

presents:·s

Insurance Services Office ""'"""''""

and other tort reforms
tions
Pools do not

reduce cost
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The
"The nrnh!Am
'cost' .

•

It is against this
surance Alliance
Underwriting n"·"v'''a"
for

II.
Mandated plans

will not work

manufacturers.
The remainder

4

Ill.

availability

structure such a
problems which
Options Available

Subsidy aspect
. recognized
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of

changes and
actively studied. The nn.nr•n::.l
fold: To
insurance
unable to obtain adequate coverage
to provide such coverage
added)
Cost the same

As has already been noted,
accounts
separate residual market
has absolutely no effect on the
cost of paying for the claims
residual market plan or
way a residual market plan
would be to subsidize the plan
some external source. The
will be discussed in another section.
Geographical Considerations

Coverage follows
product

liability insurance.
product, coverage
and used. Thus, !he

wherever the
is used,
and distributor to the tort laws
jurisdiction where

•

where residual market
any attempt to set up a

6

1 71

Much

Many states
involved
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Bear own
burden only

Complexities of
alternatives

whose products are
every other stale adoo1ted

turers

I
state,

8
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legal and Constitutional
Constitutional
questions

Any attempt to

other than
property
surer is
benefiting
business.

Safe at
what price?

174

When health

•

IV •

•

Determining
eligibility

10

Subsidy issues

Incentives
for safety
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the loss exposure. If a products liability plan is not
to per·
mit normal underwriting by insurers, then it must designate
someone else to do the job and specify the criteria to be used.

•

Framers of a products liability plan also would have to determine
whether the plan would accept obviously poor financial risks, extremely large risks (e.g., General Motors), and manufacturers of
very hazardous products such as explosives and aircraft. If not,
where is the line to be drawn and who makes the decision?
Selectivity
and equity

Requirements also would have to be established for the extent of
participation in the plan. For example, if a product manufacturer,
supplier or seller applies for coverage in the plan, must he place
in the plan ali products, locations and coverage levels, or will he
be permitted to choose portions of his product risK to put in the
plan? To put it another way, should a firm be permitted to insure
its non-hazardous products in the voluntary market at favorable
rates, and to place its hazardous risks in the plan at subsidized
rates? If not, how would the eligibility requirement apply to
conglomerates?
Rating Considerations
Determination of rates for product liability insurance differs substantially from the situation that exists for other lines of insurance
where residual market plans have been created. Medical
malpractice coverage, for example, involves a relatively few
classifications of doctors and other health care providers.
Automobiles and homes represent relatively homogenous risk
exposures. All workers compensation risks are subject to a very
elaborate classification system, developed over a long period of
time, which sorts out variations in occupational exposures.

•

Product life
hours or years

By contrast, there are thousands of different kinds of products
on the market, some with a life as short as a few hours and
others capable of remaining in use for 100 years or longer. The
infinite variety and magnitude of risks involved in underwriting the

12
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liability exposure of those
would confront any
market plan with a difficult if not impossible classification and
rating problem. Most product manufacturers who would be likely
to seek coverage in such a plan are insured today under
liability policies which lump the product risk
with the
manufacturer's various other liability exposures. Rates
monly are set on a judgment basis, based on an extensive
derwriting investigation of each manufacturer's
posures, claims experience and loss control n<>lrTI""\Irm<>nr
Considering the complexities involved, it is difficult to see how
the plan would be able to develop credible rates on a small group
of worse-than-average risks - especially when losses won't be
fully known for years.

Impact on Voluntary Insurance
Voluntary market
disruptions

The existence of a residual market plan could well have
devastating effect on the voluntary insurance market The
eligibility criteria, the degree of subsidy involved, the rate
classification used, loss control requirements, and the economic
incentives involved,
allowances to insurers and
missions to producers, could all influence the extent
ticipation in the plan.
For example, when the commissions available to
higher for risks placed in the plan than in the voluntary market,
there could be a heavy influx of risks into the plan. The
element is the total number of dollars of commission
by the transaction, regardless of whether it results from
commission rate or a low rate applied to higher premiums.
Similarly, allowances to insurers for company expense could
create advantages for some companies as compared to others.

Subsidy is
critical factor

The amount of subsidy obviously is a critical factor. If
manufacturers can obtain coverage in the
at
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lower rates than those available in the
numbers of risks will
part of their cost of doing business to their competitors, to other
insurance policyholders, or to the taxpayer. (In Massachusetts,
for example, the automobile residual market plan produced
losses in excess of premiums amounting to about $1 63 per car
in 1975 - a net loss equivalent to more than $29 for every
registered car in the state.)
This process could quickly
up the
market, wors·
ening the availability problems which the plan was intended to
alleviate. It also is likely to encourage some insurers to pull out of
that state or cease offering coverages that would subject them to
the burdens of participation in the plan.

Claims and Loss Control Services
Claims service
problems

The interstate and even international dispersion of the
liability risk creates difficult problems for a residual risk plan
established on a limited geographical basis. It would be difficult
for a state fund, for example, to provide claims and loss control
services on a countrywide basis or international basis, Similar
problems would confront many of the insurance carriers who
might be forced to participate in the plan,
if they
in·
surers might have
in providing adequate services for a
highly specialized product exposure unless they had
insured such risks and had developed the specialized expertise
required.
The services to be provided by the plan are as important as the
coverages. For example, would the plan provide a form of inrest
upon the insured? Defense costs add substantially to the losses
incurred under the products liability coverage. On the other
hand, an inadequate or inept investigation and defense would expose the plan's assets to excessive awards or settlements,

•
14
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Quality of Coverage
One of the major tasks involved in the design of a residual market
plan is to define what coverages the plan will provide.
What choices will the plan offer as to policy limits, deductibles,
excess coverages, co-insurance, premium payment plans? What
types of rating plans will be offered? What policy limits will be
provided?
Another key decision is whether coverage will be offered on a
"claims incurred" or "claims made" basis. A decision to switch
to a "claims made" basis involves complexities that require more
extensive study than is possible in the scope of this paper.

Insuring Capacity and Solidity
limits on
risk capacity

Any plan, regardless of how subsidized or by whom organized,
will have a maximum risk-carrying capacity. Therefore, some
provision must be made for limiting the liability of the plan, including criteria for detennining when the plan has reached its
maximum insuring capacity, and some provision for restricting
the acceptance of new business when the plan has reached its
maximum safe capacity.
A plan also should include contingency arrangements in the
event that losses exceed the assets or the assessment limits of
the plan. It may have to purchase reinsurance or have contingent
access to the tax base in order to handle shock losses.
The legislatures of most states have enacted medical malpractice legislation designed to make this coverage self-supporting,
including stabilization funds and provisions for premium tax offsets to cover any excess losses that might occur.

15
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V.

Conclusion and Recommendation

ommends against regulatory
non-voluntary residual market mechanism for products
We believe the
on a voluntary basis within each state.

' U. S Commerce Department Interagency Task Force on
(hereafter "Commerce Report"). p. 40
2 Insurance Servrces
·-orsplay of Suggested ISO Product Lrabilrty
Classrficatrons rn
Between January 1973 and
De·cernbrlr

1976
Office, Product Lrabrlity
Procedures, December 1976
• Commerce Report,
s Statement of policy adopted by the Independent
Inc., January 20, 1977.
s Letter dated January 24, 1
Phdrp H. Dutter of
to Homer Moyer, U.S. Department of
7 Brummond, Report to NAIC D·2 SubcomrrHttee on Products Lrabrhty. NrrvernhE"
29, 1976.
a Commerce Report, p 11

•
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•
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Section 3.

The Problem of Availability and the Recorrmended
Voluntary Harket Mechanism

1

While we know of no evidence that there exists a
••crisis 11 with respect to the unavailability of products 1
insurance in the United States,

1

there is a great deal of

that some products liability risks have not and apparently cannot
find a market for their insurance needs.

For these risks a

si

may exist, and there is therefore an availability problem which
must be addressed.
To understand this availability problem requires a bas
understanding of the products liability insurance market.
market of markedly varying exposures.
unto itself.

It is

Each risk is almost

Each presents an exposure which will differ

from others within the same industry and even with respect to
product lines produced by the same risk.

It is the function of

insurance underwriter to assess each risk based on the obta
facts pertaining to it and to price it accordingly.

Even

sks

are within a classification for which a manual rate exists must
assessed in terms of any extraordinary loss potential which might
exist.
1

The January 1, 1977 Briefing Report of the Federal Interagency Ta
Force on Product Liability, included as a major finding the state~ent
"3.
Only a few conpanies have been unable to obtain
t
liability insurance. The problem appears to be ~ore one
of affordability, than availability."
(Executive
. 11
This statement is consistent with specific information
a
number of states.
Insurers writing products liability insurance are
generally continuing to provide viable markets consistent with underwriting standards and pricing flexibility. There are no indic
that the products market is disappearing. Contrast this
th
malpractice market for individual physicians and surgeons where
former writers of the coverage have virtually withdrawn from
market.

The exercise of sound underwriting judgment is c

to

ability of the insurer to produce a
of business and to minimize the

for susta

underwriting losses on it.
These underwriting judgments require a highly
knowledge of the exposures presented, and a wel
will, from its home office, its branch

•

producers, apply essentially the same sophisticated
all the business presented to it.

isa

Although judgments of

1

company underwriters may vary somewhat one from the
dependent on the individuals' varying experience

s
1 con-

it is the insurer's objective to maintain substantial
sistency in these judgments.
The collective judgments exerci
pricing, or rejecting business wi
for the line.

by a company
its

An individual company's exposure to

ts
s on

1

of business is enormous.
A company's judgment on a

sk

11 depend on many

frequently will require an assessment, among other things, of
risk's management experience and competence, its past
implementation of essential loss and

pro

aims control measures, its

quality control program, the nature of the product,
which it sells,
ma11ufactured in a

ts

ther it is a new product or an older
rent way, its distribution

tern,

t
r

the product is to be a component of another product,

sne

of that other product, and, overall, a determination of the

s

exposure to loss relative to the limits of exposure sought
premium necessary to cover the exposure to loss and the

rer's

losses, expenses, and a margin for profit and contingencies
re

the greater unpredictability and

vo

of so much of this business.
The individual risks written present exposures not only to
losses but also to loss adjustment claims handling expenses
great magnitude.

Minimum premium requirements are in fact

on the high cost of handling product liability claims, whe
liability for loss is established.

The 32.1% ratio of loss

us

expenses to losses for the general liability line of business, of
products liability is a major component, is one of the highest
line

insurance (compare it to 15.9% for private pas

and 26.1% for medical malpractice insurance); for products 1
1
insurance the ratio is 42.8% .
For some risks the premium may even be equal to or
the limits of coverage provided.

r

This would be the case

risk is subject to a high claim frequency and it is opting,
to buy the insurer's claims services, possibly in order to
the risk's access to the major excess and surplus lines
For other risks the premium will be substantially lower
relation to the limits of coverage afforded.
For most risks the premium can be derived as a funct
but in viewing the relationship between sales and premium, ri
a greater potential for loss will generally be paying a
is a higher percentage of sales than less hazardous enterprise
Woven

th~oughout

the entire fabric of the products 1

insurance market are a nu~ber of other highly significant
1

ISO Closed Claims Survey, December, 1976, p. 78. (High cost
from legal fees and other defense costs)

s

.

'

to bear in mind:
are numerous

1.

1

liability insurance,
lines markets;
2.

1 j

Not all may be writing in

ns

same time;
3.

Products liability insurance
off

state in which the risk's princ

plant, administrative office, is located, or
other state;
4.

The coverage provided covers

insured no matter

where the loss occurs or

a judgment is

in the U.S. or Canada, so

as the

be legally liable for it;
5.

In writing products 1

li

surance

losses

is providing coverage

policy period which may have arisen out of
manufactured scores of years
is, in effect, "buying the tail"

r

--

(compared to

medical malpractice where it is "selling
6.

Each of the insurers providing a products 1
insurance market operates entirely i
the

in underwriting (which includes

acceptance, rejection, or renewal of bus
except where bureau manual rates are appl
pricing -- what one insurer may not find
others may accept willingly;
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1

•

I

7.

The producer through whom a risk seeks coverage may
not represent or do business with an insurer· will
to write the business, but other producers may
sent an insurer which does write such coverage;

8.

Some producers, like some companies, are more or

ss

sophisticated than others in developing essential
information about a products liability risk and in
finding a market in which to place it, including a
surplus lines market or a market to satisfy any excess
limit ·needs;
9.

Anticipated loss adjustment expenses, which are genera
high in relation to losses for this line of business,
can vary greatly between classes of products risks,
must be considered in appropriately pricing the
particular risk: and

10.

The very sreat disparity between types of risks,
even between different product lines produced by the
same risk, with respect to loss development and trend
factors.

It is evident that products liability insurance is a highly
sophisticated line of business which depends greatly on the
exercise of prudent underwriting judgment in reviewing and pric
business.

Substantial underwriting and pricing flexibility is

generally available, however, underwriting results for general

188

•

I

liability insurance during the past several years have

ve

unprofitable. 1

results for general liability insurance appear to be
management attitudes towards the products market appear to
positive than negative.

Nevertheless there is a concern on

of insureds and producers with the availability of
insurance.
So it was in Connecticut where on Decerrber 10, 1976, at a mee
held by the Insurance Department, large numbers of
manufacturers, and dynamite blasters

turned up to claim

products liability insurance was not available to them.
The insurance industry responded with a request for an
Advisory Committee in Connecticut to be appointed by the Insurance
Commissioner to review all speci

legations and

mitted, to assist producers in placing business, and
extensions of coverage or renewals of expiring policies
location of alternative markets.
The Committee's Cnderwriting Task Force, within a two

I

span, under virtually impossible crash conditions was able to
its way through stacks of alleged complaints submitted
agents' associations and the Commissioner's office.

At

end

that period the Committee reported to the Commissioner that out
of almost 165 compl

nts, 34 required a renewal or extension

1

The products liability exposure is one of the major components
the general liability line of business. Underwriting results
line in 1973, 1974, and 1975 were 117.1%, 125.9%, and 116.5% respectively (A.M.Best Review and Preview, January 3, 1977). The 1975
rwriting result for g.l., excluding medical malpractice, the first
ar
it became available on an industry basis, was 114.3%.
189

of coverage and the Committee was able to effectuate one or
thus a

the Task Force to assist

seeking out alternative markets, that only five ri
availability problem, and of these two involved dis
foreign devices {a French campstove and a Japanese
container) who failed to seek vendor's coverage from
one involved a newly patented device designed to melt tumors
which insufficient information had been provided, but is now
sought, and two involved manufacturers whose products 1

li

coverage currently excluded coverage for the aircra
manufactured and who were not aware of

labili

coverage through the U.S.A.I.G.
The Commissioner responded with
performed by the Committee and continued

praise for

work

and

the future.
The Committee's effectiveness '\vas

is dependent on

critical factors:

1.

Shortly after· the

Co~uittee's

appointment

at

invitation of the Committee the Connecticut Associ
of Insurance Agents joined it and provided
of a highly knowledgeable staff member to work
the Underwriting Task Force in contacting
and companies, in delineating problems, in
extens

s of coverage or

s, in

alternative markets, and in providing informa
producers on the pricing and placing of

190

s

without this cooperative effort the Committee
not have been fully responsive to the Commis
charge;
2.

A cadre of company underwriters from leading
of products liability insurance who worked
and effectively in utilizing all available resources
including local casualty underwriting managers
several companies;

3.

A viable, responsive products liability insurance
market; and

4.

An Insurance Corr~issioner who was willing to

voluntary good faith effort on the part of the
industry before invoking an involuntary

sm,

and who, when convinced of the diligence and
effectiveness of the voluntary effort shelved
involuntary mechanism as not needed. 1
The Connecticut experience serves to verify prior asser
the term "crisis" may be a misnomer if applied to the
market.

ts

There may be, however, market problems involving this 1

of business which should be addressed.
It is herein proposed that in any jurisdiction in which
regulator has received a substantial number of current comp
from producers or

sks with respect to the availability

liability insurance, or in which the regulator otherwise
to believe that a market problem exists, the regulator

1

Other regulators, most recently the New Hampshire Conoois
have continued to be of similar disposition.
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ts
s rea
11 contact

the Chairman of the Industry Advisory Committee to the NAIC Ta
Force on Products Liability or a special subcommittee to
for the function to determine whether a local committee is
and, if appropriate, to assist in the appointment of

a

Advisory Committee for the particular state to be organi
authorized to act in the manner indicated below.
It is recommended that the Committee be composed
1.

An appropriate number of licensed producers
with knowledge and background in underwriting
and pricing products liability businessi

2.

Knowledgeable representatives of four or more
insurers writing products liability insurance
in the state; and

3.

The Insurance Department.

The Committee shall utilize all available expertise
resources,

incl~ding,

but not limited to the

and assistance

appropriate cowmittees of producer associations, and

al ca

managers of insurers.
The duties of this

1.

Corr~ittee

shall include:

Reviewing all products liability insurance
problems referred to it by the Commissioner to be
certain that all markets have been explored
assist controlling producers in placing business
where necessary;

2.

Negotiating extensions of coverage with prior
carrier where necessary to permit additional
exploration of the market or accumulation of
needed underwriting data;
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1

3.

e to assi

Where the Committee is otherwise
the producer in otherwise

a

voluntary acmitted or surplus

s

a
t

Cowmittee shall encourage the development of
alternative voluntary markets, including a
program involving the use of volunteering
insurers participating in a voluntary

•

reinsurance agreement with other volunteering
under which qualified risks can be referred on a
by risk basis for underwriting and pricing and
or rejection;

4.

The Committee-shall not

ss frequently

report to the regulator on its activi

s,

include in such report its assessment of
availability problems with its recowmenda

ons,

any, with respect to therni and
5.

The Committee must, at all times, func
the caveat that no referral program can
underwriting judgment or pricing flexibili

•

, mus

not be viewed as an invitation to dumping,
be responsive as a voluntary mechanism and not
or be viewed as that which it was created to
i.e.~

a mandatory pool, or as a compe

tor

voluntary market.
It is our judgment, backed up now by our expe
that the most meaningful response possible to products li
availability problems without jeopardizing the present
voluntary market is an Industry Advisory Committee to

as herein described, created and appointed by the regulator in
state having sufficient problems to warrant its ere
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Section 5.

1?

Tort Reform. Why Is It
What Are the Proposals?

Are

The Committee pointed out earlier
problem is one of cost.

3

Cost is a factor

the standpoint of an insurer.

at

The risk of loss

either as a result of the chance of a disastrous

•

frequency of losses that the risk is no longer
case insurance is not available at any cost.
large loss or the frequency of recurring

Or

sses

great that the premium which must be
this case the insurer is willing to
is either unwilling or in extreme ca

s

se

are dealing here with commercial

cost

s

of doing business, but in some case
with jumbo exposures, the problems

ac

One possible solution to the cost
preserve the current tort system wi
government.

is

This seems impractical at

questionable at the federal level where
other needs is low particularly if alternate prac
The fast, easy and impractical solution is some
market mechanism

insurers are

to

te

faults of such a system have been pointed out
section.
The only practical way to meet
and in turn the cost.

is to

Recognition of this fact has resu

195

by many of the possibilities and areas of tort reform.
Your committee does not view its current
recommend any one program or attempt to des
time was not available.

such
a

However, the CoiDmittee has

its obligations to the Task Force in this area by (1)
collect information on at least some of the parties
field,

(2) to provide an outline of the subjects

poss

using as basis a paper which is incorporated prepared for
the trade associations,

(3) incorporating a statement by

Insurance Agenta showing a representative position of a

rs

organization and (4) attaching to the Committee's bas
report addressed to Judge Price copies of a number of
currently being considered.
A partial list of those active

the area of tort re

prepared by Paul Kipp and is as follows:

1.

THE MULTI-ASSOCIATION ACTION CO.HI..UTTEE an ad
sponsored by the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Assoc
This committee has twenty-one state action committees
established that will strive for tort reform as set
in Kansas Senate Bill 852

(Revised)~

We under

fifty trade associations are members of this ad

2.

THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE has drafted a posi
paper calling for tort reform.

3.

TEE RISK AND INSURANCE MANAGEMENT SOCIETY.

It

s

a report of its Task Force on Tort Reform, has
its membership and made the results of the
to the D-2 Committee of the NAIC, to the
1
Renurr~ered

S.B. 2007.

ava
Inter-

agency Task Force and to the Californ
mittee on Product Liability.

zens

It is also ho

on product liability and tort

s

It is supporting the efforts
4.

THE

~~RICAN

MAAC.

INSURANCE ASSOCIATION has drafted tort

reform legislation.
5.

THE AMERICAN MUTUAL

INSUR&~CE

ALLIANCE is

tort reform in the various states.
6.

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS is
seeking tort reform in the various states.

7.

RETORT, INC.
c/o Hr. E. H. Rosenberg
Thomson National Press Co.
Franklin, Massachusetts.

8.

02038
s

U.S. SENATOR PEARSON OF KANSAS has introduced
calling for a national product liability

9.

THE SENATE SELECT

CO~~ITTEE

ON SMALL BUSINESS ADMINI

is sponsoring legislation that will make
available for small business risks.
Those who have or are conducting surveys or stud

1.

Retort Inc.

2.

National Machine Tool Builders Assoc.

3.

Farm and Industrial Equipment Institute

4.

The Risk and Insurance Management Society

5.

The A:r:lerican

6.

The Insurance Services Office (Closed Claim S

7.

The Federal Interagency Task Force

8.

The Machinery and Allied Products Institute

~1utual

Insurance Alliance
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s

..
9.
10.

Various Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturer Assoc
Insurance Information Institute (Movie)

Others interested in the problem:
1.

Independent Insurance Agents of America
85 John Street
New York, New York.

2.

10038

American Machine Tool Distributors Association
1500 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

3.

20005

Chamber of Commerce of the United States
1615 "H" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

20063

c/o Andrew A. Melgard, Director,
Economic Security, Education and Manpower Section
4.

Massachusetts Bar Association
One Center Plaza
Boston, Massachusetts.

02108

c/o George N. Keches, Legislative Counsel
5.

National Federation of Independent Business
150 West Twentieth Avenue
San Mateo, California.

94403

c/o George J. Burger, Jr., Assistant to President
6.

National Tool, Die & Precision Machining Association
9300 Livingston Road
Washington, D.C.

20022

William E. Hardman
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7.

New York State Bar Association
One Elk Street
Albany, New York.

12207

c/o Mr. John E. Birny
8.

National Association of Manufacturers
1776 "F" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

20006

c/o Richard D. Godown, Senior Vice President

•

General Counsel

9.

Nissen Corporation
930 - 27th Avenue, S.W.
Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
c/o Robert J. Bevencur, Executive Vice President

10.

Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce
222 North Third Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

11.

17101

The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
1620 "I" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

20006

c/o C. Thomas Bendorf, Director, National Af

•

12.

The Ohio Manufacturers Association
100 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio.

43215

c/o Virginia D. Thrall, Assistant Director
Midwestern Office
13.

U.S. Small Business Administration
Washington, D.C.
c/o Maureen

c.

20416
Glcbes

100

rs

14.

Valve Manufacturers

Ass~~~

6845 Elm Street, Suite
I

22101

VA.

c/o William Hopf
There have been a substantia:
posals for tort reform.

==~~
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The best -·----::

mittee could find was prepared fo:- ::::= ==. -
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outlining the subjects generally "";=...::...:..
incorporation in a program as wel:.
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--In incorporating this paper in the -=-=--=========

emphasize again that it does not

fact the introductory language to -:::.::= :::=:::.:::=
out that it is merely a

discussio~ ~
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-
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a comparison of them.

The outline is as follows:
1.

---

Statute of limitations.

---:::::. =---;::..
change in the statu:::.:: ::::::: :..::=:::=..-.::..::..=...= --~-~

product related injury

product manufacturers

--

--- -----

t~~-

the product which has b;:=:. :::-= ::::::: :::::::::
manufacturer for 10 or : = _-==::= :::.. . . .::.
injury which will be
the

t~~

: : . --=
:::::-----~-

turer.
There is no desire

from

-----------

::..~.::..::::.2..1."1 t

s r i g h t to seek ::--:- -=::::..2-:::.::..:::=. :. __ ::=;:.:-;:::.::::.:-

caused injury.
balance

----

However, =:=:::::::: =..=-: .:::=

====

tween the ric;==:. -- _ ----'="--.=-...;;--=--- _

?00

::-=-=.:-:::::..::...:::e
-'=

for his injuries and the

of a

have some basis to determine the length of

s

potential liability.
Generally, the thrust of
under consideration by the associations
the statute of limitations begin to run
the manufacturer first sold the product, or
time that he was parted from the

•

ssess

and run for a specified period of years

6 to 12, thereafter.
2.

is

Product modification and alteration.

agreement that there should be a defense to a
liability action if the
a product which has been
other than the defendant.

resulted
ified or alte
There have

which manufactuers have

held liable

resulting from products

have been

altered subsequent to leaving the manufacturer'
and in some instances, altered to the po
the purpose for which the product was
Manufacturers should be able to rely on
a product will be used in substantial

the

it was manufactured and for the purpose
manufactured.
on the

In addition, they should be

t that eventual users of the product

reasonable maintenance of the product.
3.

State of the art defenses.

It is felt that a manu

should have a determination of whether or not a
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was

based upon

state of the art in existence at
Determination of

was

or

technical knowledge

acture of

itself subsequent to the
product.
liability of the manufacturer
available to him at

and not on the subsequent change in techno
or manufacturing techniques which
come into common use.

been

Neither should liabili

changes or modifications or
f

product or any similar
s made in

manufacture or in any such
ect to the injury on which
islation could be
technological knowledge,
st-accident repair or
1

and plan the j

's

the state of the art was at
was manufactured.
state of the art defense is most
val

in
1

a manu
if

so-called design defect cases.
te cost to benefit and

In
lance

turer must make ought not to become jury
is

is made in accord with

accepted practice.
4.

Reasonable limitations shou
upon

manufacturer's duty to
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truct

us

product and duty to warn of
not be required to foresee all
or

product might be put,
foresee the consequences
A manufacturer should be
which is reasonably safe for
provide instructions in the use
reasonably prudent and a person can
He should also be required to warn
might make the product unfit for
might not be readily recogni

a

Legislative proposals are
mitigate the manufacturer's
ing against almost unlimi

of
poss

be associated with the use

s

In many cases involving
of hazard and the absence

to warn
a

supported other elements of a
efforts have been made to

e

plaintiff should be required to prove

•

involved actually caused the
the plaintiff would have responded to
alternate actions, and that had

re

the warning lesser harm would have
5.

Punitive damages.

It is general

t

punitive damages have gone far
they were originally conceived, not
liability area, but in other areas
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tort

s

concept in

s

cases in which the
unconsc

, a penalty upon
ured party.

However

damages have become an
of

was

complaint whether or not

It

noted that

a

ts

against a corporate manufacturer the

0

punitive damages is borne by the

I

r

S

did not participate in the wrongful act or, more 1
st

the company's
are mass produced, the spectre
damages in a series of ac
is also present.
is generally agreed that
s.

of punitive

Some

desirable to el
1 actions.

However, o

can be developed

e

tive damages are
right to

11

cases.

ther:1. in mer
ts are those

ch

ir desirabili
upon
been

re
f

iability problem.
s

' upon which

are curren

is not a

under s

Some

as
a. Governmen

It has
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s

a products 1

lity action, evidence that a
e federal or state standards

complies
or

to des
create a de

a

or
the

t was not

This could take

form

or a rebuttable presump

In

s been suggested that evidence
standards are mandatory

ments from

a manufacturer cannot deviate

I
preclude liabil

if the product complies

~~i th

standards.

b.

Codification of the theory of strict liability.
Although a majority of states have adopted the
of strict liability in tort with respect to
the

which the theory is appl

widely

state to state.

It has been

sted that in those states

adopted a doctrine of strict liability, an
made to s

y set out the conditions whi

be necessary

the doctrine to be opposed,

def

terminology as "defec

and "unrea

dangerous."

c.

It
that the

s

demand in most claims no longer ha
to

a

sum \vhich would actual
or a relationship to

the case is

ly worth.
s

1

2 5

In

is

money judgments tend to

d

in the minds of the public and juries the value of a
particular personal injury case.
It has therefore been suggested that pleadings demanding relief in the form of unliquidated damages make a
prayer for general relief and, if necessary, state that
the amount claimed is within the jurisdictional limits
of the court.

d.

Reduction of unnecessary litigation through the elimination
of lien and subrogation rights of the employer and his
worker's compensation insurer.

Employers and their

compensation carriers have been active in the pursuit
of worker's compensation lines in subrogation.

These rights

have stirred much litigation with consequential legal
expenses.
e.

Regulation of contingent fees.

By regulating the contingent

fee, the take-home award of the injured party will be
increased and the cost of the court system reduced proportionately.

This regulation or limitation of the contingent fee

could be accomplished by placing the control of the size of
the contingent fee and the supervision of its use with the
proper legislative or judicial authority.

The contingent

fee scale should be one in which the fee rates decrease as
the recovery amount increases.
a reduction of the
f.

nurr~er

This should also result in

of nuisance cases filed.

Modification of the collateral source rule.

The collateral

source rule should be modified so as to render admissible
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all

evic~ence

service~;

of the nature and extent of all benefits

received (or to be received) by the claimant as

a result of his

injuries and damages.

Evidence

of the re-marriage of the surviving spouse should

be admissible in an action for wrongful death.

se

Such a

modification would allow the jury to be given all
about the case before them.

Duplicate recoveries in

personal injuries would be eliminated to a degree with
resulting cost savings in the reparations system.
9.

Limitation on pain and suffering awards.

The law

establishing the measure of damages which may be awarded
in tort liabili

litigation is largely court-made law

which provides only vague and general guidelines.

This

leaves the jury virtually unlimited discretion as to the
amount of damages to be awarded.

This unlimited discre

results in unfair variations in awards between different
claimants and has produced constantly increasing

s

damage awards which have contributed greatly to the
in which liability insurance costs have become
To keep total costs to a level which can be managed
insurance and which

socially acceptable, limitations

on awards are needed.

It

that the

a matter of simple justice
a liability

should re

the injured person for all economic losses resulting
an accident.
courts as pain

Non-economic loss, often referred to in
suffering, is almost impossible to

measure in dollars and cents.
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A strict statutory limi

f

sis

on pain and suffering awards by either a specific dollar
amount or some multiple of out-of-pocket damages should
result in cost savings.

Such a limitation to meet consti-

tutional requirements would have to be applied to the
total tort reparations system.
The IIAA National Board of State Directors, Executive Committee
and Commercial Lines Committee within the past month has adopted a
statement of position on the products liability insurance problem.
While time has not permitted official review by other producer organizations, the statement in the opinion of the representatives of the
Professional Agents Association and the National Brokers Association
generally represents the position of those organizations.

The state-

ment is as follows:
The Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.

(IIAA), repre-

senting over 34,000 independent insurance agencies throughout the
nation and 126,000 licensed independent agents, strongly believes that
the liability insurance mechanism has traditionally served American
business well in the products liability area and that every effort
should be made now so that businesses which produce safe products
can continue to procure essential products liability coverage.
In 1976 IIAA surveyed a significant percentage of its
numerous companies with whom its

merr~ers

rnerr~ership,

do business, and, outside

of the insurance industry, a multitude of other trade associations,
consumer organizations and governmental entities, to attempt to
ascertain the scope of the products liability problem.

The results

of those surveys uniformly have shown that there are severe dislocations
in the products liability insurance markets, manifested by spiralling
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..
premiums and unavailability of insurance in certain cases.

The

results show that two basic, related reasons for these dislocations
are the growing number of products liabili
ing uncertainty as to

lawsuits and the

son

standards will be impo

s

the manufacturer under the rapidly changing law governing lawsuits.
Our surveys have

it clear to us

to the products liability

a permanent so
is-

until the

will not

latures establish a law of products liability that will define

•

these

duties and standards are and restore a degree of rationali

and certainty so that underwriters can evaluate the risk that a
particular

manu~acturer

presents.

It is not our intention to discuss

specific statutes in this statement.

IIAA and its affiliated state

associations are actively studying these statutes and in some states
proposed laws are already being endorsed and presented to the legislatures.
It is also plain to us that similar problems are curren
experienced in all liability lines.
be drawn to cover these other lines.

Where feasible, statutes
Such a comprehensive

package will get the support of the many groups who are
affected by this problem.

•

IIAA and its affiliated as

work with interested parties to bring about meaningful reform
fair to all concerned.

The

slative effort must be emphasi

implementation should begin
liability laws can we ever
solutions to this prob
efforts to

The members of IIAA thus pledge

insurance
s

of

Only through revis

to attain permanent and

fting of 1

IIAA calls
level task

ly.

islation to

ir

s

try to establi

IIAA would assist in every way possible.
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first task force would be charged with ascertaining what the insurance
industry is currently doing to promote product safety, what additional
measures the industry should undertake in this area, and a timetable
for implementing these additional measures.

This task force might

want to seek the input of manufacturing groups currently working on
this problem.
The second task force should be charged with reviewing current
insurance industry practices in the underwriting, rating and claims
areas to find what changes can be made to help relieve the current
dislocations in the products liability insurance market.
IIAA further· invites representatives of all affected groups to
join together to study needed legislative reform.

To this end IIAA

invites the review and analysis of legislative proposals by the many
interested groups.

We hope that the recently released IIAA research

report, "A Survey of Specific Statutes That Have Been Proposed to
Deal With The Products Liability Problem", can serve as a basis for
this work, since the report incorporates the research of many of these
groups.
Regardless of our belief in and support for the foregoing as
the proper method toward a long-term solution, interim solutions for
those immediately affected must also be dealt with.

We call upon the

insurance industry to encourage the Insurance Commissioner of each.
state to appoint an "Indu

Advisory Committee" having agency, com-

pany and department representation.

This committee would review

specific complaints, and, with the assistance of the Insurance Department, would

1 in its power to resolve these complaints satisfactorily

Part of the committee's task would be to inform agents of where the
current opportunities are in the products liability market, because
this market is undergoing- changes continually.
210

Another important task

of the committee would be to encourage companies to continue to provide
coverage at affordable rates.

This proposal for an "Industry Advisory

Committee" is based on the recent experience in Connecticut where such
a voluntary committee has been successful in identifying the problem
areas and resolving the great majority of complaints.
In summary, we propose that all interested parties join together,
recognizing that solutions will not come easily.

Interim solutions

such as joint underwriting associations, reinsurance facilities or

•

assigned risk plans only serve to magnify the problems by curtailing
or destroying the voluntary market.

Real solutions lie in product

safety, enlightened insurance industry treatment of products liabil
and tort reform.

Interim insurance marketing solutions must be the

responsibility of insureds, agents and companies working together
to find markets while the real solutions take shape.
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Statement by
J. Creighton White, Vice President·
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies
Prepared for
The Joint Committee on Tort Liability
San Diego, California
July 18, 1977

•
Chairman Knox, members of the Committee:

My name is J. Creighton White.
Insurance Companies.

I am vice president of Fireman's Fund

I have nationwide responsibility for Commercial Automobile

and Liability Underwriting.

The remarks I make here today are directed at under-

writing practices in the product liability area.
Fireman's Fund is the seventh largest property-liability insurance group
in the country and a major market in California for all types of personal and
commercial property and liability coverages.
findings of this committee.

It has substantial interest in the

Last year Fireman's Fund wrote in excess of $10-

million in net identifiable premiums for product liability coverage.

About 15

per cent of that amount, or $1.5 million, was in California.
The policy of Fireman's Fund regarding product liability coverage is the
same as with other lines of insurance.

We want the business, but only when it is

adequately priced.

{more)
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-2The "adequate price" for product liability insurance has, however,
become very difficult to ascertain, because of new doctrines and procedures in the
tort liability system that inflated the legal scope of liability and spawned
enormous increases in litigation and jury verdicts.

The Chairman of the U.S.

Consumer Product Safety Commission recently stated that in California, product
liability awards have increased 800 per cent since 1965.

He also affirmed that

there is now an average of ten $100,000 product-related awards every week in the
state.

This activftY.has transformed the product liabil~rom a miscella-

neous, rather minor exposure to a most volatile, difficult one, and in a very
short period of time.
Naturally enough. then. product liability underwriters are taking close
look at applications for the coverage, and are charging premiums sufficient to
cover the loss potential and expenses.
Fireman's Fund underWTiters are directed to review very carefully those
businesses that seek our product liability coverage, to assess the probabilities
of large or catastrophic loss and to make necessary judgments relating to acceptability of the risk and pricing of the coverage.
The questions our underwriters are asking now give an indication of the
breadth of the product liability exposure.

* Is

For example:

product safety one of the primary considerations in new product

design and in redesign of products already being manufactured?
are

prod~ct

How thoroughly

designs tested?
(more)
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*

Are any of the components of the product made by subcontractors?

so, what are their qualifications and procedures?

If

Many product liability claims

stem from failure of a subcontractor's component.

* What
* Is
consumer?
loss.

is the quality control program, and how is it organized?

the product assembled at a factory, by the distributor, or by the

A failure by any to properly assemble the product could generate a

Therefore, if it's to be assembled outside the factory, are instructions

provided?

Are they in basic, easy-to-read language?

methods of assembly and use?

Do they point out safe

Do the instructions warn of inherent operating

dangers, no matter how obvious?

* Do
mation?

hazardous products bear a conspicuous warning and antidote infor-

Inadequate labels have given rise to product liability verdicts.

* Has

proposed advertising material been reviewed by engineering and

legal experts for technical accuracy?

Statements and illustrations used are, in

some instances, considered to be express warranties.

*

What stand-by procedures have been established to accomplish modifi-

cation or recall of the product if it shows potential for causing harm?

There

must be some means of locating purchasers if it becomes necessary to warn them
of a hazard and to correct the situation.

* Is

the manufacturer's attitude toward product liability concerns

positive or negative?

It's been our experience that safety programs of any type

are effective only when top management is committed.
(more)
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* What

is the financial standing of the manufacturing concern?

It

has also been our experience that, when businesses are compelled to make
economies, safety programs are among the first to feel the cut-backs.
Often applicants for product liability coverage are deficient in one
or more areas, but when they are willing to adhere to our loss control recommendations, the problems can be corrected.

Consumers are protected.

can assume the risk profitably, and thus develop capacity to

Underwr.iters

~ccommodate

the

always growing insurance needs of our society.

As I perceive the product liability market today, the situation is more
one of affordability of the coverage than of
sources ot product liability insurance in

availability.

~alitornia

There are ready

and across the country, pro-

vided the premiums coming in are sufficient to pay losses, expenses, and leave
a profit.
Manufacturers who don't keep the safety of consumers foremost, who put
shoddy, unsafe products into the stream of commerce will always have a tough time
getting product liability coverage, barring any government-imposed requirement to
the contrary.

After all, the insurance industry protects against the chance of

loss, not a certainty of loss.

This may be bad news for manufacturers of products

that cause a lot of avoidable harm, but I think it's good news for the general
public.

By exercising its prerogative of risk selection on the basis of loss

experience and loss potential, and without imposing abstract moral judgments, the
insurance industry plays a natural check-and-balance role in the country's
marketplace.
(more)
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-sAnother check-and-balance in the marketplace is the tort liability
system this committee is studying.

In my opinion the tort system, in matters

of product liability and other areas of liability as well, has recently become
more of a check than a balance.

Fireman's Fund has gone on record saying the

need for consumers to have ample recourse to any loss must be put back into

•

balance with what society can afford to pay and that balance can be achieved
only through reform of the tort system.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to share my views on
this subject.

I shall be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

you.

-v-
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Thank

EXHIBIT II
NATIONWIDE
1976 PRODUCT LIABILITY
ISO CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY
PRELIMINARY REPORT
7,791 records were analyzed with total payments of 60 million dollars:
Overall Averages
Average Payment
Per Claim

I

Bodily Injury only
Property Damage only
Total (all)

~a)

Average Payment
Per Incident

16,201

29,261

4,931

9,182

12,252

22,211

For each $1.00 of loss there was an additional 42¢ of expenses incurred

~ by the insurance company in defending the claim.

b)
c)

30¢ fqr every dollar of product liability loss involved claims wherein

~mployer was negligent to some degree.

Excluding claims on products which are consumed almost fmmediately, over
45% of all claims do not occur until more than six years subsequent to the
date o!-~J.L~~~c!ure •

..-.-

•
•

--.......,

d)

Employees injured during the course of employment received the highest
average payment for BI ($128,684), perhaps due to the severity of workplace incidents.

e)

The emplo~~he injured employee was negligent in half of the employee
injury cases. Related claim-payments -were two thirds of the payments
dollars. Preliminary analysis indicated over 30% of the total products
loss dollars go to employees of negligent employers •

f)

Food products seem to cause the largest number of claims, but in general
account for a comparative small portion to the total dollars paid.

g)

Over 92% of the cases didnot involve product modification. Those involving
some modification (8%) had significantly higher average payment involving
18% of total payment dollars.

h)

Only 5% of Bodily Injury and 9% of Property Damage Claims went all the way
to a court verdict.
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EXHIBIT fF2
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE PRODUCT LIABILITY EXPERIENCE REPORT
DECEMBER 1971 - DECEMBER 1974
BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE COMBINED
Policy
Year Ended*

Earned Premiums

Incurred Losses***

Loss Ratio****

Manually Rated Classes
12/31/71
12/31/72
12/31/73
12/31/74**

$ 31,661,275
41,624,498
49,560,259
44,748,085

$ (21' 110' 940)
(29,018,341)
(35,431,429)
(32,679,452)

66.7%
69.7
71.5
73.0

(a) Rated Classes, excluding large (a) rated cases
12/31/71
12/31/72
12/31/73
12/31/74**

*-

** *** -

**** SOURCE:
NOTE:

85,984,805
120,110,961
167,144,160
158,531,975

(97,574,782)
(96,906,925)
(256,947,974)
(199,568,635)

113.5%
80.7
153.7
125.9

The reason more recent data are not available is due to the desire to
report incurred losses as accurately as possible. When a loss is reported, a reserve is established based on the company's best estimate
of the ultimate settlement or award and related expenses. However,
as time passes, some of these claims will be paid and, based on further
information, reserves on others can be restated to more accurately reflect the potential loss. Thus, while incurred loss data for more recent years could be compiled, it would be subject to a greater degree
of uncertainity.
Preliminary data as of 12/1/76.
Incurred losses include loss adjustment expenses as well as amounts
paid to claimants and reserves on claims reported but not yet paid.
Loss adjustment expenses amount to about one-third of incurred losses.
They consist mainly of payments to defense attorneys, salaries for
claim adjusters, and overhead expenses.
Since underwriting expenses average around 25 percent of premium, a
loss ratio over
represents an underwriting loss.
Products Liability Insurance Study.

u.

S. Department of Commerce

(a) -Rated classes involve classifications which represent wide
differences in exposures within the class. Rates are arrived at by
underwriting judgement as applied to the particular insured. Most
manufacturers of industrial goods fall into this category.
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EXHIBIT #3

NET PREMIUM-TO-SURPLUS RATIO
<gxcluding Value of Life Insurance Subsidiaries)

10 largest writers
of miscellaneous
11ab111ty insurance

•

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1975

1.60

1.79

2.46

1.82

4.84

3.74

1.67

1.60

2.09

1.63

2.74

2.50

All
Industry

Source:

Best's Aggregates and Averages, Best's Insurance Reports, Best's
Insurance Securities Research Service, McKinsey & Co. calculations.

220

EXHIBIT #4
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE Cat:PANY

NATIONWIDE PRODUCTS LIABILITY EXPERIENCE!
(BI & PD COMBINED)
Calendar
Year

Net
Premium
Written

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

$3,327,526
2,092,245
3,161,312
4,752,610
9,645,132

$3,895,836
3,403,292
3,107,032
4,072,305
8,139,430

Calendar
Year

Loss
Ratio

Unallocated
Loss Adjustment
Expense
Ratio 4

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

101. n.
98.7
83.1
81.5
70.1

11.2'7.
10.9
9.1
9.0
7.1

N
N

r-'

Net
Premium
Earned

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Losses
Incurred
2
{Ex-IBNR)
$3,963,111
3,386,781
2,586,273
2,846,998
4,067,579

Total
Losses
Incurred

IBNR
NA
$ -26,276
-3,266
472,454
1,635,228

Statutory
Underwriting
ExpenseS
Ratio
39.0'7.
37.0
38.8
37.3
30.8

$3,963,111 3
3,360,505
2,583,007
3,319,452
5,702,807

Dividends
Ratio
-.3'7.
.9
-1.8
-.2
.6

Excluding Composite, Large "a" Rated, and Loss Rated Business.
Including Allocated Loss Adjustment Expense Incurred.
1972 Total Losses Incurred do not Include IBNR
Estimated as 11.0% of Total Loss Incurred; Factor promulgated by ISO
Based on Nationwide Ratios for All General Liability Sublines.

Statutory
Trade
Ratio
1Sl.6'7.
147.5
129.2
127.6
109.2

Statutory
Trade
Profit (Loss)
(2,010,251)
(1,616,564)
(907,253)
(1,123,956)
(748,828)

EXHIBIT 415
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY
PRODUCTS LIABILITY EXPERIENCE
POLICY YEAR DATA
VALUED AS OF MARCH 1977
CALIFORNIA - BI

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

•

Premium
Earned

Losses*
Incurred

Loss
Ratio

$

619,043
479,432
338,811
349,476
783,018

$451,238
374,044
235,998
250,963
313,922

72.90
78.02
69.67
71.81
40.09

$

369 '721
302,565
238,425
260,962
680,734

$266,306
113,454
235,591
181,747
112,386

72.03
37.50
98.81
69.65
16.51

$ 988,764
781,997
577,236
600,438
1,463,742

$717,544
487,498
471,589
432,710
426,308

72.57
62.34
81.71
72.07
29.13

CALIFORNIA - PD
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
CALIFORNIA - TOTAL
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

*Including paid allocated adjustment expense
NOTE:

Actuarial estimates indicate that, at a minimum (utilizing basic
limits loss development factors) the California Bodily Injury loss
ratio will ultimately develop to:
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

74.3
81.0
80.0
99.0
71.0
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CRASHWOH'l'HY VEHICLES:

AX 'rHE QUIET,

~~~~·-~oMP L~'I'E_L_RE:'{Q!-:U'I'~Q~.f.~.-~ RODU~TS. __!:-IABI L!_'I'~_LA~

•
A S'l'ATEMEN'l' BY
RICHARD A.

El:STEIN

PROFESSOR OF LAW
'1'0 'I'HE ,JOINT COMMI 'l'TEE ON TOR'l' LI ABI LI'rY
OF 'rBE CALIFORNIA LEGISLA'l'U RE
ON BEHALF OF 'fHE
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CRASHWOR'I'HY VEHICLES:
~!J'l'_ CO~PLE'l'E,

.

AX 'I'HE QUIE'l'

I

RE~!:!TION_!!!__PRQDUC:!;'§__ LIAB1LI:!:'£.._LA~

'l'lle past year has witnessed an extensive reexarn.i nation
u£

lhe entire law of products liability.

govt~rnment

The Un1ted States

has commissioned the Interagency Task Force to

undertake a comprehensive review of products liability lawi
mqny states have initiated their own legislative studies
of the area; and many private organizations, including the
American Insurance Association, have developed packages for
legislative reform.

In the current outburst of activity it

had always been taken for granted that there had been radical
and far-reaching changes in the substantive law since, to choose
a convenient date, the publication of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in 1965.
Lhe

With the fac!: of change safely recognized,

important issw:s \vere:

first, did the identifiable changes

on balance represent an improvement 1n the substantive law;
and second,

if they did not, was it possible to correct past

mistakes, be it by legislative or judicial action.
It therefore comes as somewhat of a surprise to learn
that there is no need to justify modern innovations in products
liability law simply because there are no such modern innovations which require justification.

In particular I refer to

the remarks of Mr. Craig Spangenberg, Chairman of the National
Affairs Committee of the Association of 'I'rial Lawyers of America.
In his remarks of April 27, 1977 before the United States Senate
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-2Subcommittee on Consumers of the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, he spoke on behalf of A.T.L.A.
as follows:
"there has been little change in the
doctrines of liability in the last ten .
years, and almost none in the last
five.
The requirement of privity was
abolished, in suits against manufacturers, well before 1965."

•

And earlier in his remarks he drew his

ines~apable

con-

elusion:
"We see no evidence that. products
marketed today are of better design,
better material, safer and more durable.
On the contrary, as consumers we see
products that are flimsier, lighter,
cheaper in material and design, and
overwhelmingly plastic.
If the safety
index in improving, it does not show up
in the statistics.
The primary cause of
the product liability problem is defective products sold by the manufacturers
and retailers."
I think that the above statements are wrong and misleading and give a totally false impression of the revolution in the substantive law of products liability which
continues to run its course to this very day .

•

The nub of the matter is not the safety indexes and
it is not the privity requirement.

The safety indexes to

which Mr. Spangenberg refers speak only of the safety of
the product in use; and products which are improperly used
wi 11 cause damage even if they are in no way defective.
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To learn whether the current level of accidents is attributable to bad products, to bad use, or to some other cause
requires a detailed study of each individual incident.
Many thoughtful commentators have noted that the expansion
of plaintiff's rights in products liability actions could
have adverse effects upon safety by removing the incentives
that product users have for their own safety and well-being.
The proposition is of course empirical and may yet be
false.

It may of course be true as well.

Only a detailed

study of individual occurrences, and not casual citation
of aggregate phenomena, will help answer

th~s

question.

The privity doctrine too is not the source of the current uneasiness.

The traditional privity requirement held

{subject to some exceptions) that only an immediate purchaser could sue an immediate seller for damages caused by
a defective product.
enormous.

The impact of the rule was of course

One of its implicdtions was that no person who

purchased a d,mgerous product through a retailer could have
any recourse against its manufacturer.

Another was that no

worker could even sue a manufacturer or retailer who dealt
with his employer.

I have no desire to defend the privity

doctrine 1n all its rigor and do not think that this is
the time to explore all of the confused reasons that led
19th century courts to embrace it in the first instance.
Suffice it to say Uwt the rejection of the privity
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-4limitation brings into the legal system a large number of
cases which would have been excluded under the old regime.
The crucial question is not whether privity should be abolished; rather the question is how ought the claims brought
into the system be treated once the privity limitation is
overcome.

I shall comment on the normative questions during

the course of thi's paper but first wish to show the magnitude
of the changes in products liability law that occurred long
after the abolition of privity.

The major reason why there

are more "defective" products on the market is because the
term "defect" in the past 10 years has, as a term of art, taken
on such a broad meaning that it is possible today at least to
argue that almost any product is defective no matter how well
it is constructed.
The burden of this enterprise is in one sense too vast
for this paper, as the law of products liability covers all
manner of products, from ordinary canned foods to the most
complex industrial machinery.

Changes in it have been every-

where.
Rather than discussing the movement in products liability law in the abstract, I think it is better to fasten
attention upon a single doctrine with a single line of
products, while noting at the outset the story told here
could be reproduced in other connections as well.

I there-

fore choose to concentrate my attention upon an important
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-5line of cases -- those concerned with the liability of
manufacturers for injuries allegedly caused by "uncrashworthy vehicles."

In essence the plaintiff in the typical

uncrashworthiness case alleges that there is some defect
in the defendant's automobile -- in most cases a defect
in design-- which either caused or enhanced the plaintiff's
injuries when the plaintiff was involved in a collision.
In many cases the plaintiff alleges that the car did not
protect him as it should have; in others, usually involving bystanders, that it enhanced the injuries that were
otherwise inflicted.

At one level the plaintiff's cause

of action looks familiar.

There is the usual split in the

jurisdictions over whether the plaintiff's cause of action,
when recognized, is based upon a theory of negligence or a
theory of strict liability, and the usual uncertanity as
to what difference, if any, the distinction makes.

There

are also the familiar references to causation, negligence,
defect and design, coupled with a discussion of the possible
defenses that are open to the defendant.

In one sense it

could be argued that these crashworthiness cases do not
mark any real departure from the traditional common law
principles of liability.

But a closer look at the evolution

of the doctrine gives a very different story.
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-6For our purposes it is only necessary to go back as
far as 1958, to the California case of Hatch v. Ford Motor
Company,

163 Cal. App.

2d 393,329 P.2d 695 (1958).

The

plaintiff was a boy, aged six, who lost his eye when he
ran into a pointed ornament whose tip extended beyond the
front end of the radiator grill.

A local statute made it

unlawful for the defendant to construct the car in this particular manner.

The plaintiff brought his action for damages

under two theories.

His first claim asserted that the de fen-

dant was in breach of its common law duty of ordinary care;
his second was predicated specifically upon a breach of the
regulatory statute.

The trial court dismissed both of plain-

tiff's causes of action as a matter of law;
affirmed on appeal.
action,

•

its decision was

With respect to the common law negligence

the Appellate Court held that the defendant did not

owe any general duty of care to the public at large and to
the plaintiff in particular t:o "prevent the type of injury
sustained by the plaintiff when said automobile was at rest,
properly parked on the highway", and it noted as well that
plaintiff's attorney furnished the court with no cases which
supported the recognition of a duty that would make the jury
"an arbiter" on the question of design.
The plaintiff's cause of action on the statute 'also
failed.

Even though it was clear that the statute did

place an affirmative duty upon the defendant, the court

230

-7barred recovery because the injury was not of the type which
the statute inlended to prevent.

The statute, it s

d,

"was designed to deere ase the hazard
created by the driving of said automobile upon the highways where its
negligent operation might cause it to
come in contact with others. It was
not designed to protect those who, solely
by reason of their own act or omission,
might come in contact with it as an inert
object lawfully standing unattended on
the highway. 11
In essence the opinion rested upon the assertion that
the defendant was under

~

duty to guard the plaintiff

against this sort of contigency where the moving force,
literally understood, was not the defendant {who was "an
inert object" etc.) but the plaintiff.

The central point

that here emerges is that the duty limitation remained a
significant issue 1n all products liability cases even
after the passing of the privity limitation.

How many

duties, of what description and against what contingencies,

The !_!atch case then represents the early and complete
rejection of any crashwor

vehicle doctrine.

rehe next

point at which to assess the legal situation is 1965, for
in that year the American Law Institute published the
Restatement

(Second) of Torts, which contained

a new section 402A announcing a general principle uf strict
liabili

of the sellers of products "in a defective con-
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dition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property."

The section also expressly rejected

two defenses which might have otherwise been available in
a products liability case.

First it confirmed the death

of the privity limitation by treating as immaterial the
absence of a direct contractual relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant.

Second it accepted (largely

in advance of the cases which it was supposed to be restating) the doctrine of strict liability by treating as
ineffective the defense that the defendant had "exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product."
It is clear that the strict liability provisions
of §402A marked an important doctrinal shift from the
first Restatement of 1934, which contained no provision
analogous to §402A.

A closer ceading of the comments to

§402A and of the other sections in its chapter (entitled
quaintly "'rhe Liability of Persons Supplying ChattE:ls for
the Use of Others.") suggest in retrospect however that
the

s were not as vast as some might suppose.

'!'he

central concept within the Restatement provision is that
of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."

The ex-

pression itself, apart from its obvious clumsiness, is
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-9not se 1 f-de fining, particuL..trly as it applies to al] proucts of whatever kind and descr

t

'it'Je get a senst:;

what it intended only by exa1nining

e cases which the

draftsman thought fell within its ambit.
stan

s are prosaic,

The specific in-

largely limited to

The Res ta tc:~ment talks of whiskey "with
fusel oi

, or tobacco "contai

standable
its

rous amounts of

something like marijuana",

or bad butter "contaminated with fish oil."
preoccupati

and drugs.

The original

is with food and drugs in §402A and is undern that the earlier versions of §402A confined

ration first to food and drugs, and then in a later

draft

tD

products "intended for intimate body use."

The ex-

\

f the provision to cover all products was probably

pa s

made

I

po1nt

know of no good contemporary discussion of the

the assumption that the defects to be embraced by
r provisions were to be analogized to those pre-

s y

men t.i orw .

In e feet the only class of defects clearly

red by the section is the class of construction defects, as
l l d,
l

washe

which

as when the plaintiff is injured by a

roper

funct icJns because, say, it lacked a

or a seal on a crucial pa r of the equipment.

rpreted the s

of the section turns out

st indeed.
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There is yet another sense in which §402A of the
Restatement represents only a limited change in the subs tan t i ve law.

Before the adoption of the strict liability

standard in products liability cases, the courts in virtually all jurisdictions allowed the plaintiff, where the
defect in the product was established, to hurdle the

I

negligence barrier with the aid of the presumption of res
ipsa loquitur.

The effect of res ipsa was to place the

defendant under a very heavy burden to establish that he
had acted with the requisite due care.

'rhe use of the

presumption was very useful in these cases because it helped eliminate from trial the troublesome question of just
how

m~ch

inspection and care should be given to prevent

accidents.

Questions of degree admit of no precise answer,

and their elimination in this context not only served (properly in my opinion)

to expand liability, but also to

simplify the adjudication or settlement of product related
claims.
The attention given to §402A should not, however, be
allowed to obscure the fact that there were many design
defect cases on the books at the time of the Restatement.
Nor should it obscure the fact thc1t other provisions of the

Restatement (sections 395 to 398) were directed towards the
application of negLigence theories to cases of bad desHJn.
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Yet here it is necessary to emphasize yet again how far
removed from the crashworthy vehicle cases were the typical
design negligence cases first decided only around the time
of the publication of the Restatement.
The typical design case involved a product sold by
the defendant which when used in the y_ery

~~

in which the

defendant had intended it to be used was of insufficient
strength or safety to bear the stresses and strains associated with such use.
ta

ons

To illustrate the nature of the limi-

liability, it is useful to

recount some of

the cases in which the plaintiff recovered under this type
of theory.

Thus a rather "heavy set" woman was allowed to

recover when she fell out of an S-shaped chrome chair des gned
chai
h

the defendants, when the center of gravity of the
w

unusually far forward, because the chair did not

the s

li ty needed for its intended function.

___________ : __.§..:=:J::le~~!:e!> 167 Cal. App. 2d 306,334 P.2d 225
959).

kewlse the plaintiff recovered when his car ex-

p oded when he turned the key
h d

in the ignition; gas fumes

scaped from the tank to be trapped in the trunk com-

part_men t where they were set off
the

nition was turned on.

8 F. 2 d
to re
t's

<t

spark cnoated when

13l:~!_Zsi::~ in ~-__!'~rd ~ot~E-.~~-..:,

7 3 9 (5th C i r. 1961).

The plaintiff was allowed

ver as well when the towing attachment on the defertrva r- broke as the car 1.vas being towed in the man-
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ner specified by the defendant, when the towed automobile
was released from t:he tow truck striking another automobile.
e~lmo_~~-~aratono,

28 Mich. App. 217, 184 N.W. 2d 367 (1970)

The plaintiff was also entitled to recover when the aluminum ladder which he used collapsed under his weight.
v. Sears,

•

Roebuck_~~~,

Lifritz

472 S.W.2d 28 (197l)i and when a ramp

upon which his trailer was being driven collapsed under its
weight.

Berry v. Fruehauf 'f'rail!:::E Co:...L 371 Mich. 428, 124 N.W 2d

290 (1963).

Indeed the very California case which first

adopted the rule of strict products liability, Greenman v.
Yuba

Pow~,

59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697

(1962), was a design defect case of this sort because it involved a situation in which the claimed defect was the existence of "inadequate set screws" to hold wood in place
during the normal use of a lathe of defendant's manufacture.
All of these cases (whether decided on a neqligence
or a

stri~t

liability theory)

can easily be fit into a con-

ception of defect slightly broader than that embrace,] by
the original text of Restatement 402A, but still emjnently
workable and eminently defensible:

the defendant will be

responsible for whatever forces are released in the use and
operation of his product where these forces are the ones to
which the product must be subjected as a matter of course

2 36

with ordinary use.
is wh

lt question in these cases
which are not,

uses are regarded as ordinary
stion which

a

The diff

should not be answered

the manufacturer's subjec
the way in wh
of

s

per

reference to

unexpressed intentions
shou

the

be used.

The

public limitations upon product use and
may be tricky (how heavy a load can be lifted

w

lf-inch rope) but the cases already referred to
icate that it

no means an unmanageable task.

'l'raynor, the

t of strict products liabil-

As Just

said in the course of his opinion:

in
mach

i

ence on the market, however, was the

's

that it would safely do the jobs for which

ntat
was

"Implicit

ilL

It is that implicit representation which needs
, both to create liability and to limit it.

ict l

ili

de

negl
t~aken

doctrines of the second Restate-

in combination, a far c
1

0

f

Ra

from the

in uncrashworthy vehicle

the state of the law in 1967
le

1960's

nee cases of the ear

well illustra-

Nader and Joseph Page:

.;,__-.e;;;.___..-..-.----c.;...___;;;:;.;,_,_._..;.;;.;.....,...__;;;_..:....:.:..;:_.__;;_.~--==-=----_:...-s_ ,

5 5 c a l i f • L • Rev •

It should come as no surprise that the
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-14authors were in favor of imposing a general duty upon manufacturers to make crashworthy vehicles, but even with their
own intellectual orientation they recognized that the current
body of case law gave no support whatsoever for the recognition of that duty.

The then most recent case on the

issue, Evans v. General Motors,

359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966)

had just held that "a manufacturer is not under the duty to
make his automobile accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must
he render the vehicle "more" safe where the danger to be
avoided is obvious to all."

It then dismissed the plaintiff's

cause of action based upon the theory that the defendant's
Chevrolet station wagon was negligently designed in that it
had an X-frame without side protection for the decedent who
had been killed when another vehicle collided with the left
side of the wagon.

Nader and Page attack the logic of the

Evans opinion, arguing that the decision simply misstated
the essential problem by insisting upon talking of a duty to
design a "fool-proof" car.

'I'hcy argued that the duty con-

templated only required the defendant to proceed with reason-

I
able care to design a car which was reasonably safe.
The Nader article also recognized the limitations upon
the plaintiff's new cause of

act~ion.

"Even if the defendant's

conduct was substandard, however, each new plaintiff must prove
that the conduct caused the harm; the defendant has in each case
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-15the defenses of contributory fault, assumption of risk and
abnormal use."

(p.

663)

The uncrashworthy vehicle cases came out of the law
reviews and into the courts with the now famous dec is ion
of Larsen v. General Motors CO:r:£., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.
1968).

Doctrinally speaking, the point in question was

whether the involvement of an automobile in a road crash was
an "intended use" of the vehicle.

The court held that it

should be so treated because of the foreseeable certainty
of involvement in collisions, however unwanted they might
be.

The Evans case, decided but two years before was dis-

cussed and rejected, as the court held that "general negligence priciples" should be extended to crashworthy vehicle
cases.
The endorsement of a yeneral ngeligence standard leaves
o

course a great deal of uncertainty as to what is expectof any given defendant in any particular case, for that

s andard opens still wider the intractible question of just
how much precaution must be taken against what sorts of harms.
I

other areas of admitted negl iqence liability, routine

running down cases fur example, the courts have sought with
but mixed success to find more particular standards to
counteract the vagueness of the general negligence rule,
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-16and to that end they have turned to both statutes and custom
as sources of the standard of care.
With respect to automobiles there are today fairly exhaustive statutory standards under the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

It is moreover quite

proper to base private causes of action upon these standards
because the standards themselves give explicit direction to
vehicle manufacturers as to what must be done with their
products.

The question of how much, always the bane of the

negligence inquiry, is in effect hammered out \in an administrative hearing where the pros and cons of certain safety
precautions can be resolved with inputs from all interested
p

es.

The results of these deliberations may not always

be wise, but for the purposes of the tort system this is quite
immaterial, as a manufacturer faced with definite and clear
standards knows that he deviates from them only at his peril.
Th

manufacturer can, where statutes are the sole standard of

care, use the statute as a "safe harbor" against tortious
liability, while remaining free to better his product still
further to meet market demands for additional safety.
The argument just made presupposes that the statutes
involved form the sole standard of care, such that compliance with the statutory norm carries with it, at least in
crashworthy vehicle cases, insul

24-0

from the threat of
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tortious liability.

This is not, however, the position

under the current law.

With reference to motor vehicles,

the 1966 National Safety Act makes it quite clear that
compliance with the statutory requirements is not a complete defense, by providing:

"Compliance with a Federal

motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchap-

•

ter does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law."

(Section l08C)

This provision is crucial for unders·tanding the
doctrinal developments in the crashworthy vehicle cases,
for it raises the question of what supplementary standards should determine, not whether an automobile is safe
in ordinary use, but whether is it safe enough to withAt this point the

stand severe impacts from without.

inquiry turns to the relationship between custom and
state of the art on the one hand, and the "general costbenefit" formula on the other.

In dealing with this issue,

Larsen treated the state of the art as the standard

•

against which to measure the suitability of the defendant's vehicle.

The court did not, however, attempt to

resolve one major ambiguity that lurked within its basic
rule.

One possible approach was to treat the state of the

art as analogous to the usual role of custom in medical
malpractice cases, suc:h that any defendant who complied
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with that state of the art, as measured by current practice, escaped all liability, even if the standard was in
time superseded.

'l'his approach would mean it would not

be possible, at least in the context of private damage
actions, to challenge the practices of an

ent~re

industry

(or even that of a substantial proportion of it) on the
grounds that the standards themselves were lax under some
aggressive application of the reasonable care test.
th~

state of

The

art becomes the safe harbor, although one

less definite than that offered by statute.
The courts in most jurisdictions, including California, have taken, however,

the alternative position that

the custom within the industry is s i.mply evidence on the
question of reasonable care, but that the ultimate issue
of negligence is one to be decided by the jury in each

indiv dual case on the full totality of the evidence.
here

rely upon the famous opinion of Learned Hand ln
'I'.

lAnd see

J.

for my criticism of the 'I'. ,J. Hooper rule Epstein,
ce:
Re s .

And

J .

87

The Case for Contract,
·------

(l 976 ) . ]

1 Am. Bar. Found.

The problem with the T.

proach quite simply is that it

leav€~s

~~c!_~ca!

J._}!~ope!:

ap-

us with no standards

whatsoever by which any given sort of product should be
j

ed.

All agree that the design of any product requires

the trade-off of, among other things, price, quality, ease
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of operation, safety and durability.
of infinite resources on product safe
finite chance of product danger.

Even the expenditure
leaves open the

The objective of absolute

safety only can be met, not by taking reasonable precautions
but by stopping straight away the manufacture of all products.
Repetition of the general negligence formula used in Larsen
only tells us what we already know, that the balance needs
to be drawn.

It does not tell us where or how.

In effect

the law on the subject is reduced to little more than a
laundry list, as the jury is told to take into account:
the utility of the product to the user and the public as a
whole, the likelihood that it will cause injury, the
seriousness of the injury caused, the availability of substitutes, the cost of eliminating the defects without impairing the essential worth of the product or without making it too expensive, the ability of the user to avoid the
damage, the user's knowledge of the product or the knowledge of the product held by the public at large given the
obvious product features, and the ability to spread the loss
through liability insurance.

(See for this list Wade, On the
r Products, 44 Miss. L.J.,

837-838

(1973).

The application of this formula cannot be done by any
court or any jury which conscientiously tries to measure
with precision each of these factors mentioned in the
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formula.
mounted,

And, even if the measurement hurdles are surthere is nothi

about

how the different factors s
reach ,our answer.

s

s

which tells us

be combined in order to

Juries

be instructed about this

formula and may do their best to come in with proper verdicts.

But we should never confuse the fact of a decision

th the disciplined applicat
definite calculus.

this elaborate and in-

The former is always present; the lat-

ter is never possible.

The state

the art is never the

perfect standard, but the reasonable care standard in all
its sophistication is no standard at all.
This formal elaboration of the design defect standard
shows how different design

def~ct

cases are from construction

defect cases, once we move away
pre tat

of intended use.

the restricted inter-

In the construction defect area

the movement towards strict liability was fully supportable
rgely on the ground it reduced the defect question to a
rison between the product
specifications.

the manufacturer•s own

'The question

of how much care, how much

quality control, how large a

lure rate, etc. never were

answerable, and the strict liabi

s

Lik

with the need to answer

dispensed

se ·in the design defect

cases involving product failure in ordinary use, the strict
liabili

standard could p

in the sense that

r

the manufacturer should be held to
ance

which it was desi

standard of perform-

The rig should support its

-21own weight, and the car should not explode when the key is
turned in the ignition.
The acceptance of the crashworthiness doctrine in automobile cases, however, now makes it quite impossible to
decide cases simply by squaring the product against the
standard.

Now it becomes first necessary, without adequate

guidelines, to decide what the standard is.

Here, moreover,

it is not simply enough to prove that the product as
designed is defective or unsafe.

The acceptance of a

general negligence theory in design defect cases places a
far greater pressure on the general causation requirements
of the law of torts, for it is simply not possible to
relate the particular injuries which the plaintiff suffered
to the design defects of the defendant•s product unless we
have an exact knowledge, not only of the forces to which the
product is subjected, but also of the extent to which those
forces could have been resisted if the car had been of an
acceptable design.

Thus if it is decided for example that

a gas tank is too close to the exterior of an automobile,
the question of liability requires us to know exactly where
it should be placed and to know as well how it would have
resisted the blow if it had been put into that position.
Indeed it requires nDre, as we must know if the relocation
of other parts of the car would have created some alternative source of danger given the external pressures applied.

') ,, 1:

-22Even if there is some sense that the j

knows what is

wrong, there is little hope that there
able agreement as to what is

ll be any reason-

How much protection

is enough protection?
We have said enough to show that des
involving crashworthiness

ckly

air as the plaintiff hires an

on a surrealistic
rt who will testify to

the jury that some additional sa
at which

defect cases

ght have preve

precaution (but only
or reduced

have been well worth its cost.

accident)

Then given the wide

degree of discretion that is left to j

s in cases of

s type, it will be up to the jury to decide whether the

marginal costs of the additional precaution are greater or
less than the marginal benefits to be gained.
often be no effort to provide the J

There will

with an actual al-

ternative design, or to show that the design in question
11 not create more problems

it solves.

the defendant may be lucky enough to get a

In some cases
rected verdict

after a long and expensive trial, but in most the decision
wi 11

n one for the jury.
A brief glance at the reported cases helps illustrate

the extent to which liabili
de feet theories.

ssi

lS

under design

Thus cases have held that the jury is to

decide whether or not an automobile gas tank could have
been more safely positioned to avoi

24
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resulted when the car was struck from the left rear by
another vehicle going somewhere between 65 and 85 miles
per hour.

Self v. General Motors , 42 Cal. App. 3d l, 116

Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).

Or whether the hood of an auto-

mobile should be designed to enable the driver to see under
it in the event that it opened, because left unlatched,
while the car was in motion.
525 P.2d 125 (1974).

Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457,

Or whether the front posts of a Volks-

wagen minibus were sufficiently strong to withstand the force
of a head on collision with another vehicle.
Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of
P.2d 286 (1974).

Ame~ica,

Seattle-First

11 Wash. App. 929, 525

Or whether the divider which separates

the headlight from the turn light should have been designed
with a softer material in order to protect another motorist
who was run down by a care less driver.
Company, 546 F.2d. 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976)

~~~en_'!.__·

Ford Motor

Or whether the doors

of an automobile should be designed to make sure that an
unlocked door does not fall open when struck in the side by
another automobile.

!:!elia_v. Ford Motor

Comp~E2''

534 F.2d

795 (8th Cir. 1976).
There are of course some cases in which the defendant is able to pcevall in spite of a jury verdict against
him.

Thus the plaintiff's jury verdict was overturned on

appeal when the court decided that it was improper to

~n

struct the jury that a Volkswagen bus should have the same
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-24resistance against a head on collision as a Ford sedan with
an eight cylinder engine in front of the passenger compartment.

Driesonstok v. Volkswasen, 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir.

1974).

Likewise in a recent California case the appellate

court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the
claimed design defect was the hinging of the rear doors in
a

four door car from the rear panel.

Kuxli v. Ford Motor

Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d ll5, ____Cal. Rptr. ____ (l977).
If these cases show the extremes to which cases can go
before they are taken from the jury (and then only upon apal)1 then it seems clear that there is far too much play
in the joints in crashworthiness cases.

The source of the

problem to my mind lies in the fact that the reasonable care
formula,

always the soft-underbelly of the tort law, cannot

possibly deal with the range of problems that are raised
once the common law duties are extended as they were in
Larsen.

The formula creates the illusion of precision where

there is but unprincipled chaos.

Complete acceptance of

statutory and state of the art standards is needed if the
tort system is to remain workable.
The discussion as it has taken place has assumed that
all crashworthiness cases should be decided upon a negligence theory.

One of the important developments which has

n place after Larsen has been to treat the crashworthiness cases under the strict liability principles, either
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-25contained in or patterned upon §402A of the Restatement.
California, in the important case of
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1151, 104 Cal

Cron~.~!._Q_!~,

Rptr. 433 (1972),

now treats crashworthiness cases under such a strict
liability standard, indeed one tougher than that contained
in the Restatement itself.
It is important to note the consequences that do and
do not follow from the shift to strict liability.
~irs!,

whatever its precise doctrinal nuances, the standard

involved becomes somewhat higher than it would otherwise be
under a negligence standard.

One possible interpretation of

the shift is to say that the strict liability standard
means that in all cases the defendant should be charged
with knowledge of the dangerous condition of the product
in question, whether or not he could have discovered it
with reasonable care, and to then ask whether the defendant
with such knowledge would have taken some precaution against
it.

Wade, supra.

Another way to look at the shift' is to

treat it as demanding the best possible set of design choices,
not those which might have been reasonably suited under the eire urns tances.
Second, no matter which of these (or indeed any other)
1nterpretation is adopted of a strict liability requirement
in design defect cases, it is still clear that they
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-26involve issues that sharply separate them from the construction defect cases.

Restatement §402A treats as

immaterial the degree of care involved in the preparation
of the product; yet there is no doubt that the costs of
discovering and implementing a new design technology must
remain relevant under a strict liability test for design
defects no matter how it is phrased.

Strict liability

still demands the same tradeoffs as negligence, for the
only way that such tradeoffs can be eliminated is to hold
a manufacturer of an automobile responsible for all harms
to passengers in that vehicle no matter how they were
caused.

This the courts are still not prepared to do.

And short of this position the movement to strict liability
only helps shift the balance in each case further to the
plain

ff's side.
Third, the shift to a st

ct liability standard has

nabled the California Supreme Court to circumvent at least
tradi

onal rules of evidence.

The California Civil Code

provides that the introduction of a product improvement or
modification after any accident shall not be admissible to
establish the negl

of the defendant.

In Ault v .

. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148,

International Harvester Co.,. 13

1 7 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974) the court held that where the
pl

ntiff's action was based upon a theory of strict
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liability the evidentiary bar did not apply,
because the defendant 1 s wrong was not based upon "negligence or culpable conduct."

The decision is criticized

in the American Insurance Association Product Liability
Package, and here I wish to note only that the ability
to introduce all manner of subsequent design changes in

•

products liability actions since the Ault decision has served
to increase the probabilities of success for the plaintiff,
especially in those areas in which rapid technological advance has made improvement the rule instead of the exception.
Fourth, the characterization of design defect cases
as strict liability actions has severely undercut the affirmative defenses based upon plaintiff's wrongful conduct
which were once available to defendants in products liability
actions.

Recall for the moment the observations of Nader

and Page that the defendant in the crashworthiness cases
had recourse to the defenses of abnormaL use, assumption
of risk and contributory negligence.

•

Today all of these

defenses have been sharply cut back .
The more recent cases make it quite clear that as the
defendant can design a product which will guard a 'Plaintiff
against most forms of misuse, only those types of misuse
which are completely unforeseeable will constitute a defense.
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Contributory negligence too has been completely eliminated in design defect actions, the argument being that as
negligence has no place in the plaintiff's case, so too it
has no place in the defense to it.

The hostility towards

contributory negligence has a strong appeal in the case of
contaminated foods and drugs which were the main preoccupation of the Second Restatement.

It makes no sense to

ask a consumer to finger bits of tuna fish in order to
search for slivers of tin.

But with design defect cases

the possible types of contributory negligence consist of
more than searching for a latent defect in a product which
the defendant represented as fit for human consumption.
Now the conduct of the plaintiff which is ignored is the
runn

of a red light or speeding upon the open highway,

[see Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) .]
All of these would be sufficient to hold the driver of an
automobile accountable for the injuries of third parties
even if his car contained some defect of design or conruct

should make him responsible for his own

, and

injuries as well.

The expansion of the prima facie case does

not invite, as has been suggested, the contraction of available defenses.

To the contrary it suggests the greater need

to preserve these defenses lest the defendant's conduct be
treated in law alone as the only source of plaintiff's in:jury.
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-29Innocent plaintiffs should be protected, but all plaintiffs
should not be regarded as innocent as a matter of law.
Assumption of risk has also been transformed, so that
today it is applicable only where a plaintiff, with a specific
knowledge of the defect and of the type of harm to which he
is exposed, proceeds to encounter the risk unreasonably and

•

voluntarily.

Whereas the obligation of the defendant is

cast in terms of reasonable foresight, with most anything
which does happen being foreseeable,

the obligation of the

plaintiff is cast in much narrower terms.

See Luque v. Mclean,

8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).

If

the defendant in Dreisonstok cannot get a directed verdict on
assumption of risk where the plaintiff-passenger knows that
there is no engine in front of the passenger compartment, then
it is clear too that this defense too has been eroded nearly
to the vanishing point.
The sum and substance of these observations should now
be clear.

•

The law of products liability has been the subject

of constant transformation, both in California and elsewhere,
and at no time has that change been greater than in the last
ten years.

The crashworthiness cases provide but one illus-

tration that typifies that pattern across the law of products
liability.

Before l9b8 there was no duty to make a car which

could protect its occupants against collision.

Then there was

a duty to take reasonable care to prevent the occupants
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-30against such harm.

Subsequently the negligence was, at least

in California, replaced by some form of a strict liability
standard.

And finally the affirmative defenses based upon

either state of the art or the plaintiff's conduct have
ci ther been restricted or eliminated, to the point where
the defendant in the normal case will have left to him the
denial of the defect or of its ca"§al relationship to the
injury.

The story told with uncrashworthy vehicles could

be told with machine tools or with commercial drugs (think
only of the swine flu cases and recognize that not a
single cause of action rests upon the ground that the vaccines
themselves were poorly prepared), or with many other consumer or industrial products.

Everywhere the tempo of

change has been rapid and everywhere the changes have worked
in favor of recovery.

With some of those changes there can

I think be little quarrel, as the law of the late so•s was
restrictive.

Other of the changes, however, are not

welcome, and we must resist the tendency to convert the
tort system into a system of universal entitlement for
injured parties.
glV

s

I have already expressed some of my mis-

th the more recent shifts in the rules governing

des gn liabi

ty.

There is still time to argue the merits

the substantive shifts once it is conceded by all that the
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shifts have indeed taken place.

It is, however, simply

wrong to say that the "primary cause of the product liability
problem is defective products • .

"

They may be part of

the problem, but so too are defective laws .

•

* * *
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APPENDIX VIII

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-- A POSITION PAPER PRESENTED.TO THE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON TORT

REFO~l

ON JULY 18, 1977

BY WYLIE A. AITKEN, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSN.

Conservatively estimated, each year ordinary consumer products
produce 20 million injuries, 30,000 deaths, 110,000 disabilities and

•

disfigurements and the 5.5 billion economic losses.

That is the

"crisis" in products liability to the extent there is a "crisis,"
not the artificial one promoted by the liability insurance industry.
Th(~re

are not a million or a half million la\vsuits on file in

products liability; the only authoritative study I have seen indicates
50,000.

I can tell you that statistically in the State of California

that the products liability cases are less than one percent of the
civil filings that we have here in California.
The Federal Interagency Task Force appointed by the Commerce
Department

to find and seek out the products liability crisis --

reported that there, in fact, was no crisis.

What they did discover

though was the reason we have products liability cases is because
people are making unsafe products and people are getting injured ny
unsafe products.

And they further told us that the cost of products

liability insurance accounts for less than one percent of the percentage of sales of t.he companies involved.

We submit, is that too

much of a price to pay for safe products; too much of a price to pay
to see that people who are injured by unsafe products are compensated?
I think we've seen and heard enough in California about stories
about the little farmer who is going to lose his farm unless you vote
a certain way on a proposition or the doctors that are going to leave
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August 10, 1977

alifornia Legislature
oint Committee on
Tort Liability
Committee Members:
I'm Gerald Cashion, President of Meyer Machinery Company of Los Angel
and Redwood City, and representing the California P

•

duct Liability

Task Force, which is an unincorporated organized association.

We are

group of wholesalers and distributors in the State of California work
together for a common purpose; that of the enactment of legislat
the State level to provide equitable product liability laws.

How many businesses and employers are directly affected here in
ornia?

a

In the 1972 census there were approximately 24 000 who e

and distributors in California that generated 28.9 billion dollars wo
of sales per year and employed approximately 269,000 employees.

In our opinion, product liability has reached a cr sis in this state
small business.

The proliferation of product liability suits poses

o

the industry, and especially the small businessman, a threat uneq
that faced by the medical profession.
of range for many small businesses.
operate without insurance.

It is driving insurance
It is forcing some companies to

It is eroding the foundation of the

industrial system and the common market place.

It i

, as a result,

pumping millions of dollars worth of inflation into the economy annuall
in the form of higher prices for goods manufactured that must be paid
by the consumer.
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Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort
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ot only the wholesaler distributors,
a ing increase for costs in products

Fred Nag estad
Clarence Bush
Jim Hamilton
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Testimony at Products Liability hearing in San Diego 7/18/77
by Dick Romney
JULY 19, 1977

CHAIRMAN KNOX

I have been asked to reply to your letter of June 6th.
I am Dick Romney - President of Pac-Power, a Walnut Creek-Woodland
California utility equipment firm.
We sell, service, and overhaul hydraulic aerial manlifts and mobile
derrick cranes; perform dielectric, stability, structural testing;
and certify.
as a mobile

We are licensed by the State Industrial Commission
c~ane

test and certification agency- No. A-97.

Our

customers are public utility companines, municipal governments,
State of California, Federal agencies, and some export accounts.
We currently employ 27 people.

Since inception - one liablity

action - $900 loss.
We represent two of the leading midwestern lift and crane
manufacturers.
Our company was founded in 1973 - I've been in the ut
field thirty-three years - my partner seventeen years.
Assemblyman Knox asked that I answer three specific questions.

The

first is:
1 - How much have your premiums increased since 1974?'
In July of 1973, with a major carrier we paid about $3,200
for $500,000 primary and $1,000,000 umbrella policy-products
and completed operations.
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100%

coverage with
for
tmas 1976 -

Yes, we have to date approached vigorously 42 carriers;
received coverage from none.

We have utilized a small-

town agent, a broker specializing in construction and
industrial liability coverage. and three of the
brokerage houses in San Francisco.

We have been repeatedly

commended by insurance comapanies for our well run and

•

documented business.

Some three weeks ago, after detailed

plant inspection, documentation, and testing review with
the carrier and brokers group, we received this quote:
$100,000 primary coverage only - with $10,000 deductible
per occurance - written on a claims-made basis for
in premium.

This is 37 times manual rate.

One occurance - and we would be out $73,000

This means we

would be spending 73 cents to protect 27 cents - this makes
no sense to me.
We have been repeatedly turned down by

or carriers

write firms in other states doing the same job,
the same lines we do - and with realistic premiums costs.
Salt Lake City, Denver, Portland, San Antonio are all
The Colorado company in June saved some $19,000 in
costs due to legislative change; Texas, $11,000 with
commission help.
Twelve western utility equipment dealers, we are one of them,
are so concerned a captive insurance company is
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Statement of Berry L. Griffln, Jr.
before the Joint Committee on Tort
Li.abili ty.

San Diego. California
July 18, 1977
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of

1 will not rehash the many reasons

we

What 1 will do is propose solutions to
problem so that manufacturers can
price.

Fi.rstly, manufacturers should be producing ,..,..,f'Vi •• ,.. 11...
defect.

Industry is spending many mUlions of dollars

~oducts

are safe.

Industry must continue these

agencies are carefully watching industry's

efforts~

efforts~

Secondly, much more must be done to educate
the tort syatem..-to let. the public know what happens
the price of any product purchased

the insurance industry must get a
They must
mium.s

•

d~velop

mesn1ngful statistics which

now demand.

lastly, the .kn.?.ri cen Tort System, enccnpassj
is a

cmcept wh:i.ch sbould be

retained~

The

cept of l i ab:ll i ty, the lncreased use of the courts to
tm

and i.nefftd ency of the system evidance
the system.

We support responsible, meaningful legislation
the basic

ca~~es

of our tort system problemft

277

make sure

s

for

on--We
both as to

as

the

before an

of Wlnnar.'s Costa--We

]

the court costs and

suits

:l

so

Payment of Awards--We can

in

to

the
you

I

any

280

